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ABSTRACT 
 The purpose of this study is to correlate agenda-setting effects of the press to newspaper 
coverage of public university desegregations in the southern United States in the early 1960s. 
Front-page news and editorial page content from the Atlanta Constitution, the Athens Banner-
Herald and the Red & Black newspapers were analyzed for the 1961 desegregation of the 
University of Georgia. The Clarion-Ledger, the Oxford Eagle and The Mississippian newspapers 
were analyzed for the 1962 desegregation of the University of Mississippi. The Birmingham 
News, the Tuscaloosa News and the Crimson White newspapers were analyzed for the 1963 
desegregation of the University of Alabama. Judgments of the favorability or legitimacy with 
which news articles and editorial content portrayed desegregations were made by the researcher 
and the content coded as being pro-desegregation, anti-desegregation, neutral or unclear. In 
Georgia and Alabama, less tumultuous university desegregations correlate to newspaper 
coverage that was mostly neutral or pro-desegregation. In Mississippi, a highly volatile 
university desegregation correlates to newspaper coverage that was often anti-desegregation in 
the news section and always anti-desegregation in the editorial pages, except in the case of The 
Mississippian. Historical analysis of the desegregations provides an additional framework for 
interpreting results. 
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CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION 
The American Civil Rights Movement, whose first phase is commonly held to have 
begun with Brown v. Board of Education in 1954 and ended around 1968 as the Black Power 
movement took precedence over peaceful, nonviolent protests associated with the earlier phase, 
is a defining era in recent American history. Its history, machinations and consequences have 
given rise to an entire academic discipline – African American studies – and also contributed to 
other academic disciplines, including Southern studies, journalism and communications studies. 
 Mississippi was a battleground during the Civil Rights Movement. At the time, 
Mississippi’s economy was one based largely on agriculture, with 91.5 percent of Mississippians 
living in rural areas, according to the 1960 Census.1 Though whites were not an overwhelming 
majority of the state’s population in the 20th century – 58 percent in 19602 – they were the state’s 
primary business and landowners. They controlled the economy both through that ownership and 
through racial segregation that presented blacks with fewer opportunities for prosperity – schools 
and education were second-rate compared to those for white pupils3 with black teachers earning 
less;4 certain jobs could only be held by whites; voting rights were denied to blacks; persistent 
pseudo-science supported white claims of black mental inferiority. Draconian Jim Crow laws 
that lingered after the Civil War ensured that cultural and economic segregation based on race 
                                                
1 U.S. Census Bureau. “United States Census 1960.” 1960. 
http://www.census.gov/prod/www/abs/decennial/1960.html 
2 Ibid. 
3 Susan Weill, In a Madhouse’s Din: Civil Rights Coverage by Mississippi’s Daily Press, 1948 – 1968 (Westport, 
CT: Praeger Publishers, 2002), p.x. 
4 U.S. Department of the Interior. “Racial Desegregation in Public Education in the United States: Theme Study,” 
2000. p.64. 
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persisted for the benefit of the white-controlled economy. This was also true for all states in the 
American South, though the particulars of Jim Crow varied from place to place, from rural to 
urban, from Deep South toward the North. 
  The established order that had persisted for most of the South’s post-Civil War history 
began to show cracks in its façade when black World War II veterans returned home from abroad 
and were disappointed to be denied the rights they felt they had earned abroad, their citizenship 
vetted in a foreign war.5 Those feelings began to be expressed by more and more blacks, 
exclusive of veteran status. Ethnic minorities in the United States had generally been very 
supportive of America’s role in the war and returned with a commitment to securing a better 
future for themselves, informed in part by the egalitarian rhetoric of the wartime atmosphere.6  
Expectations for access and equality, in the context of this inquiry, extended to 
educational opportunities. The U.S. Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of Education of 
Topeka, Kansas – a decision which applied to five different cases, including a case in Virginia 
about an overpopulated, segregated black school – stated the “segregation of white and colored 
children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is 
greater when it has the sanction of the law; for the policy of separating the races is usually 
interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the Negro group.”7 
 The Supreme Court’s ruling was flouted in much of the South. In the mid-20th century in 
the South, there was among many whites a lingering resentment toward the federal government, 
based not on dissatisfaction with taxation rates or other such minutiae that form the basis of 
contemporary perceptions of the federal government by state citizens, but rather on hundred-
year-old cultural legend – that of a powerful North interfering with an agrarian South, razing its 
                                                
5 Weill, p.21-22. 
6 “Racial Desegregation in Public Education in the United States: Theme Study,” p.70. 
7 Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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cities and dismantling its economy of slave labor. The Civil War was not as distant a memory 
then as it is today, with children of Confederate soldiers still living, among them then-
Mississippi Governor Ross Barnett.8 
That anti-federal bent of the whites of Mississippi received new life during 1962 when 
James Meredith became the first black student to successfully and openly integrate a public all-
white university in Mississippi. In the run-up to his integration of the University of Mississippi, 
various legal decisions consistently held that he had the right as a citizen of Mississippi who met 
the academic criteria to be admitted to Ole Miss. Though the most likely endgame of Governor 
Barnett’s attempts to delay Meredith’s admission was clear to legal observers as well as Barnett, 
most of the twenty daily newspapers in Mississippi at that time misreported the facts of the legal 
decisions, of Meredith’s history and of Barnett’s power. Additionally, editorial columnists in 
these newspapers perpetuated the misinformation – both intentionally and unintentionally – 
through their written opinions that overwhelmingly supported Barnett and Jim Crow laws 
separating the races. 
A chain of pathologies may be diagnosed to illustrate the interrelation of the threats 
perceived by white powerholders in Mississippi. At its core, the anti-federalism expressed during 
this time was a symptom of racism. Fears that the balance of power would be upset by federal 
intervention point back to racism – whites were willing to share power with one another, but not 
with blacks. If the primary motive for whites to resist was economic in nature, it was to keep 
blacks from earning a larger share. Even in a capitalist economy where survival of no one was 
guaranteed, blacks were specifically targeted first. There are also suggestions that a 
psychological fear of sexual domination of white women by empowered black men accounted 
                                                
8 Raymond Arsenault, Freedom Riders: 1961 and the Struggle for Racial Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2006) p.626. 
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for some measure of the resistance. This interpretation also points to racism as the primary 
motive for resistance. 
Because all roads lead back to racism, it is important to qualify what is meant by 
“racism,” which the Oxford English Dictionary defines as:  
The belief that all members of each race possess characteristics, abilities, or qualities 
specific to that race, especially so as to distinguish it as inferior or superior to another 
race or races. Hence: prejudice and antagonism towards people of other races, esp. those 
felt to be a threat to one's cultural or racial integrity or economic well-being; the 
expression of such prejudice in words or actions. Also occasionally in extended use, with 
reference to people of other nationalities.9 
Sociologist Ian Law gives further definition to the distinguishing characteristics of racism 
in news coverage, presuming the concept of race exists: 
1. The signification of race characteristics to identify a collectivity 
2. The attribution of such a group with negative biological or cultural characteristics 
3. The designation of boundaries to specify inclusion and exclusion 
4. Variation in form in that it may be a relatively coherent theory or a loose 
assembly of images and explanations 
5. Its practical adequacy; in that it successfully “makes sense” of the world for those 
who articulate it. Its pleasures; “an unearned easy feeling of superiority and the 
facile cementing of group identity on the fragile basis of arbitrary antipathy.10 
Though Meredith successfully integrated the University of Mississippi on October 1, 
1962, the occasion was marred by violent riots in which a journalist and a bystander were killed, 
                                                
9 Oxford English Dictionary: “racism”. http://www.oed.com 
10 Ian Law, Race In the News, (Hampshire, England: Palgrave, 2002) p.vi. 
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and in which the chaos was quelled by a force of federal U.S. marshals and federalized National 
Guardsmen at the behest of President Kennedy. 
  The Civil Rights era in Mississippi is known for its violence. Lynchings, fire bombings 
and intimidation were perhaps more numerous and systematic in Mississippi than in any other 
state. The chaotic integration of the University of Mississippi was additional instance of white 
resistance to equal rights of blacks. Of course, other Southern states experienced violence and 
opposition to integration during the Civil Rights Movement. The University of Georgia was 
integrated in 1961 with no great civil unrest. The University of Alabama, in a state as agrarian 
and thoroughly segregated as Mississippi, was integrated in 1963. Though there was some 
unrest, it did not spiral out of control as it at the University of Mississippi. 
  The particulars of each state’s road toward integration varies, but one thing they all have 
in common is that desegregation of the flagship public university in Georgia (University of 
Georgia), Mississippi (University of Mississippi) and Alabama (University of Alabama) all took 
place during a common era. The University of Georgia was integrated after Kennedy’s election 
and shortly before he was inaugurated, while the imprint of the Kennedy Administration was 
clearly left on the latter two desegregations. Proportionally, more people read the newspapers 
daily then than now.11 Newspapers were also the dominant news media at the time, outstripping 
radio and television in numbers of consumers.12 Editorials contributed to the public discourse – 
set the agenda – about integrations at the sacred cows of the University of Georgia, the 
University of Mississippi and University of Alabama, places where the white elite of each state 
was educated. The existence of a correlation between editorial content – either pro-, anti- or 
neutral-integration – and the magnitude of resistance to integration should be documented. 
                                                
11 Choire Sicha, “A Graphic History of Newspaper Circulation Over the Last Two Decades.” 2009, October 26. The 
Awl. http://www.theawl.com/2009/10/a-graphic-history-of-newspaper-circulation-over-the-last-two-decades 
12 Charlotte Grimes, “Debate: Civil Rights and the Press,” Journalism Studies, Volume 6, Number 1. (2005): p.120. 
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In Alabama, Governor George Wallace had a tight grip on security with assistance from 
papers promulgating his message to stay away. Georgia was probably more progressive 
culturally, since Governor Ernest Vandiver did not do much to ensure security, but only 
momentary unrest happened and was quickly quashed. Mississippi was a confluence of 
misinformation, reckless leadership and cultural opposition to black advancement. 
In the researcher’s view, there is a disconnect between the historic record and the cause 
for civil unrest. That is, even given the limitations placed on blacks during the Jim Crow era, the 
integration of a university was not reason enough for such a tense environment and feelings of 
inevitable conflict. Legal precedent provided for the desegregation of the universities, so it 
should have been a simple matter. But the egos of governors involved created obstacles, fed by 
cultural distrust of the federal government. Newspapers, as independent sources of information, 
should have fulfilled a role as a neutral informer on the front pages, while saving opinion for the 
editorial pages. In two of the three desegregation cases, this was the usually the case, however, in 
another, the large newspaper of record (Clarion-Ledger) acted as a mouthpiece of the 
government, with the local paper falling into line. 
 The purpose of this research is to analyze the content of newspapers that would have 
naturally had an interest in covering the desegregations of the three universities. By analyzing in-
state newspapers’ coverage and comparing them with the known outcomes of the desegregations 
at each university – orderly or tumultuous – some conclusions might be reached about the 
agenda-setting potential of newspapers. Neutral, objective news coverage paired with editorials 
that asked the readers to abstain from disorderly conduct might correlate to desegregations that 
were free of riots, violence and injuries. News coverage that is unbalanced and presents rumor 
and conjecture as fact, combined with editorials that painted the federal government as an 
7 
intruder in states’ rights could correlate to social unrest that boiled over into riots. The specific 
research questions are: 1. Do the newspapers analyzed engage in agenda-setting via their 
coverage of the desegregations? 2. If so, are the agenda-setting effects measurable, either via a 
direct causal relationship or via correlation to the how the university desegregations were carried 
out? 
Following this section, the literature review discusses prior research on the issue of 
agenda-setting in the media and the historical contexts of the desegregations of the flagship 
public university in each of the three states. Special depth is provided for the extensive legal 
wrangling and state government resistance in the case of the desegregation of the University of 
Mississippi both because it is the home university of the researcher and plentiful resources on the 
subject were available, as well as because more prior research has been done on this instance of 
integration than similar instances at other universities. The methodology section explains how 
the researcher carried out the content analysis and coded his results. The researcher’s quantitative 
and qualitative analyses of newspapers during month-long survey periods are also included in the 
results section. The findings of the study are summarized and explained in the conclusions 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER TWO – LITERATURE REVIEW 
Agenda-Setting Theory 
 Agenda-setting theory is the mass media theory paradigm that informs this analysis. 
According to Wayne Wanta, agenda setting is a form of social learning, one in which – in a mass 
media context – the news media give salience cues to the public, alerting them to the issues to 
which they should pay attention. The public, through repeated reception of those salience cues, 
believes that issues receiving more coverage are more important than issues receiving less 
coverage. The messages are internalized and an individual’s cognition is affected, though 
research has yet to produce an explanation for exactly how this takes place and why a certain 
opinion on a subject is formed. It is influenced by many factors, including the education level of 
the individual, the social demographic into which he fits, his motivations to learn more about the 
issue, his past behavior patterns and so on.13 
 An antecedent to the current agenda-setting theory was laid out by influential journalist 
and media critic Walter Lippmann in his 1922 tome, Public Opinion. He addressed the 
metaphysical question of why individuals respond the way they do to certain stimuli. Lippmann 
said the real environment in which people exist is too complex and too fleeting for people to 
make rigorous observations, thus people create a simpler model in their minds and respond to 
those “pictures in their heads.” Bernard C. Cohen in 1963 developed the idea further, laying the 
basis for the 1972 publication that defined agenda-setting. Cohen wrote, “[The press] may not be 
                                                
13 Wayne Wanta, The Public and the National Agenda: How People Learn About Important Issues, (Mahwah, NJ: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2007) p.2. 
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successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in 
telling its readers what to think about.”14 Building upon Cohen’s writing, the agenda-setting 
theory was first laid out as such by Donald Shaw and Maxwell McCombs in 1972 when they 
analyzed the 1968 U.S. presidential campaign. Their research was the first empirical 
confirmation of Cohen’s idea that the press measurably influences people’s opinions.15 
 McCombs and Shaw’s research was conducted through interviews of 100 voters during 
the 1968 presidential race between Richard Nixon, Hubert Humphrey and George Wallace. In it, 
they sought to determine how issue salience – that is, the relative importance of particular issues 
such as race, monetary policy, the environment, education, and so forth, as they are defined and 
given coverage in the media – compared to the amount of coverage those issues were given in 
the media at the time.16 McCombs further clarifies the definition of issues in later writing: 
In the abstract, the items that define the agenda are objects. The objects are the things on 
which the attention of the media and the public are focused. Each of these objects has 
numerous attributes, those characteristics and traits that describe the object…Which 
aspects of an issue are covered in the news – and the relative emphasis on these various 
aspects of an issue – makes a considerable difference in how people view that issue.17 
McCombs and Shaw’s original 1968 research showed: 
The correlation between the major item emphasis on the main campaign issues carried by 
the media and voters’ independent judgments of what were the important issues was 
+.967. In short, the data suggest a very strong relationship between the emphasis placed 
                                                
14 Stanley J. Baran & Dennis K. Davis, Mass Communications Theory: Foundations, Ferment and Future, 
(Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth, 2006). p.316. 
15 Ibid, p.317. 
16 Ibid, p.317. 
17 Maxwell McCombs, Setting the Agenda: The Mass Media and Public Opinion, (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 
2004) p.5. 
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on different campaign issues by the media…and the judgments of voters as to the 
salience and importance of various campaign topics.18 
Lippmann’s original statement about human cognitive limitations was made in the 
context of politics, and as the theory of agenda-setting has been further refined, politics and 
societal trends relating to politics have remained the focus of agenda-setting. McCombs and 
Shaw stated that political reality is shaped by what news editors, reporters and broadcasters 
chose to communicate to the public. Also important to the agenda-setting function of the press is 
the amount of coverage given to an issue – either in inches of newsprint or minutes of airtime.19 
A potential theoretical weakness, at least in early agenda-setting research, was pointed out by 
McCombs in the initial 1972 publication. Their results implied there was a causal relationship in 
the direction of news coverage of an issue influencing how people perceived issue salience. 
McCombs acknowledged that, instead, it could simply be reflective of the news media being 
adept at providing their audience with the coverage they want, which could be demonstrated by 
the very high correlation.20 McCombs wrote three decades later in 2004 that more than 300 
agenda-setting studies worldwide had documented agenda-setting function of the media, with a 
majority demonstrating correlations of +.50 or better, thus fortifying his position that news media 
influence opinion.21 It would be an extraordinary coincidence for news media to be so accurately 
tuned to the desires of their audiences, especially given the decline of newspaper subscriptions in 
recent decades, which would demonstrate the converse. 
Shanto Iynegar and Donald Kinder added the concept of “priming” – the idea that media 
coverage is a zero-sum game, giving coverage to some issues at the expense of other issues – to 
                                                
18 Baran, p.317. 
19 Ibid, p.317. 
20 Ibid, p.318. 
21 Maxwell McCombs, “The Agenda-Setting Role of the Mass Media in the Shaping of Public Opinion,” 
http://www.infoamerica.org/documentos_pdf/mccombs01.pdf (2003) p.3. 
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the agenda-setting model. Iyengar and Kinder demonstrated a causal relationship between media 
coverage and the salience people assign to issues by measuring test subjects’ responses to edited 
and unedited broadcasts. Subjects exposed to the more dramatically edited broadcasts assigned 
the issues greater salience for the national interest. Iyengar and Kinder found, too, that 
dramatically presented television news stories undermined that medium’s agenda-setting power 
by focusing too much on individuals or specific situations rather than on the societal implications 
for an issue.22 That observation by Iyengar and Kinder assumes that the television news 
broadcasters were following the social responsibility theory of the press, and desired for their 
audiences to be well informed and not just to be gripped enough by drama to stay tuned in 
through the advertisements. In the context of this examination of agenda-setting in newspapers 
during university desegregations, the predilection of some newspapers to frame news and 
editorials in a dramatic fashion focused on individuals – Mississippi governor Ross Barnett 
versus instigator/NAACP pawn James Meredith and the intrusive Kennedy brothers, as it was 
framed by The Clarion-Ledger – and the effects it has on setting the agenda of the readership is 
one of the possibilities that is explored. The other possibility is that news and editorial coverage 
in other newspapers was framed within a larger societal context – Charlayne Hunter and 
Hamilton Holmes are justly seeking to matriculate at the University of Georgia, and society will 
not crumble because of it, as it was framed by The Atlanta Constitution – and had different 
agenda-setting effects on those readerships. A desire for social responsibility, as defined by that 
theory of the press, on the parts of the newspapers is not assumed in the cases examined in this 
study. 
Iyengar and Kinder also found that the position of a story affected the power of its 
agenda-setting potential. Lead stories in television news had greater agenda-setting effects than 
                                                
22 Baran, p.318. 
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stories that came later in a broadcast.23 The researcher, for lack of direct evidence cited in other 
research, assumes this property of television news agenda-setting is transitive for prints news, as 
well. That is, front-page news has a greater agenda-setting potential than news found on 
subsequent pages in a news section. As television viewers believed the salience for society was 
greater for stories presented earlier in the broadcast, so, too, did readers believe front-page news 
held greater salience than news on later pages. McCombs did address in general terms the 
salience cues that newspapers employ, saying that headline size and story placement on page one 
are indicative of the emphasis the newspaper staff wish to place on the content.24 
McCombs also added to Lippmann’s original thesis by stating that the basic 
psychological tendency of humans to reduce overwhelming information about the environment 
into more easily digestible bits is not just a habit, but an innate biological need for orientation. 
The need for orientation is defined by “relevance” of an issue to an individual and “uncertainty” 
of the individual about the outcome.25 How closely an individual monitors news coverage of an 
issue depends on the combination of levels of relevance an uncertainty. For instance, an issue 
with high relevance, but about which the outcome is relatively certain to the individual, will 
result in low monitoring of the issue in the news by that individual. On the other hand, high 
relevance and high uncertainty will result in a great need for orientation for the individual.26 It is 
the postulation of the researcher that in the early 1960s in the southern United States, the 
potential for mortal blows being dealt to unconstitutional Jim Crow segregation by federal courts 
caused the cases profiled in this study to be regarded with high relevance by the populations of 
those states. A public university desegregation would be a gradual, but also immutable, step 
                                                
23 Ibid, p.318. 
24 McCombs, p.1. 
25 Ibid, p.9. 
26 Ibid, p.10. 
13 
toward ending segregation in its totality, thus eventually affecting everyone. It is also the 
researcher’s postulation that uncertainty was also high. In each case, the governors of each state 
made, at the least, overtures toward resisting federal court rulings that mandated public 
university desegregation. In the case of Mississippi, the resistance was taken further. The 
maneuvers by the governors – and in some instances, the news and editorial coverage of the 
litigation provided by newspapers – contributed to atmospheres of uncertainty, despite the clarity 
of federal court orders and the mandate of federal courts defined by the U.S. Constitution that 
ultimately settled all the cases. 
The findings of McCombs and Shaw in 1972 and further research in the field led to 
McCombs categorizing agenda-setting research into four phases: 
1. Initial examination of the agenda-setting process. 
2. Exploration of the contingent conditions that enhance or inhibit agenda-setting 
effects. 
3. Exploration of candidate images and political interest as alternative agendas. 
4. Research into factors and parties affecting the press’ agenda.27 
Of the above four categories this analysis fits with the (second category) because this 
study explores the then-current social and historical contexts surrounding each university 
desegregation, as well as the vigor or neutrality with which newspapers reported and commented 
upon the desegregations. This analysis also contributes to the study of agenda-setting influences 
of the news media vis-à-vis the civil rights issue, which was begun by Winter and Eyal in their 
1981 study. In this subset of agenda-setting research, analysis is concerned with the issue of the 
                                                
27 Wanta, p.3. 
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presentation of civil rights issues in the media and not on the individuals’ level of concern with 
civil rights.28 
Overview of university segregation prior to 1960s 
 The complexity and thoroughness with which social segregation of blacks and whites was 
carried out in the South is hard to understate. Every aspect of public life was subject to division 
along racial lines. Education and religious worship took place separately. Businesses catered to 
one racial clientele or another. Certain jobs were usually filled a person of appropriate ethnicity – 
doctors and lawyers, for instance, were mostly white – with rare exceptions. Segregation 
extended even to the rules of the road. If two cars, one driven by a white and one by a black, 
came to an intersection simultaneously, the white person had the right-of-way. Whites held the 
higher social and economic positions in the divided society, with blacks occupying a subservient 
positions. Jim Crow was clearly present at the South’s public universities, like in all other social 
institutions. 
 University-level higher education was a rarity for most of American society, and even 
more rare for black Americans for most of the country’s history. The application of black 
Americans to and their eventual desegregation of public universities is often framed in popular 
culture as a heroic civil rights struggle. That is a part of the narrative, to be sure, but the 
underlying motivations for desegregation that led to dramatic episodes such as the University of 
Mississippi’s violent desegregation and the tense stand of George Wallace at the University of 
Alabama began a century earlier with the establishment of federal land-grant colleges in 1862. 
Because slavery was still a reality in 1862, higher education of blacks was not considered in the 
establishment of these state schools. That was corrected in 1890 with new regulations that 
                                                
28 Ibid, p.11. 
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required black students benefit from federal funds appropriated to states for higher education.29 
In the South, this manifested itself as the establishment of black colleges, which, like their 
whites-only land-grand counterparts provided students with agriculture-centric education. 
Predictably these black colleges had inferior facilities and funding compared to the white 
colleges but the system of duplicated curriculums persisted through most of the 20th century until 
the post-World War II era when the dearth of programs at the 1890-established schools became 
intolerable to black students seeking to become educated in a wide variety of disciplines that 
would be of increasing importance in a modernizing, post-agricultural economy.30 Black students 
who desired to become white-collar professionals with thorough humanities training were left 
with few choices. One choice was to seek education out-of-state at higher cost to themselves, 
though it was a law that their home states had to make up the difference in tuition costs under 
“separate but equal” legislation. This route was less than desirable because there was no 
guarantee of acceptance to their desired program, nor of the state deeming the out-of-state 
program to be acceptably different from a cheaper in-state program at a black college, thus 
resulting in a denial of funds. Another obvious drawback is that an out-of-state university usually 
meant they were a greater distance from home, causing additional hardships for students. The 
alternative, then, was to apply to an in-state program at a white university. Such an applicant was 
most often subject to instant disregard in many states, and court battles ensued. The drawbacks 
of application to white universities are apparent in a case such as James Meredith’s – enormous 
waves were made in Mississippi society and two bystanders died as a result, with Meredith 
requiring constant federal protection during his tenure at Ole Miss. A less obvious drawback is 
the waste of time and resources on the part of the applicant. Even after the densest period of 
                                                
29 Peter Wallenstein, ed., Higher Education and the Civil Rights Movement: White Supremacy, Black Southerners, 
and College Campuses, (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2008), p.5. 
30 Ibid, p.5. 
16 
university desegregations in the 1960s, most blacks continued to attend historically black 
colleges and universities given the individual nature of desegregations – in Mississippi, it was 
not until 1965 that the state stopped opposing each black applicant’s attempts to enter a white 
university on an individual basis – and the lack of outreach on the part of white universities to 
potential black students.31 
 Jim Crow-era laws and customs provided a high barrier to entry for the black applicant, 
though it is interesting to note that non-black minorities received a break on the issue of state 
university enrollment. Chinese Mississippians were allowed to enroll in white universities 
starting in the 1930s. The University of Mississippi, one of the universities included in this 
analysis, had its first student of Chinese descent in 1960. Mississippi State College (now 
Mississippi State University) integrated its first Chinese student even earlier in 1945.32 In fact, by 
the time of the Brown v. Board of Education ruling in 1954, only Alabama, Mississippi, Georgia, 
Florida and South Carolina had not yet begun to enroll black students in non-black public 
institutions of higher learning.33 Those five lingering states of university segregation in 1954 
may be contrasted with the seventeen states that maintained total educational segregation 
between 1890 and 1935.34 These twelve states that desegregated their institutions of higher 
learning, though, did not necessarily do so voluntarily. A series of court cases beginning in 
Maryland in 1935 began to chip away at the legal foundations for “separate but equal” university 
education for blacks in the South. United States Supreme Court decisions followed that made 
integrated higher education compulsory for every state in the country. 
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 A 1938 Missouri case involving a black man, Lloyd Gaines, applying for law school in 
the state resulted in a ruling that any state that offers a law school education to whites could not 
require that black students go out of state to obtain the same training. The state covering the cost 
of out-of-state tuition for black students who wished to receive education in a degree not offered 
at an in-state black college was common practice at the time, and in fact, figures into the 
desegregation of the University of Georgia. A series of 1950 cases brought about by district 
attorneys in Oklahoma (McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education) and Texas 
(Sweatt v. Painter) reinforced the 1938 Missouri ruling by banning segregation of black students 
in classrooms and libraries once they had already been admitted to a university.35 The landmark 
rulings in Brown v. Board of Education in 1954 and 1955 eliminated the legal argument of 
“separate but equal” under which state governments could institute segregation at public 
elementary and secondary schools. This case also set the stage for university desegregation by 
allowing challenges to the next logical step of desegregation of public learning institutions – 
state universities.36 
 Though the three states in this analysis chose not to be proactive about university 
desegregation in the face of an ever-shrinking legal basis for segregation, other states reacted to 
the writing on the wall by loosening their rules for black acceptance to state universities. West 
Virginia, Delaware and Arkansas began to admit some black applicants as graduate students 
absent court orders to do so. These states, though, only made concessions in lock-step with court 
rulings, not broadening their enrollment policies further than courts had mandated in other cases. 
West Virginia began greater acceptance of blacks to some programs in response to the 1938 
Gaines case. Delaware and Arkansas’s new policies were a response to a 1948 Oklahoma case. 
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All three of these states also limited black applicants to certain programs, and did not practice 
broad-based acceptance of black applicants until later court action set precedence for 
nondiscriminatory admission. By 1955, all six states of the border South – Delaware, Maryland, 
West Virginia, Kentucky, Missouri and Oklahoma – had begun to admit black undergraduates 
regardless of majors.37 
 It is worth providing some additional context for the resistance of Georgia, Mississippi 
and Alabama in the form of other southern universities that admitted black undergraduates and 
graduate students with much less fanfare than the three involved in this analysis: 
• University of Tennessee: Theotis Robinson, Jr.; Charles Edgar Blair – admitted 
in January 1961. 
 • Clemson University: Harvey Gantt – admitted January 1961. 
 • University of Florida: integrated in September 1962. 
 • Texas A&M: a black graduate student and undergraduate were admitted in June 
1963. 
 • Louisiana State University: black undergraduates were admitted under court 
order to the Baton Rouge campus June 1964.38 
• Mississippi State University: Richard E. Holmes – admitted July 1965. 
The University of Georgia 
Among the three universities profiled, the University of Georgia in Athens, Georgia, was 
the first to desegregate on January 11, 1961. The university was at the time, and remains today, 
the largest public university in the University System of Georgia, and, like the University of 
Mississippi and the University of Alabama, may be described as the flagship school its 
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respective state. Located 70 miles from Atlanta, the largest and capital city of Georgia, Athens in 
1961 was a small city of 33,500 people.39 Its location near a major metropolitan center, and the 
relatively near influence of urbane Atlanta likely provided a moderating influence on the level of 
upheaval that was experienced during the desegregation of the University of Georgia. Because 
Atlanta had a large black professional class – in contrast to more agrarian Mississippi and 
Alabama – and the state newspaper of record, The Atlanta Constitution, was editorially firmly on 
the side of desegregation of the university, the idea of desegregation was more palatable. 
Horace T. Ward – The First Attempt 
 The 1961 matriculation of black students Charlayne Hunter and Hamilton Holmes was 
not the first attempt by black applicants to desegregate the University of Georgia. The first 
known attempt occurred in September 1950 when Horace T. Ward, a graduate of Morehouse 
College with an additional master’s from Atlanta University – both historically black colleges – 
applied for admission to the University of Georgia’s law school. The qualifier of “first known 
attempt” is important because there is anecdotal evidence of students of African descent 
surreptitiously enrolling at the three universities profiled in this study, but whose skin tones were 
light enough that their true heritage was not detected by white schoolmates or administrators. 
Ward, though, applied openly as a black candidate at the behest of William Madison Boyd, the 
president of Georgia’s chapter of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People (NAACP) and the chair of the political science department at Atlanta University.40 
 The influence and assistance of the NAACP in all three desegregation cases profiled in 
this study cannot be understated. While many segregationists at this time denounced the NAACP 
as a communist organization, the professional legal aid that the NAACP provided to those 
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students seeking entry to white universities proved crucial not only to navigating legal obstacles 
for entry, but also to providing those applicants with psychological support in the face of the 
monolithic state governments opposing their entry to white universities. 
The NAACP chose to focus on breaking down the color barrier at white public 
universities first instead of at the primary school level because they believed that the legal battles 
in higher education would be less protracted. The NAACP felt the ramifications of one or two 
black students integrating white universities would be less acutely felt by the populace of a given 
state than if all primary schools were suddenly and comprehensively desegregated. The focus on 
white universities, they thought, would allow the segregated populaces, especially the more 
powerful white portion, to acclimate to change and provoke fewer negative responses during a 
controlled demolition of Jim Crow.41 
 Ward’s attempt for acceptance to the university’s law school was met with immediate 
denial. In order to deter future black applicants from attempting to chip away at the flimsy legal 
basis for denial of black applicants to the university, the Board of Regents, which by 1951 
included Georgia state representative and “kingmaker” Roy V. Harris, instituted new admissions 
requirements that included a new battery of entrance exams and, common for insular southern 
colleges at the time, letters of recommendation from alumni.42 The rationale for the latter 
requirement was clear – because no black University of Georgia alumni existed, it stood to 
reason that any white alumnus progressive enough to give his vote of confidence to a black 
applicant would have to take pause before doing so. The cultural and economic climate in the 
South at the time meant that knowledge of the endorsement would likely become public and the 
alumnus’ business and personal prospects would suffer. 
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However, it was not legal to deny black applicants the opportunity to study a discipline 
for which there was no analogue at an in-state black college, law in this case. Plessy v. Ferguson, 
the regressive 1896 U.S. Supreme Court decision that created Jim Crow and its attendant 
segregationist policies, held that white and black segments of society could remain separate so 
long as they were also equal in public funding and facilities. While this decision provided for 
separate primary and higher education in the South, it did nothing for improving the efficiency of 
education budgets. To this end, black public universities generally lacked complete redundancy 
of white programs of study at the university level. Rather than expend finite resources on 
constructing, in Horace Ward’s case, a black school of law in the state of Georgia, the state 
provided vouchers for black students to study an unavailable in-state program in another state 
that would accept the black applicant.43 
Though this practice was ruled unconstitutional in a series of federal court cases between 
1936 and 1950, it continued in Georgia as late as 1961.44 Though Georgia resisted the federal 
court rulings, it is important to note that the federal judiciary was more liberal than it had been 
years prior, an enduring legacy of the administration of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 
and one that would play a role in the federal backing of black applicants at other schools during 
the 1960s. This more liberal judiciary, especially the Supreme Court, began to gradually strike 
blows against racial discrimination in education as early as 1944 in a case in which Texas’ all-
white primary was ruled unconstitutional. In spite of the more progressive nature of the judiciary, 
each instance of racial discrimination would have to be tackled individually for the next two 
decades until the passage of the Civil Rights act of 1964.45 During the 1951-1952 session, the 
Georgia state legislature also passed legislation that provided for cutting off state funds to any 
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white public university that admitted a black student, which would come into play a decade 
later.46 
 The application of Ward, of Lagrange, Georgia, though initially rejected out of hand by 
the university, was not dropped thanks to determination on the part of Ward and his legal team, 
which included Georgia lawyers A.T. Walden and Donald Hollowell, along with Constance 
Baker Motley, Thurgood Marshall and Robert L. Carter from the NAACP’s Legal Defend and 
Education Fund.47 Three years after his application Ward was given a federal court date for 
appeal of the University of Georgia’s denial of his application. In the months leading up to the 
October 1953 hearing two newspapers that are included in this study of later undergraduate 
desegregation, The Atlanta Constitution and The Red & Black, the weekly student newspaper of 
the University of Georgia, entered the editorial fray to comment upon Ward’s predicament. State 
Rep. Roy V. Harris played the role of antagonist. 
Harris was a 1919 graduate of the University of Georgia’s law school who was elected to 
the state legislature in 1921 at age 26 and also twice served as Speaker of the House.48 He was a 
life-long lawyer and politician whose kingmaker reputation came from his management of three 
successful gubernatorial campaigns. A former law partner from his practice in Augusta described 
him as “the planner. A behind-the-scenes, smoke-filled room guy.”49 In addition to these roles, 
he was also a race-baiter and demagogue who owned The Augusta Courier newspaper and used 
it as a platform for spreading his segregationist ideals, including the following sample from 
October 2, 1950, of the sort of pseudoscientific and historical revisionist thought that was 
commonly espoused in papers of the period: 
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 The negroes have made greater progress in this country than any other place on this earth. 
Were it not for the effort of the white people and for what the white man had done for the 
negro, the negro would still be a naked savage in the jungles of Africa.50 
 Harris, as a segregationist and a member of the university’s Board of Regents, became 
embroiled in a battle with the editors of The Red & Black when they expressed support for 
acceptance of Ward’s application: “There is absolutely no logic in excluding the Negro from the 
white man’s way of life, especially at a university.”51 This October 8, 1953, editorial statement 
titled “The Color is Black” expressed a progressive sentiment politically at odds with the state 
Democratic establishment. The Democratic Party of Georgia on November 2, 1952, had 
sponsored a full-page ad in the Constitution during that year’s gubernatorial contest that told 
white Georgians, “This is your last chance to help defend yourself and uphold the heritage and 
traditions [segregation] of Georgia. The threat to our schools and colleges is now.”52 
 Harris responded with a letter to the editor of the Red & Black in which he wrote: “Rather 
than sissy activities like writing for a school paper, y’all ought to be out playing football or doing 
something really macho.”53 The opposition of the editors of the paper to the policies of then 
Governor Herman Talmadge caused Harris to publicly run editorials in his own paper rebuking 
their views. He privately threatened to use his influence on the Board of Regents to threaten to 
suspend publication of the student newspaper, which was at that time still published on campus 
and subsidized by university funds. The editor-in-chief of The Red & Black, Walter Lundy, and 
his managing editor, Bill Shipp, responded by running a story of Harris’ private attempts to cow 
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the editors into compliance.54 The embarrassment of Harris raised his ire even further, prompting 
him to rally the support of the University of Georgia Board of Regents to pressure Lundy and 
Shipp into resignation through increased university faculty oversight and the use of Board of 
Regents-approved content designed to squelch the dissenting opinion among the student paper’s 
leadership.55 
Lundy, who resigned, remarked, “I cannot conscientiously remain in the position of 
editor without expounding my views on the charges of Harris.”56 Shipp said they were denied 
“the right to reply to charges and names hurled at us [by Harris].”57 
The Red & Black editors received support for their stance. Letters to the editor came 
mostly from journalists and others not related to the university, along with a few from alumni, 
but they had little vocal support from University of Georgia undergraduates and law students.58 
While most support originated from outside the region, an important proponent of the student 
editors’ stance was Ralph McGill, the liberal editor-in-chief of The Atlanta Constitution, and the 
man who would become known as the “Conscience of the South,” for his progressive views on 
segregation.59 
The Red & Black case raised the level of antagonism between Harris and McGill, the 
latter of whom was a prominent, popular liberal voice in a state whose white citizens still 
overwhelmingly supported segregation.60 Though McGill at the time of Ward’s application to the 
University of Georgia law school was a proponent of gradual integration of public schools and 
other facilities – and had set a precedent by being the first newspaper editor in the South to 
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capitalize the word “Negro” in print61 – his opposition to Harris and conservative Democrats 
would be important nearly a decade later when he used his widely read platform to call for 
Governor Ernest Vandiver to adhere to federal judgments in favor of the admission of two black 
undergraduate students to the university without resistance and without cutting off university 
funds. 
Black coverage in the mainstream press 
 The mere fact that McGill and the student editors addressed the issue of black admission 
to the university with measured rationale was highly unusual in the South at the time, for the 
lives of black Americans were largely ignored in the pages of newspapers. In their book The 
Race Beat: The Press, the Civil Rights Struggle, and the Awakening of a Nation, Gene Roberts 
and Hank Klibanoff noted the treatment of the black segment of society by white newspapers: 
 For the most part [newspapers] treated Negro communities as a creepy corner of the 
world not worthy of their readers’ time. Many newspapers didn’t carry any news at all 
about Negroes; some printed only social snippets under such headlines as ‘Activities of 
Colored People.’ And some devoted a full page to Negro news, in editions circulated only 
in Negro neighborhoods…The papers didn’t carry Negro wedding announcements or 
obituaries.62 
 That was in the best case. Also common was the practice of referring to blacks with 
generic, derogatory pseudonyms, as well as airbrushing blacks out of photographs.63 Though few 
empirical studies have been done on the coverage of blacks in mainstream newspapers during the 
two decades following the end of World War II through the end of the Jim Crow era, those 
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studies all indicate that coverage of black issues was inadequate compared to whites.64 In more 
recent years journalism professor Carolyn Martindale of Youngstown State University wrote that 
the mainstream press during the entirety of the Civil Rights Movement had failed to explain “the 
disenfranchisement of black citizens in the South, Jim Crow laws, economic and educational 
inequality, discrimination in hiring and housing, oppression by law enforcement officers, 
inadequate city services and schools in black inner city neighborhoods.”65 
The Ward case – as an outlier, deviating from the norm of the sort of news coverage of 
black issues that appeared in the mainstream press – took place before the first of three phases of 
the Civil Rights Movement by which time it had coalesced into a recognizable effort on the part 
of blacks to secure benefits of citizenship. 
It is important to understand the different phases as lenses through which to view the 
press’ coverage of Ward first and the later successful desegregation attempts at the University of 
Georgia, the University of Mississippi and the University of Alabama. 
The first phase took place between 1954, the year of the Brown v. Board of Education 
Supreme Court ruling that outlawed school segregation, and 1960. Because Ward’s attempt took 
place before this phase, his case seemed to be viewed largely as a curiosity by the mainstream 
press and had not yet taken on the edge of something that threatened white dominance, as later 
attempts would. 
The second phase – and the one with which this study is primarily concerned – occurred 
between 1960 and 1964 and was characterized by sit-ins and growing public demonstrations in 
favor of desegregation of public facilities. As will be demonstrated later in analysis of the 
content of newspapers during the three successful desegregation attempts in this second phase, 
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the aura of curiosity that accompanied Ward’s attempt gave way to feelings of desperation and 
superiority among those opposed to desegregation of white universities versus rationality and 
inevitability among those in favor of desegregation. It was during the second phase that the press 
was viewed by many in the Civil Rights Movement as being allies of the movement. 
The third phase occurred following the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and is 
outside the purview of this study.66 
But for Ward back in the early 1950s, the support of The Red & Black and McGill 
suddenly became a moot point. In 1953 Ward was drafted into the U.S. Army – with some 
questioning the convenient timing of the notice – and served for two years. In the meantime, the 
landmark decision Brown v. Board of Education, was handed down by the U.S. Supreme Court, 
the strongest knock against the Jim Crow structure legitimized by Plessy v. Ferguson. Despite 
the ruling, southern states resisted by adhering to their discriminatory standards for admissions, 
including the requirement of alumni endorsement. 
Ward renewed his application in 1955 after he was discharged from the Army, but 
enrolled at Northwestern University law school in Illinois in 1956 before the case went to trial. 
Tired of putting his legal education on hold any further, his enrollment at Northwestern nullified 
his case in Georgia. The University of Georgia also claimed that he was not qualified for 
admission because his prior colleges, Morehouse and Atlanta University, were not accredited by 
the Southern Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools, though no black colleges were 
accredited by that organization at the time.67 Ward would later use his legal training to assist in 
the desegregation of the university by working on the legal team of Charlayne Hunter and 
Hamilton Holmes. 
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Brown v. Board of Education 
 The case of Brown v. Board of Education is significant in the context of this study 
because it provided not only a true federal precedent for the desegregation of public universities, 
but also because it was the legal victory upon which the rest of the African American Civil 
Rights Movement laid. Whereas in 1950 Horace Ward had to navigate state-level legal waters to 
apply for entrance to the University of Georgia, the Supreme Court Brown decision changed the 
laws in Georgia and the rest of the country to make segregated education illegal. The decision 
formed the legal basis for the successful desegregations at all three universities in this study. 
The other side of the coin, however, is that it raised the specter of a too-powerful federal 
government in the eyes of many people in the South. It caused segregationists to entrench 
themselves and form the White Citizens’ Council – later officially called the Citizens’ Councils 
of America, though the original name endures – and for violent opposition to Washington among 
the more extreme elements of conservative southern society.68 In real terms, it also had the 
unintended consequence of making university admission more difficult for black applicants. The 
university made its acceptance requirements more difficult for blacks to achieve in response to 
Brown and the feared onslaught of black applicants.69 
 In terms of the newspaper press in Georgia, McGill had written a famous editorial in 
1953 entitled “One Day It Will Be Monday” in which he predicted an eventual U.S. Supreme 
Court ruling that would outlaw segregation.70 It was his support of Brown that saw him take a 
more prominent position as a journalist of note in the nation at large and a voice of reason in the 
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South.71 At the University of Georgia, the new editors of The Red & Black also supported the 
ruling, writing, “The Constitution of the United States has taken on a new and fuller meaning of 
freedom with this latest interpretation.”72 
Hunter and Holmes – Desegregation Achieved 
 The Brown ruling was an enormous blow to Jim Crow laws, and its legitimacy was 
challenged by policy makers at the state level, including Ernest Vandiver, the governor of 
Georgia in 1961 when the University of Georgia was desegregated. Vandiver, a career 
Democratic politician, was elected governor in 1958 on a segregationist platform with a slogan 
of “No, not one” in reference to his vow to disallow segregation of public facilities in Georgia. In 
a foreshadowing of the sort of tactics that would be deployed in future university desegregation 
battles, Vandiver also promised to employ state highway patrolmen and national guard troops as 
armed enforcers of his policies.73 Though Vandiver himself never resorted to this tactic, his 
strongest lever in the question of maintaining segregation in Georgia came in the form a law 
passed by the Georgia General Assembly in 1956 that allowed for state funds to be cut off to any 
school that was desegregated.74 While he was the least obstructionist of the three governors in 
this study, Vandiver displayed the common trait of viewing external parties as being the primary 
threats to the universities in question. “Let us hope the NAACP will not force the closing of a 
single school,” he told state legislators in January 1960.75 
 Into this legislative atmosphere came University of Georgia undergraduate applicants 
Charlayne Hunter and Hamilton Holmes. Hunter and Holmes were both children of black 
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middle-class professionals. Charlayne Hunter was daughter of an Army chaplain – an officer – 
and was active in extracurricular and honors activities at Atlanta’s Henry McNeal Turner High 
School, the top black high school in Atlanta. Because she was interested in pursuing journalism, 
Hunter applied to out-of-state schools because the flagship journalism program in the state was 
out of her reach at the segregated university.76 
Hamilton Holmes, her classmate and valedictorian of their 1959 graduating class, was 
likewise a standout at the segregated high school. Like Hunter, Holmes was the son of a member 
of the black professional class – a prominent Atlanta doctor – and was active in extracurricular 
activities at Turner High. Holmes had intended to apply to Morehouse College in Atlanta as a 
pre-med major, but he and Hunter both caught the attention of Jesse Hill, a member of the 
NAACP’s education committee, which sought outstanding black students who would be likely to 
break the color barrier at segregated universities. Hill originally wanted Hunter and Holmes to 
apply to Georgia State College of Business Administration (later to become Georgia State 
University), but Holmes felt that the University of Georgia had a better selection of classes for 
his pre-med major.77 
After their graduation from high school, they both applied to the University of Georgia in 
1959, but were denied for “tardiness,” the first of several bureaucratic tactics the school would 
employ to maintain segregation. The excuse of additional procedural errors and dormitories 
filled to capacity would comprise the bulk of the university’s attempts to dissuade the pair from 
continuing to seek admission. But their NAACP legal team composed of Donald Hollowell, 
Constance Baker Motley, Vernon Jordan and Horace Ward persevered with additional attempts 
each quarter through September 1960. In the intervening year, Hunter and Holmes did not delay 
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their continuing educations on principle as Ward had done a decade earlier. Hunter was admitted 
to Wayne State University in Detroit, Michigan, while Holmes began his studies at Morehouse. 
 In September 1960, Hollowell and Motley filed for an injunction that sought to prohibit 
the university from “refusing to consider [Hunter’s and Holmes’] applications and those of other 
Negro residents of Georgia for admission to the University.” Judge William Bootle, an 
Eisenhower-appointed judge for the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Georgia, 
ordered that a full trial be held in order to determine if Holmes and Hunter were sufficiently 
qualified for admission to the University of Georgia. Suddenly, on January 6, 1961, three weeks 
into the trial in which university registrar Walter Danner was the defendant, Bootle concluded 
the 18-month legal battle and ruled in favor of the applicants. In his decision in Holmes v. 
Danner Bootle said the applicants “are fully qualified for immediate admission,” adding they 
“would already have been admitted had it not been for their race and color.”78 
Though this seemingly definitively cleared the way for Hunter and Holmes to attend 
classes, there was an air of uncertainty about the sort of reactions to expect, both from the 
government of Georgia as well as the populace. In the immediate wake of Bootle’s ruling, 
student leaders at the university implored the student population to remain calm, though the night 
of the ruling a small crowd burned crosses in protest on the northern part of the university 
campus.79 The next day an effigy of Holmes was hung at one of the entrances to campus, though 
Dean of Men William Tate broke up the group and confiscated student identification cards to 
demonstrate how serious the university was about maintaining order.80 
 The official response of Governor Vandiver was also still unsettled. On January 7, 
Vandiver dispatched Attorney General A.G. Cook to district court to file a motion for a stay in 
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Bootle’s ruling, which Bootle accepted and for which he scheduled a hearing on Monday, 
January 9. Bootle stayed his own ruling because he decided the state deserved an opportunity to 
appeal the ruling. At the same time, University of Georgia President O.C. Aderhold held a press 
conference declaring that the university was prepared to enroll Hunter and Holmes, 
demonstrating a lack of collusion between the office of the governor and the president of the 
university. Meanwhile, Vandiver was considering his options, namely that state law required him 
to cut funding to the university if it integrated. On the morning of January 9, Hunter and Holmes 
officially registered at the University of Georgia.81 
 The legal team representing the two applicants quickly moved to have the stay overturned 
by appealing to Judge Elbert Tuttle, a liberal Republican and chief judge of the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, which then included Georgia. Tuttle ruled that Bootle’s stay was 
“improvidently granted,” causing Vandiver’s legal team to make a last-ditch petition to the U.S. 
Supreme Court on January 10 to halt the desegregation. Attorneys Hollowell and Motley had 
already delivered a motion to the U.S. Supreme Court to have the desegregation proceed, 
ultimately resulting in the state’s motion being denied.82 Vandiver’s last option was to follow 
Georgia law and cut off state funds to university, drawing the ire of the populace of Georgia and 
causing Vandiver to publicly appeal to the state legislature to repeal the law.83 
The response from students was immediate and vocal – roughly 1,000 students protested 
in the streets, some waving Confederate flags, with two students arrested.84 More peacefully, 
hundreds of students signed a petition against withdrawing state funds and the closure of the 
university. Judge Bootle settled the question of cutoffs by enjoining Vandiver from doing so, 
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thus opening the doors of the university to Hunter and Holmes. 85 By the afternoon of the 10th, 
Hunter and Holmes arrived in Athens to celebrate at the residence of the Hollowells, but were 
given a cold welcome by students chanting, “two-four-six-eight, we don 't want to integrate.” 
The pair officially began classes on the morning of Wednesday, January 11, 1961, with the day 
passing uneventfully until that evening.86 
Per university rules, Hunter, as a single female, had to live in a dormitory on campus; 
Holmes lived off campus. That night after the University of Georgia had lost a close basketball 
game to Georgia Tech, a crowd estimated at 2,000 descended on Myers Hall, Hunter’s residence, 
and began to riot. Rocks and bottles were hurled at the building, causing some structural damage 
and a minor injury to a girl living in the dorm. The Athens police tried to secure the area and 
Dean Tate once again confiscated student IDs to identify the troublemakers. Eight members of 
the Klu Klux Klan were present at the riot, and later FBI documents suggested they had joined in 
on the riot after it had been pre-planned by some students. Fire hoses and tear gas had to be used 
to disperse the mob.87 
The same night Hunter and Holmes were both taken back to Atlanta by state police, and 
were subsequently suspended by Dean of Students J.A. Williams for their own protection and the 
safety of the 7,000 other university students. The pair, though, was supported via petition by 
two-thirds of the university faculty and by state business leaders who were mindful of the 
economic consequences of the perceived backwardness of the South vis-à-vis segregation. 
Hunter and Holmes were reinstated as students by Judge Bootle on Friday, January 13, and were 
back in class the following Monday.88 
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The University of Mississippi 
 The case of the desegregation of the University of Mississippi (Ole Miss) by James 
Meredith on October 1, 1962, is the most well known and well documented desegregation of the 
three universities profiled in this study. It involved the most legal maneuvering both on the parts 
of the university and the state government to defy federal law – the Brown v. Board of Education 
case that outlawed segregation in public education – as well as to defy subsequent rulings by 
federal judges ordering Ole Miss to grant admission to James Meredith. 
Meredith’s desegregation certainly provided the most high drama of the three 
desegregations thanks to Governor Ross Barnett’s vacillation in negotiations with the Kennedy 
administration as well as the Mississippi government’s unintended, yet negligent, meltdown of 
order that resulted in a battle between U.S. Marshals and assorted obstructionist parties at the 
Lyceum building on the Ole Miss campus. 
Ole Miss also has the dubious distinction of being the only lethal university 
desegregation, with one bystander being killed by an errant bullet and a foreign journalist being 
murdered while reporting on the melee. It is also the most academically well documented 
desegregation of the three profiled, both in terms of the sheer volume of analysis dedicated to the 
subject, and, germane to this study, analysis of the press in Mississippi at the time. To briefly set 
the tone for the state of Mississippi’s newspaper press during the Jim Crow era, Mississippi 
native and journalist Karl Fleming wrote of the general state of blatant racism in the state’s 
newspapers at the time, but singled out state capital Jackson’s largest newspaper The Clarion-
Ledger as being “the worst.”89 Journalist Bill Prochnau of The Washington Post called The 
Clarion-Ledger, “perhaps the most racist major newspaper in the country.”90 The Columbia 
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Journalism Review likewise weighed in on the journalistic integrity of The Clarion-Ledger and 
its sister publication, the Jackson Daily News, in a 1967 edition, calling them “quite possibly the 
worst metropolitan newspapers in the United States.”91 Journalists Hank Klibanoff and Gene 
Roberts in their book The Race Beat state that the Hederman family of Jackson, who owned and 
published The Clarion-Ledger, through their racist, unbalanced coverage set a low standard that 
“editors at smaller papers found all too easy to meet,”92 perhaps accounting in some part for Ole 
Miss’ particularly contentious desegregation via the agenda set by the paper. 
 
Post-World War II Mississippi 
 For most participants in World War II, the war became the defining event of their lives. 
For some black members of the military, it also served to inspire them to secure their rights once 
back in America. In spite of fighting in a segregated army, black soldiers often found that they 
were received more warmly by whites in Europe than in the United States. Former army soldier 
and brother of Mississippi civil rights leader Medgar Evers, Charles Evers said, “When we got 
home we were determined to be treated fairly.”93 Black Mississippians, though they constituted 
60 percent of Mississippians fighting in the war, returned home from foreign battles to a state 
that still did not accept them as full citizens. Despite being granted suffrage with the passage of 
the Reconstruction Acts of 1867, intimidation of and acts of violence against black voters by 
groups such as the Klu Klux Klan as well as regressive Jim Crow laws had seen the number of 
blacks registered to vote in Mississippi dwindle from a high of 60,000 in 1867 to 20,000 in 
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1954.94 Black students of all levels in Mississippi were also treated as second-class citizens, 
relegated to having to gain an education on budgetary scraps. By 1950 black primary school 
students accounted for 60 percent of the state’s public school students, but received less than 30 
percent of the budget for public schools. For the year 1959-1960, Mississippi public expenditures 
per black primary school pupil were $21.77 versus $81.86 for white pupils.95 Salaries for black 
teachers were half of what they were for white teachers.96 Increasing integration in other areas of 
public life outside the state also made life in the segregated South harder to continue to endure. 
President Harry Truman’s 1948 Executive Order 9981 mandating the desegregation of 
the military along with increasing non-southern Congressional support for civil rights gave black 
Americans reason for hope. The rising profile of civil rights, though it took a long time to sink 
into the public consciousness, according to Gallup polls, and also caused some conservative 
white Southerners to dig in for a fight, contributing to the founding of the States’ Rights 
Democratic Party, better known as the Dixiecrats.97 The Brown v. Board of Education ruling in 
1954 sent further waves through conservative white Mississippi society, resulting in the 
establishment of White Citizens’ Councils in Mississippi and other southern states.98 The ruling, 
as an affront to white dominance in Mississippi, also garnered much attention in the pages of the 
state’s press, though it received half as much editorial space than the Dixiecrat walkout six years 
earlier. The entrenchment of vitriolic, segregationist whites in the face of trends toward black 
societal enfranchisement came about because of long-established white preferences for black 
behavior, specifically the so-called “Happy Negro”.99 The prospect of blacks fully vested in all 
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the rights of citizenship upset paternalistic white notions of black inferiority, which existed along 
a spectrum ranging from attempting to raise up the black race through education, to the view that 
blacks were a permanently retarded race for whom education was futile but who could be 
employed in unskilled labor.100 The latter sentiment was succinctly stated by one Mississippi 
newspaper editor who stated, “[The Negro] is already getting all the education he could 
handle.”101 It was this latter strain of though that also established the pretext for exploitative 
employment practices and reliance of white enterprises such as sharecropping upon cheap black 
labor.102 
There was also a sexual element to the subjugation of blacks in the Jim Crow South. The 
same pseudoscience cast an animalistic light on blacks – jungle rhythm, etc – also caused them 
to be viewed as fearsome sexual aggressors103 for whom social integration would create 
opportunities for sexual assaults against white women in the worst cases and intermarriage – thus 
eroding the purity of the white race – in the best cases. 
The concept of “miscegenation” – mixing of the races – was probably the most widely 
relied upon, publicly acknowledged reason for resisting integration among white Mississippians. 
Contrasted to the desire for continued economic subjugation of blacks and the paranoia of white 
parents that their daughters would be set upon by black sexual predators, the miscegenation 
principle was not confined to hushed, private conversations, but instead was commonly cited in 
public discourse of the faults inherent in societal desegregation. Conservative interpretation of 
biblical passages lent credence to the anti-miscegenation concept, thus defending mortals against 
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accusations of racism and instead making only God accountable for laying down the rules for 
social and biological interaction. In the view of opponents to miscegenation, the erosion of social 
barriers to interracial interaction would inevitably lead to interracial sexual relationships and 
inferior biracial offspring prone to disease, retardation and immorality.104 Barnett explained to 
the New Orleans Times-Picayune his views of miscegenation invoking a sports metaphor: 
Supposing Ole Miss went somewhere and played a team that uses Negroes. We would 
have to have a return game with them in Oxford, or Jackson. After the game, there would 
be a social event. What would the Negroes do? They would attend. What would the 
Negroes do? Would they dance with white girls? Not in Mississippi. It wouldn’t work 
and that’s why we’re staying out of it.105 
Desegregation 
United States Air Force veteran and Mississippi native James Meredith sued for entry to 
the University of Mississippi on May 31, 1961, thus setting in motion the end of segregation in 
public higher education in the state of Mississippi. Meredith’s application to the university, from 
the perspective of most white Mississippians at the time, constituted an assault on a system of 
segregation that had been carefully cultivated since the end of the Civil War. 
The late James Silver, a former professor of American history at the University of 
Mississippi and outspoken reformist, wrote at length of what he called “the closed society” of 
Mississippi. He described a caste system into which black Mississippians were born at the 
bottom, and which whites at the top sought to preserve through whichever theoretical 
underpinnings happened to be most convenient, including religious fundamentalism and 
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conservative interpretations of the Constitution that gave broad prerogative to states.106 The 
atmosphere of the University of Mississippi itself and the agendas of its administrators also stood 
in opposition to Meredith’s attempt at matriculation. 
The university, after the transformational experience of World War II, still remained a 
bulwark of the state’s conservative, elite agrarian society. By the early 1960s, the university still 
retained its character as a “finishing school for the children of the gentry,” in the words of then-
chancellor John D. Williams.107 Williams, himself a quiet reformer, sought to change the 
university into a more reputable institution with more graduate students, increased research and 
with higher-quality faculty members possessing terminal degrees. His ability to do so was kept in 
check, though, by a Board of Regents that was composed of the sort of landed elites who sought 
to retain the university’s country club atmosphere.108 The state’s power structure was also filled 
with alumni of the university, for whom the school formed a central aspect of their social lives, 
and for whom the thought of intermingling equitably with blacks was untenable.109 Mississippi’s 
newspapers contributed to the enshrinement of the University of Mississippi through regular 
newspaper coverage of campus events that might not command such attention in other states, 
such as the selection of the campus homecoming king and queen.110 The specter of a righteous 
Civil War confederacy also loomed over the campus. The university’s sporting teams were called 
the Rebels, and home football games featured a field-sized Confederate battle flag draped over 
the field. The campus featured a Confederate cemetery and a marble statue of a Confederate 
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soldier. There was also an annual essay contest begun in 1906 where students defended 
Mississippi’s right to secede in 1861.111 
Any black person seeking to integrate the University of Mississippi would encounter an 
environment that was, at the very best, deeply ambivalent toward the question of integration. A 
few professors, such as James Silver and criminology professor Alfred C. Schnur, proposed that 
the mistreatment of the black population of Mississippi was detrimental to all Mississippians.112 
Chancellor J.D. Williams, himself not a Mississippian, exhibited progressive tendencies in trying 
to bring the University of Mississippi up to modern standards, though he had not specifically 
addressed the question of integration in his efforts. Williams, though silent on his opinion on 
integration, recognized the generational grudges that any efforts to integrate in the South would 
have to overcome: “I came from the part of the country where the percentage [of blacks] is much 
less, where we were never governed by Negroes in the Legislature, or Negroes as governors, or 
Negroes as justices in the courts as this part of the country experienced during the 
Reconstruction period.”113 The campus newspaper, The Mississippian, also showed periodic 
signs progressive editorial thought. Editor-in-chief Tom Bordeaux in 1946 made waves when he 
suggested in editorials that social and economic suppression of blacks also hurt white 
Mississippians.114 Editor-in-chief Jimmie Robertson drew the ire of conservatives when he 
criticized the segregationist Race and Reason Day at the university in a January 1962 editorial.115 
Segregationists later attempted to preempt the editorship of Billy Barton in 1961 because he had 
interned at the Atlanta Constitution under the liberal Ralph McGill.116 
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Aside from these few examples of progressive individuals, the campus was generally 
resistant to change in the status quo regarding integration. The university held a bizarrely 
inconsistent view of race. Non-white foreign students, including Africans, were readily accepted 
as students, but domestic blacks were not. The only American black faces to be seen on campus 
were university workers who were often subjugated to disrespectful treatment by their white 
managers.117 The editors of The Mississippian, though occasionally more skeptical of 
segregation than the student body, did not squelch the opinions of students who submitted letters 
to the editor to the contrary. One student wrote in early 1962, “[The races] will instinctively 
cleaves to the people of his own race…[I will] instill in my own son an inherent interest in his 
own race.” Another student wrote that desegregation “would be to loose upon the Southland a 
maelstrom of riots and criminal acts, the mind of the Negro being what it is.”118 
The University of Mississippi also played host to the sort of anti-communist efforts that 
conflated communism with the civil rights movement. The civil rights movement was linked to 
communism in the minds of segregationists because the Communist Party’s 1928 platform 
specifically mentioned ending racial segregation as one of its goals.119 Perpetuating the 
disingenuous relationship, the university sponsored a series of anti-communist essays to that end. 
It also invited assistant director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation William C. Sullivan to 
speak to student religious groups on the subject of “Communism and Christianity.” The president 
of the American Bar Association and Yazoo City native John C. Satterfield gave an anti-
integration lecture entitled “They Will Bury Themselves – If We Help Them.”120 
James H. Meredith 
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 James Meredith was born in 1933 in Attala County, Mississippi, to Moses “Cap” and 
Roxie Meredith. Cap Meredith was an atypical rural black Mississippian during that time in that 
he was literate and owned his own farm, thus was not locked into a subsistence sharecropping 
cycle like most blacks. Cap was also a rarity in that he registered to vote in Attala County in 
1919, an action that often resulted in intimidation or worse for blacks who dared to do so.121 The 
Meredith household was also unusual in that in addition to residing on their own land, their 
house also had electricity and a radio, thus exposing James Meredith to a wider world from an 
early age.122 In spite of the relatively advantageous circumstances into which Meredith was born, 
his family was also very insular, especially when it came to interacting with whites. Cap and 
Roxie Meredith forbade their children to ever set foot on white neighbors’ property to avoid the 
sort of misunderstandings or accidents that could result in severe retribution being taken against 
the Merediths. As for many others in the rest of the Deep South, Meredith’s childhood in 
Kosciusko, Mississippi, was one of segregation – separate churches, schools, businesses and 
neighborhood for blacks.123 
 Meredith was known as a bright student in primary school and was raised to value 
education since his parents were unable to complete theirs.124 After finishing high school, 
Meredith enlisted in the U.S. Air Force in July 1951 because he could not afford college and 
wanted to avoid service in one of the more violent branches that were fully engaged in the 
Korean War. Early on in his service, Meredith was one of a few airmen chosen to take the 
entrance exam for an appointment to the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, but did not gain 
entry due to his somewhat deficient high school education in Mississippi. This shortcoming 
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stung Meredith, thus he set out to improve his education through college correspondence courses 
via the University of Kansas; Armed Forces Institute of Madison, Wisconsin; Washburn 
University in Topeka, Kansas; and the University of Omaha. Around this time, the young 
sergeant also began to invest in land in Attala County.125 Meredith initially mustered out of the 
Air Force in 1955, but soon re-enlisted after he became dissatisfied with his brief attendance at 
Wayne State University in Detroit. After his re-enlistment he married Mary June Wiggins and 
was then stationed in Japan, where he became known as a taskmaster to his subordinates and also 
received high ratings from superiors.126 
 Meredith’s Air Force service in Japan was an especially formative time for him because 
of the relative societal freedoms he enjoyed there. “It’s the only place in the world where I’m 
near free,” he said.127 To the Japanese, Meredith’s black ethnicity identified him only as an 
American G.I. and not as a second-class citizen as it did in the United States. Meredith, who had 
expressed a childhood dream to attend the University of Mississippi and who remained informed 
of the nascent civil rights movement stateside, received some unexpected encouragement in his 
support of the movement from a white colonel from Mississippi. During a promotion review 
board, the colonel quizzed Meredith about his opinions on the civil rights movement and told 
him, “We are with you, but the degree of success attained in this new move to unify the 
potentials of our country will depend on you.”128 After Meredith’s second enlistment in the Air 
Force was finished in 1960, he moved back to Mississippi to participate in the civil rights 
movement. His stated goal was “total victory . . . over ‘White Supremacy.’” In order to more 
effectively participate, Meredith decided to enroll at Jackson State College to complete his 
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education. Meredith settled on Jackson State because of its focus on liberal arts education and its 
location in the capital city of Jackson, which Meredith felt afforded blacks a more dignified 
existence than in the other more rural locations of black colleges in Mississippi.129 
 Meredith’s intellectual attachment to the civil rights movement continued to grow during 
his attendance at Jackson State. His college papers and essays from this time indicated a 
willingness to tackle questions of how to improve black society that were answered with his 
opinion that blacks were being stifled by white authorities and that blacks would have to 
establish a new system in order to benefit.130 Meredith also became involved with student groups 
at Jackson State and joined the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
(NAACP) in September 1960. Meredith met with NAACP Mississippi field secretary Medgar 
Evers to discuss applying to the University of Mississippi, though Meredith declined to do so in 
spite of his childhood desire.131 Meredith’s initial rejection of Evers’ proposal did not end his 
interest in attending the University of Mississippi, though. His interest in doing so grew, and he 
was encouraged to do so by friends and classmates. His Jackson State coursework continued to 
strengthen his resolve. Meredith felt that he had the right to attend any public institution and that 
“there is no logical reason to justify denying a law-abiding citizen the rights of full citizenship 
solely on the basis of race.”132 Meredith also felt that the new John F. Kennedy administration 
taking office was a positive development, as he felt Kennedy was more likely to take political 
risks for blacks than the defeated Richard Nixon.133 Around this time, Meredith made two 
important decisions, though one seemed trivial at the time. First, he registered to vote in Hinds 
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County, a risky venture for a black man in 1960s Mississippi.134 The ramifications of this 
decision would later affect the legal proceedings of his second, fateful choice: to apply for 
acceptance to the all-white University of Mississippi. 
 After requesting an undergraduate course catalog and an application form from the 
University of Mississippi on January 21, 1961, Meredith received a letter from registrar Robert 
B. Ellis on January 28, 1961, that said, “We are pleased to know of your interest in becoming a 
member of our student body.”135 Meredith submitted a complete application for acceptance to the 
University of Mississippi Registrar Robert B. Ellis’s office on January 31, 1961. The mailed 
application included his health records and an application for student housing, along with 
academic transcripts forwarded by Jackson State.136 In the application package Meredith 
immediately disclosed that he was not white: “I sincerely hope that your attitude toward me as a 
potential member of your student body . . . will not change upon learning that I am not a white 
applicant. I am an American-Mississippi-Negro citizen . . . I certainly hope that this matter will 
be handled in a manner that will be complimentary to the University and the state of 
Mississippi.”137 
 Ellis’ first move was to recognize that Meredith’s background and attributes made him 
unusual for a black person from Mississippi, and that as an unknown quantity he presented a 
potentially successful applicant to the university. Unlike past black applicants to the university, 
the last of whom was Clennon King in 1958, Meredith was a native-born Mississippian and a 
military veteran. He had also been a successful student at other colleges, and Ellis recognized 
that Meredith’s application could not be handled routinely. It was forwarded to university 
                                                
134 Ibid, p.217. 
135 Doyle, p.30. 
136 Eagles, p.221. 
137 Doyle, p.30. 
46 
counsel Hugh Clegg, who had been designated to investigate applications from blacks. Copies 
were also forwarded to Mississippi state Attorney General Joseph T. Patterson and the executive 
secretary of the board of the Mississippi Institutes of Higher Learning (IHL).138 The university 
administration had to scramble to decide what to do about Meredith’s application because the 
spring semester began a few days later on February 6, 1961. A special meeting of the 
university’s leadership and the IHL board of trustees’ executive secretary was convened in 
Oxford on February 4 with the official purpose of “discussing the problem of over-crowding”139 
at the university. The participants cited the increasing student-to-faculty ratio, crowded labs and 
cramped dorms among the reasons for limiting admissions. The university administration 
decided to retroactively set the cutoff date for new admissions at January 25, 1961, six days prior 
to the receipt of Meredith’s application on January 31, though it did not apply to university 
employees, their families, graduate students or anyone with a prior oral commitment from the 
university.140 Chancellor Williams, however, chalked the cutback up to inadequate funding from 
the state. Regardless of the stated reason, it was the first attempt on the part of the university, and 
later, the state of Mississippi, to use “delay, deception and duplicity” to avoid admitting 
Meredith.141 Registrar Ellis telegraphed Meredith, as well as thirteen other applicants, why he 
had been denied admission. 
Not content to let the excuse of overcrowding suffice, the IHL board of trustees convened 
a meeting in Jackson on February 7 where it adopted three policies that would serve to 
perpetuate segregation of higher education in Mississippi. The first policy allowed a white public 
university to reject transfer applications, such as Meredith’s, from unaccredited colleges, such as 
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Jackson State College. This policy effectively prohibited all potential black transfer applicants 
because no black colleges were accredited by the Southern Association of Colleges and 
Secondary Schools (SACS) at that time. Second, an applicant could be rejected on the vague 
premise of having submitted an application that contained “false, contradictory, questionable or 
uncertain data.” Last, any applicant must have a certificate of admission prior to being able to 
register for classes in person. All three of these policies applied to Meredith.142 
 Meredith, despite the impression of naivety that he emanated, took precautions from the 
very beginning of his effort to gain admission to the University of Mississippi. At the suggestion 
of Medgar Evers, Meredith contacted the NAACP’s Legal Defense and Educational Fund (LDF). 
The LDF, directed by Brown v. Board of Education chief plaintiff counsel and future U.S. 
Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall, was a spin-off of the NAACP concerned with 
litigating on behalf of plaintiffs in civil rights cases.143 Even though Meredith sought out the 
assistance of the LDF, he was initially unsure of the ability of the NAACP to effect any change. 
Meredith was also put off by Marshall’s insistence upon gaining complete documentary evidence 
of Meredith’s academic and military records.144 Meredith also reached out to the U.S. 
Department of Justice via the Jackson-based U.S. Attorney William L. Higgs. Higgs, a white 
Mississippian, was also a liberal activist and Harvard Law alumnus who readily put Meredith in 
touch with Burke Marshall, the assistant attorney general of the United States. Meredith 
explained the embarrassment he had suffered in being rejected by the University of Mississippi 
and said in his letter to Marshall, “I simply ask that the federal agencies use the power and 
prestige of their positions to insure the full rights of citizenship for our people.”145 
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 It was around this time that the press first caught wind of Meredith’s application to the 
university. On February 8, 1961, the Jackson Daily News reported that an unnamed black 
Jackson State College student had applied and that the university had responded by moving the 
application cutoff date to January 25 in order to deny him. Over the next month, Meredith 
conducted two anonymous interviews with UPI reporters telling them that he wanted to attend 
the University of Mississippi because it was “no doubt the best institution in the state”146 and that 
he felt compelled to apply to the university because he wanted to be able to one day tell his 
infant son that he had done his part to fight segregation.147 Though Meredith was still unnamed 
at this time, his identity had leaked to people outside the media. His parents were visited at their 
home in Attala County by influential members of the black community, sent there at the behest 
of powerful whites, to have the Merediths dissuade their son from continuing his effort. James 
Meredith and his neighbors in Jackson were also aware of unfamiliar cars filled with whites 
cruising by his apartment complex. Given these pressures, Meredith adopted what he termed “a 
strategy to survive.”148 
 It was in mid-February 1961 that Meredith’s case was picked up by the LDF and 
Constance Baker Motley was assigned to him as his counsel. Motley was chosen by Marshall 
because he reasoned that a black woman was less likely than a black man to suffer attacks in the 
South.149 Motley, communicating with Meredith from New York City, suggested that he focus 
on applying for the following 1961 fall semester and to have the university registrar classify his 
as a “continuing application.” Motley also instructed Meredith not to communicate unnecessarily 
with the university and to keep copies of all his correspondence with the school. Meredith 
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followed Motley’s suggestion to request the university hold his room deposit and to classify him 
as a continuing applicant, but was met with silence by university officials. 150 Because of this, 
Meredith became further assured that the university would employ tactics of delay in order to 
defeat his application. This bolstered his view of himself as a soldier in his efforts with the status 
quo embodied by the University of Mississippi and the state as the enemy: “I considered myself 
an active duty soldier . . . Everything I did I considered an act of war.”151 Motley understood the 
university’s tactics and instructed Meredith to make his application conform as exactly as 
possible to the parameters set out by the school’s admission policies, including resubmitting five 
letters of recommendation that attested to Meredith’s qualifications for admission in addition to 
his good moral character.152 The university’s policies required the letters come from alumni, but 
because all university alumni in 1961 were white and Meredith knew none, he was unable to 
procure them and substituted them with letters from blacks who knew him.153 Motley advised 
him that the issue of recommendation letters was not vital because the LDF had won a similar 
suit in Georgia.154 Even as Meredith and his counsel began to prepare for a legal battle for 
admission to the University of Mississippi, Meredith continued his studies at Jackson State. 
Jackson State’s administration and his classmates supported Meredith’s plan, but to garner more 
support and to clarify his intentions, Meredith publicly identified himself as the anonymous 
black applicant to the University of Mississippi. He also circulated an essay in late March 1961 
that rationalized his attempt by highlighting that the United States’ socialist rivals used American 
segregation in propaganda.155 
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 Meredith endured a four-month silence on the part of the university that ended on May 9, 
1961, when he received a letter from Ellis. In the letter Ellis acknowledged that his application 
and transcripts had been received, but that the university could accept only 48 of Meredith’s 90 
semester hours. The letter, however, did not say that Meredith had been approved, and asked if 
he would like the application to be handled as a “pending application.” Motley believed that the 
letter from Ellis implicitly stated that Meredith was qualified for admission,156 but on May 25 
Ellis sent a letter to Meredith stating: 
 I regret to inform you in answer to your recent letter, that your application for admission 
must be denied. The university cannot recognize the transfer of credits from the 
institution which you are now attending since it is not a member of the Southern 
Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools. Our policy permits the transfer of credits 
only from member institutions of regional associations. Furthermore, students may not be 
accepted by the University from those institutions whose programs are not recognized.157 
 Given Ellis’ response and the increasingly obvious refusal of the university to consider 
Meredith’s application in any good faith, Motley filed suit in federal court in Meridian on May 
31, 1961, thus beginning over a year of litigation between Meredith and the University of 
Mississippi. The case, Meredith v. Fair (head IHL trustee Charles D. Fair), was presided over by 
Judge Sidney Mize. It was on the following day, June 1, 1961, that Meredith’s picture first 
appeared in a newspaper – a very rare phenomenon for a black person at the time – on the front 
page of the Meridian Star. The Star ran an editorial that day titled “Never Say Die” that 
presented as evidence against desegregation the sort of quasi-biblical pseudoscience that 
frequently bubbled up in writing at the time: “Massive integration will mean future intermarriage 
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. . . the emergence of a tribe of mongrels.” The Jackson Clarion-Ledger on the same day ran a 
story about the lawsuit on its front page. The paper did not advance an official editorial stance at 
the time, but columnist Charles M. Hill sought to falsely discredit Meredith by stating that he did 
not know how to spell “Biloxi.”158 
 Meredith’s claim was based on the Fourteenth Amendment, specifically the Equal 
Protection Clause that saw Brown v. Board of Education decided in favor of ending school 
desegregation.159 Motley sought to have the court declare that blacks had the right to attend state 
institutions based upon the same entry criteria that saw whites admitted. The suit centered on the 
four-month wait Meredith endured before receiving his denial of admission and that the 
university had not given a reason for its decision, thus not extending to Meredith the same 
treatment that would have been expected for a white applicant.160 Judge Mize, unconvinced of 
wrongdoing on the part of the University of Mississippi, denied Motley’s request for a 
restraining order, which would have allowed Meredith to enroll at the university. Mize, though, 
scheduled a hearing two weeks later in order to hear arguments about the larger implications of 
Meredith’s suit against the university.161 
 When the hearing reconvened in mid-June 1961, the state of Mississippi focused on 
trying to discredit Meredith’s moral foundations. The state assistant attorney general and lead 
defense counsel Dugas Shands was given a wide latitude by Mize to pepper Meredith with 
irrelevant questions and to imply that Meredith was a pawn of the NAACP in his attempt.162 
Shands’ first attempt to deconstruct Meredith’s qualifications for admission was to attempt to 
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show that Meredith had fraudulently registered to vote in Hinds County upon his relocation to 
Mississippi. Shands’ argued that Meredith had not resided in Hinds Country for a year prior to 
registration, as was required. Meredith, however, showed that he had always listed Mississippi as 
his home state during his military service and that the Hinds County voting registrar gave him 
the same residence waiver that all military personnel received.163 
 Judge Mize then halted the hearing and scheduled it for resumption a month later on July 
10, 1961. Before the hearing could resume, the Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission, a 
state agency that worked to maintain segregation and to foil “federal encroachment,”164 tried to 
intimidate Meredith by releasing information about himself and his family.165 During the 
intermission of the hearing, Meredith’s legal team tried five times to depose registrar Ellis in 
order to find out what other applicants had been admitted without the same paperwork that was 
being required of Meredith. The state resisted allowing Ellis to be deposed because he had 
already once been called as a witness during the hearing. The state also made an issue of lead 
defense counsel Shands’ health in delaying forward movement.166 Ellis was able to continue to 
avoid deposition and continued to deny that Meredith was rejected because of his race, but 
instead was rejected because his legal residence in Mississippi was in question. Ellis and the state 
of Mississippi continued to argue that Meredith simply wanted to cause trouble at the behest of 
the NAACP.167 When the hearing resumed in Jackson on August 10, 1961, after an eight-week 
delay, Shands tried to demonstrate Meredith’s psychological instability by pointing out that 
Meredith had complained of “nervous trouble” while on duty in the Air Force, but had omitted 
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mention of the ailment on his application to the university. Ellis was called as a witness on 
August 11, and explained that Meredith’s application was incomplete. After another four-day 
delay, Shands tried to throw further derail the hearing by constantly objecting to Motley. Motley 
did succeed in getting Ellis to admit that he would admit a black applicant if he met the entrance 
requirements.168 Motley pointed out that the university had decided not to accept Meredith’s 
Jackson State credits on February 7, 1961, prior to the date when it formally adopted the policy 
of not accepting class credit from non-SACS-accredited schools on May 15, 1961. She also 
argued that Jackson State was accredited by other accrediting institutions, including the 
Mississippi College Accrediting Commission.169 When the university’s argument over academic 
achievement had been dismantled by Motley, attorney Charles Clark, who had taken over for an 
ill Shands, resorted again to the argument that Meredith was not qualified because he did not tell 
the truth under oath, thus demonstrating a deficiency in moral character.170 
 Judge Mize ruled against granting Meredith’s request for an injunction against Ole Miss 
on December 12, 1961. Mize rejected the defense’s argument that Meredith was not a resident of 
Mississippi, but accepted their arguments on other counts: that Meredith’s race was immaterial 
and that he had been rejected on the grounds that his application was incomplete and that his 
moral fiber was in question. A member of Meredith’s LDF counsel immediately filed an appeal 
with the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. Chief Judge Elbert P. Tuttle granted the appeal and 
a hearing was scheduled for January 9, 1962, in New Orleans. When the hearing convened, 
Motley repeated to Tuttle and Judges Richard T. Rives and John Minor Wisdom her argument 
that Meredith’s application had been rejected because he was black.171 The Fifth Circuit did not 
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grant the requested injunction that would allow Meredith to register. But the court did recognize 
that the state of Mississippi and the University of Mississippi favored whites over blacks, but that 
Meredith counsel had not yet proved that he was rejected solely for being black. The Fifth 
Circuit chastised Judge Mize for his earlier conduct of the hearing in the lower court and ordered 
him to proceed with a full hearing. 172 The full hearing presided over by Mize began again in 
Jackson on January 16, 1962, with both plaintiff and defense repeating their arguments about 
racism and moral shortcomings, respectfully. On February 4, 1962, Mize once again ruled that 
the university had not discriminated against Meredith on the basis of race.173 
 The next day on February 5, 1962, Motley filed a request with the Fifth Circuit again to 
seek an injunction against the university’s rejection of Meredith so that he might be able to 
register in time for the beginning of the spring semester the next day on February 6, 1962.174 The 
three judges – Rives, Tuttle and Wisdom – agreed to hear the case. Motley again argued that race 
had decided Meredith’s application, while Mississippi assistant attorney general Joseph Patterson 
called on the court to uphold the decision of another federal judge.175 In a two-to-one decision, 
the Fifth Circuit rejected the request because Rives and Wisdom did not want to issue an 
injunction only to overturn it later after a full hearing. Tuttle was the dissenting vote, reasoning 
that the court would eventually issue an injunction and did not want to waste time. The court, 
despite its reticence to issue an injunction, suggested to Meredith that he not make the case moot 
by graduating from Jackson State and instead might strategically procrastinate by taking 
electives until a full appeal hearing could take place.176 
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 The full appeal hearing of the Fifth Circuit convened on April 20, 1962. Judges Wisdom, 
John R. Brow and Dozier A. DeVane presided. Motley stuck to her argument, while the 
university lawyer, Edward Cates, focused on Meredith’s “fraudulent” voter registration in Hinds 
County in 1960. Apparently unwilling to take a chance on Meredith receiving his desired 
injunction, Mississippi authorities tried to head him off. On June 6, 1962, prior to the decision in 
the current appeal hearing, Hinds County county attorney Paul G. Anderson sought a bench 
warrant from a justice of the peace in that county to have Meredith arrested for fraudulently 
registering to vote. A Hinds sheriff’s deputy arrested Meredith at his home in Jackson and held 
him in jail until Medgar Evers and Jack Young, a black Jackson lawyer, posted $500 bail later in 
the evening.177 Judge Wisdom, on application from Motley, ordered the state not to charge 
Meredith with a crime, calling it a “punitive action.”178 
 The case of Meredith v. Fair was seemingly decided once and for all on June 25, 1962, 
when Judges Wisdom and Brown decided in favor of the plaintiff. The decision said: 
. . . From the moment the defendants discovered Meredith was a Negro they engaged in a 
carefully calculated campaign of delay, harassment, and masterly inactivity. It was a 
defense designed to discourage and to defeat by tactics which would have been a credit to 
Quintus Fabius Maximus . . . [The continuances] were part of the defendants’ delaying 
actions . . . It almost worked.179 
 The Fifth Circuit’s ruling did not overturn Judge Mize’s decision, however, but reversed 
it and strongly rebuked Mize in its majority opinion of the decision. The court found that 
University of Mississippi’s policy of requiring applicants to submit alumni recommendation 
letters was designed to circumvent the rulings of the Brown v. Board of Education case. The 
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university’s policy was enacted just six months following the Brown ruling. Judge Wisdom, in 
writing for the majority, noted that the state of Mississippi’s IHL effectively prohibited all black 
college transfer applicants from applying to white universities because Mississippi’s black 
colleges were purposefully hindered with the intent of being unable to gain accreditation from 
accreditation granting organizations.180 Wisdom also wrote that the court found Meredith had 
been turned down “solely because he was a Negro. We see no valid, non-discriminatory reason 
for the University’s not accepting Meredith.”181 
 The defense had up to twenty-one days to file an appeal to the ruling, but did not act by 
the time the Fifth Circuit sent its mandate to Mize. Realizing their odds of successfully appealing 
the ruling were slim, the defense instead lodged a request with another member of the Fifth 
Circuit, Judge Benjamin Franklin Cameron, to issue a stay in the order.182 Judge Cameron was 
known as a conservative who believed in states’ rights more than a strong federal government. 
The goal of the state of Mississippi lawyers was to get Cameron to issue a stay that would 
prevent Mize from acting on the Fifth Circuit’s orders. They hoped that during the thirty-day stay 
U.S. Supreme Court would agree to hear their appeal before its summer recess. This turn nearly 
caused Meredith to abandon his case. He was torn between staying the course and finishing his 
degree at Jackson State in order to move on to graduate school, but Motley was able to convince 
him to keep up the effort. The three judges of the Fifth Circuit reacted by recalling their directive 
to Mize, resumed authority in the case and set aside Cameron’s stay on July 27, 1962. Between 
July 28 and August 6, 1962, Cameron and the other three Fifth Circuit judges alternated stays 
and vacations. Cameron rationalized his stays by saying that the Fifth Circuit was overstepping 
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its bounds.183 After Cameron’s final stay on August 6, Meredith’s LDF team decided to break the 
cycle of judicial badminton in the Fifth Circuit and filed a motion with the U.S. Supreme Court 
to have Cameron’s stay vacated. With the Supreme Court on summer recess and the last day to 
register for classes on October 1, 1962, approaching, the LDF directly appealed to Justice Hugo 
Black. Black held jurisdiction over appeals from the Fifth Circuit when the Supreme Court was 
not in session. They asked Black to use his authority to solve the “spurious question” that the 
state of Mississippi used to reject Meredith. The defense asked for a writ of certiorari, which 
would delay any legal action until the Supreme Court returned from vacation after October 1, 
1962.184 Because of the complexity and conflicting legal actions involved in the case, Black 
informally asked the Department of Justice to comment, thus involving the Kennedy 
administration in the case for the first time.185 
 The Department of Justice (DoJ) began paying closer attention to Meredith’s case after 
Justice Black’s request. The Civil Rights Division of the DoJ prepared an amicus curiae brief – a 
voluntary legal opinion from someone not party to a case – that suggested how Fifth Circuit’s 
order could be enacted. The DoJ’s interest in the case can be explained by the stake it has in 
seeing federal judgments being enforced. In its amicus brief, the DoJ called Judge Cameron’s 
actions “altogether lawless” and opined that Cameron’s stay “would irreparably injure 
Meredith…because the additional time he would lose would be irretrievable.”186 
 Justice Black issued his judgment on September 10, 1962, in which he agreed with the 
Fifth Circuit’s prior decision to issue an injunction against the University of Mississippi. Black 
did not vacate the defense’s request for a writ of certiorari on his own, but consulted with each of 
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the other eight justices and was assured that he had the authority to vacate Judge Cameron’s 
stays. Black decided to act on his authority because he thought it unlikely that entire court would 
agree to hear Meredith v. Fair. Black said that Meredith only stood to be harmed by further 
delays and that the university could not demonstrate that any harm would come to it by admitting 
Meredith. His decision effectively ordered Meredith’s admission to the University of Mississippi 
via the Fifth Circuit’s order to Judge Mize to order an injunction against the university 
preventing Meredith’s enrollment. Meredith stated that he expected to register the following 
week.187 
 The book was closed on the University of Mississippi’s legal arguments with Justice 
Black’s decision. With the U.S. Supreme Court unlikely to agree to hear the case, the Fifth 
Circuit’s decision was the court ruling of precedence. While the university relented at this stage, 
it marked the beginning of resistance on the part Mississippi’s governor, Ross Barnett. Barnett 
commented on the ruling by saying that it was “just as illegal as if the Supreme Court of Kansas 
had employed it,” thus foreshadowing his attempt to employ “interposition” to resist the federal 
court order.188 The concept of interposition was a failed states’ rights theory with its roots in the 
Tenth Amendment that held a state had the right to ignore a federal law or court order if it ran 
afoul of what the state believed. By 1962, interposition had been repeatedly tested and failed, 
most notably in the Civil War a century earlier.189 Following the Brown v. Board of Education 
decision, multiple Southern state legislatures passed resolutions of interposition to permit their 
governors to resist forced federal attempts at desegregation within their states. 190 Alabama flirted 
with passing a resolution of imposition after Brown, but Governor Jim Folsom recognized the 
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futility of such a gesture, saying, “It’s like a dog baying at the moon and claiming it’s got it 
treed.”191 Mississippi’s state legislature passed such a resolution in 1956.192 
 Barnett and his discredited delaying strategy of imposition would eventually be forced 
into compliance by the John F. Kennedy administration. Though the Kennedy administration 
ultimately proved to follow a somewhat plodding course in supporting the Fifth Circuit’s ruling, 
the president had a reputation as being a supporter of civil rights and was as progressive a chief 
executive who had ever been in office. Kennedy tried to walk a fine line in building support of 
both blacks and conservative Southern whites. He gained support of voting blacks by reaching 
out to the NAACP and helping to get Martin Luther King, Jr. released from a Georgia jail. But 
Kennedy also threw a bone to conservative Southern democrats when he chose Lyndon B. 
Johnson of Texas as his running mate in 1960. Governor Barnett, though, burned a bridge 
between himself and the future president when he expressed support for unpledged electors in 
the 1960 election in order to build for himself more support among displeased Southern 
conservatives who looked ready to revolt from the Democratic Party.193 Despite Barnett’s earlier 
affront to Kennedy, the Kennedy administration, and U.S. Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy 
in particular, followed a very gradual course in ensuring the Fifth Circuit was obeyed. The 
Kennedys preferred persuasion to overt federal action, and simultaneously sought to prevent 
further fracturing of the Democratic Party by allowing Governor Barnett to appear to have an 
authoritative, collaborative hand in the inevitable desegregation of the University of 
Mississippi.194 
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 The Kennedy administration, though it had a reputation of racial progressiveness and 
ultimately gained credit for its role in bringing to bear the violent potential of the army in seeing 
Meredith enrolled at the University of Mississippi, was a reluctant participant in the proceedings. 
The DoJ initially did not respond to the letter Meredith sent to assistant attorney general Burke 
Marshall’s office in February 1961. Marshall, for his part, recognized as early as June 1961 that 
the federal government was bound to have to become involved if Meredith were granted an 
injunction by a federal court. In a sign of early planning, Marshall had two deputy marshals 
make a reconnaissance visit to Oxford, Mississippi, to learn the lay of the land and how to 
prepare for a possible escort of Meredith. The FBI and army intelligence also got involved in the 
planning by having local Oxford agents plan where to build a tent city for housing a force of 
deputy marshals. The Air Force also contributed by flying recon missions over Oxford.195 
Marshall acted as attorney general Robert F. Kennedy’s point man on the Meredith v. Fair case 
as it gained steam, keeping the attorney general apprised of the situation. The DoJ remained 
officially uninvolved until Justice Black made his September 1962 request for an amicus brief 
from the DoJ. Even before Black’s September 10, 1962, decision the upheld the Fifth Circuit’s 
instructions to Judge Mize to grant an injunction, Marshall was working to lay the groundwork 
for the involvement of federal entities in the bodily protection of Meredith when he set foot on 
the university campus. Marshall instructed chief U.S. marshal James P. McShane to prepare for 
Meredith’s integration. Marshall also began coordinating with the army for providing logistical 
support to the marshals.196 
 Mississippi and its institutions had leapt into action to thwart the federal orders the day 
following Black’s decision. Governor Barnett, who had run and won in 1959 on a platform of 
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segregation, was the lead antagonist. After Barnett planned the state’s next move with his 
advisers and White Citizens’ Council leaders, he addressed Mississippi in a state-wide radio and 
television broadcast. On September 13, 1962, the same day Mize granted an injunction against 
the IHL board, Barnett said in his address: 
This is the day and this is the hour…No school in our state will be integrated while I am 
your Governor. There is no case in history where the Caucasian race has survived social 
integration. We will not drink from the cup of genocide. Mississippi, as a Sovereign 
State, has the right under the Federal Constitution to determine for itself what the Federal 
Government has reserved to it. Therefore, in obedience to legislative and constitutional 
sanction I do hereby interpose the rights of the Sovereign State of Mississippi to enforce 
its laws and to regulate its own internal affairs without interference on the part of the 
Federal government or its officers.197 
 Following Barnett’s proclamation of interposition, the organizations that would have to 
bear the brunt of the governor’s gambit went to work to try to plan for the near future and 
ameliorate the damage that was being set in motion by his protestation. University of Mississippi 
chancellor J.D. Williams and his staff immediately instructed students to treat Meredith 
normally. The chancellor, the provost and student leaders also held a two-day retreat to plan for 
the desegregation. The student leaders were charged with keeping their peers in line, and the 
administration decided that any unruly students would be expelled.198 The IHL board of trustees 
– the defendants in Meredith v. Fair – met on the day following Barnett’s broadcast to see on 
which side of the decision the various trustees stood. Five of trustees agreed with interposition 
and the risk of being cited for contempt of court. Six others preferred to admit Meredith. Two 
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were undecided.199 Barnett also considered appointing himself registrar in order to let the IHL 
off the hook and force a showdown between the office of the governor and the federal 
government.200 Around the same time, on September 15, 1962, Barnett and attorney general 
Kennedy began a series of secret phone negotiations whereby the governor agreed to a course of 
action, but then reneged when the federal government kept up its end of the bargain. In the initial 
agreement, Barnett agreed that Meredith would appear on campus to register on September 20 
along with a handful of deputy U.S. marshals, but would be turned away and allowed to register 
once a federal court order was arranged. On the public front, Barnett threatened to close the 
university, which was apparently within his power. This threat was a gambit on the governor’s 
part to get the IHL Board of Trustees to take the probable contempt bullet for him. The IHL had 
no interest in seeing the University of Mississippi close, and Barnett hoped his threat would force 
them to make a declaration on their intentions vis-à-vis admitting Meredith. Barnett would get to 
look like a hero to segregationist Mississippians – he was mulling a run at a U.S. Senate seat – 
and make the IHL look like the villains who gave in to federal pressure.201 When Barnett and 
Robert Kennedy spoke again on September 17, Barnett changed the plan and proposed that 
Meredith register at the IHL in Jackson. When Kennedy insisted it be in Oxford, Barnett then 
asked for further delays because the IHL board had not yet decided on a course of action.202 
 Aside from Barnett’s efforts at delay, entities around the state of Mississippi colluded in 
an attempt to throw new roadblocks in Meredith’s way. On September 19, 1962, the Hinds 
County prosecutor renewed the voter fraud charge against Meredith in spite of the Fifth Circuit’s 
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injunction not to.203 The state legislature immediately stepped in by passing a bill to prevent the 
enrollment of anyone convicted of or facing crimes involving “moral turpitude.”204 With Barnett 
vacillating and the legislature laying the groundwork for trouble with the federal government, the 
IHL board of trustees decided to pass the buck firmly to Barnett by making him responsible for 
registering Meredith. The pace of desegregation was beginning to quicken in Oxford and on 
campus, as well. Sporadic Meredith effigy burnings took place on the university campus in late 
September 1962. More than fifty reporters came to Oxford to await Meredith’s registration.205 
The ability of the state of Mississippi to provide law enforcement was also coming into question. 
The city of Oxford and the university campus had only sixteen police officers between them. 
State agencies and other counties sent 300 more law enforcement personnel, but the federal 
government could not trust that these men would serve to keep the peace since they could be 
mobilized to follow Barnett’s potentially conflicting orders. For this reason, Meredith never 
stayed in Oxford as he awaited the opportunity to register; he always traveled to Oxford via 
plane or motorcade with federal agent protection from safer locations in Memphis, Jackson or 
New Orleans.206 
 On September 20, 1962, Meredith was found guilty in absentia in the renewed voter fraud 
case in Hinds County. Motley immediately filed three motions in federal court that sought an 
injunction against Meredith being arrested, against the Hinds County judge’s injunction against 
Meredith enrolling, and a restraining order against the new moral turpitude law being used to 
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disqualify Meredith. Federal judges and the Fifth Circuit honored Motley’s motions and removed 
the legal barriers to enrolling Meredith.207 
With the legal stage set, that same day, Barnett and Meredith both went to Oxford. 
Barnett flew to Oxford first, along with the lieutenant governor, Paul B. Johnson and Dugas 
Shands. Barnett arrived with a mandate from the IHL board to either approve or deny Meredith 
for registration. Barnett met a throng of students surrounding the Lyceum – the main campus 
administration building at the University of Mississippi – and soaked up their adoration. 
Meredith arrived in a motorcade with Chief Marshal James P. McShane and a DoJ lawyer, St. 
John Barrett. Meredith and his small federal entourage were met with racist jeers from the 
gathered crowd. Chancellor J.D. Williams was not present because he had effectively been 
stripped of power in the situation when the IHL board gave the mandate to Barnett. Registrar 
Robert Ellis was present, however, as stage dressing for the stand Barnett was going to make. 
When Ellis notified Meredith that he no longer had the authority to register Meredith, Barnett 
read a statement that said, “You, James H. Meredith, are hereby refused admission as a student to 
the University of Mississippi.” Barnett claimed that he was denying Meredith because admitting 
him would upset the peace. Meredith and his entourage left. The DoJ petitioned Judge Mize in 
Meridian to charge university officials with contempt of court, but not against Barnett. The 
Kennedy administration still did not want to go head-to-head with an unruly governor in court. 
Mize ultimately decided not to charge the chancellor, dean and registrar with contempt, but the 
DoJ also asked the Fifth Circuit to increase the pressure on the IHL board by charging all fifteen 
board members with contempt. After Mize refused the contempt charges of the three university 
officials, the DoJ added them to the appellate court contempt petition.208 The Fifth Circuit 
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hearing on the contempt charges convened on September 24, 1962, in New Orleans, just a few 
hours before registration for the Fall 1962 semester was scheduled to close. The defense attorney 
for the three named university administrators maintained that Barnett had taken their powers of 
enrollment. The court ruled the IHL trustees were in contempt. The members immediately 
capitulated and said they would follow any order the court issued. The court extended the 
registration deadline for 24 hours, giving Meredith enough time to be registered by Ellis in the 
board of trustees office in Jackson the next day, according to the plan struck that day.209 When 
Robert Kennedy and Barnett spoke on the phone that evening, Barnett was taken aback by the 
decision made without him and replied that he did not yet know what he was going to do, stating 
that the Mississippi court injunctions were still valid.210 
 The next day, September 25, 1962, the Fifth Circuit issued an injunction that prohibited 
anyone – Barnett included – from obstructing Meredith’s registration at the University of 
Mississippi. In a phone conversation that morning, Barnett reiterated that he did not yet know 
what he was going to do. The governor even vacillated on whether or not Mississippi was part of 
the Union, demonstrating his adherence to his interposition gambit. In Jackson at noon that day, 
the IHL board agreed to take back from the governor responsibility for approving Meredith. In 
the same move, they restored power to Chancellor Williams and Registrar Ellis. When Burke 
Marshall learned that Barnett had gone to the IHL board office to exert more pressure, he 
arranged for Fifth Circuit Judge Tuttle to extend the deadline again in order to undermine 
Barnett’s stalling. When Robert Kennedy called Barnett to verify that Meredith would be able to 
safely enter the IHL building in spite of the growing crowd, Barnett affirmed that it would be 
safe. When Meredith, McShane and John Doar, the assistant attorney general for civil rights at 
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the DoJ, arrived from New Orleans that afternoon and went to the IHL building to register, 
Barnett met them at the entrance and refused to allow them in. Barnett claimed that both the 
public peace and instructions from the state attorney general mandated his interposition. Doar 
reiterated his orders to see Meredith registered then and there, but Barnett stood his ground. As 
the Meredith entourage left to jeers, Barnett once again entered the crowd to imbibe their 
adoration.211 
After Barnett’s willful defiance of federal court orders that afternoon, attorney general 
Robert Kennedy called to plan the next attempt. Barnett agreed that Meredith would show up to 
classes on the university campus the next morning at 10 a.m. Chancellor Williams tried to 
prepare the student population by giving a campus-wide radio broadcast telling them panic was 
not beneficial. Meredith flew into Oxford on the morning of September 26 and rode with Doar, 
McShane and six other deputy marshals to the university. The Kennedy administration still did 
not want to overwhelm any opposition with force, thus dispatched only a few marshals with 
Meredith to this point. Meredith, though, was blocked from entering campus by a force of 
Mississippi Highway Patrol officers who created a human barrier across University Avenue, the 
road leading to the entrance to the campus. Lt. Governor Johnson was ahead of the phalanx and 
cut off Doar, explaining that Barnett ordered Johnson to refuse Meredith entry onto campus. 
After the Meredith entourage departed, the Fifth Circuit ordered Johnson to appear before them 
in New Orleans on September 29 to explain why he should not be held in contempt, again letting 
Barnett off the hook. Besides federal forces putting pressure on the University of Mississippi – 
the DoJ was examining recommending cutting federal funding to the university – other 
organizations were also reassessing their opinions of Mississippi and the university. The 
Southern Association of Colleges and Schools was considering whether or not to accredit the 
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university given the unfolding trouble.212 There were also worries among the state business 
community that Barnett’s stand would scare away corporations interested in locating branches in 
Mississippi.213 
Following Barnett’s failure to keep up his end of the bargain, he and Robert Kennedy 
again negotiated by phone. Barnett’s new plan involved a surreal theatrical production in which 
Barnett would capitulate and register only after the U.S. marshals drew their weapons, but Burke 
Marshall rejected the plan because of the powder keg it was likely to ignite. The next attempt 
agreed to by Robert Kennedy and involved a force of two dozen marshals accompanying 
Meredith and Doar. One marshal was designated to draw his pistol in front of Johnson, forcing 
him to yield. By this point more than one hundred journalists had traveled to Oxford, along with 
three hundred state troopers and one hundred sheriff’s deputies from around the state were on the 
University of Mississippi, all unarmed. Barnett showed up on the afternoon of September 27 as 
Meredith’s entourage was on its way from Memphis and riled up the crowd of two thousand 
people. Angling for another delay, Barnett called Robert Kennedy and asked him to have 
Meredith’s motorcade turn around because of the threat posed by the large crowd in which 
Barnett was just basking.214 
On September 28, 1962, the Fifth Circuit in New Orleans held a hearing that found 
Barnett in contempt of court, per the DoJ’s motion. Judge Tuttle said the court had “about 
exhausted its powers…the time has about come…when the burden now falls on the Executive 
Branch.” The court levied a $10,000-per-day fine against Barnett, but gave him until October 2 
to comply with the order. 215 Lieutenant Governor Johnson was found in contempt the following 
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day and had a $5,000-per-day fine levied against him, with the same deadline of October 2 for 
compliance.216 It was at this point that President Kennedy became more involved by actively 
conferring with the DoJ about the situation. Plans for the deployment of federalized National 
Guard troops began to coalesce when President Kennedy had Robert Kennedy confer with the 
leaders of the military to decide if army backing would definitely be required in Oxford. It was 
decided that an army engineering battalion would be sent to Naval Air Station Memphis to await 
the order to erect a tent city for housing occupying army guardsmen in Oxford, if it still proved 
necessary.217 The odds of military intervention grew in the several days preceding October 1, 
1962. The FBI was receiving reports that indicated racist citizen groups were mounting 
campaigns to send protesters – or possibly thugs – to the university campus. Edwin A. Walker, 
the army general who implemented an order from President Dwight Eisenhower to maintain 
order during the 1957 integration of Central High School in Little Rock, Arkansas, was a vocal 
opponent of the integration of the University of Mississippi. Based in Texas, he rallied support 
for on-campus demonstrations against the perceived federal intrusion when he came to Jackson 
on September 29.218 Walker, who had been pushed out of the military for being too zealous in his 
anti-communist stance, made a public statement that contained sentiment common among 
extreme segregationists: 
I am in Mississippi beside Governor Ross Barnett. I call for a national protest against the 
conspiracy from within. Rally to the cause of freedom in righteous indignation, violent 
vocal protest, and bitter silence under the flag of Mississippi at the use of Federal troops. 
This today is a disgrace to the nation in 'dire peril,' a disgrace beyond the capacity of 
anyone except its enemies. This is the conspiracy of the crucifixion by anti-Christ 
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conspirators of the Supreme Court in their denial of prayer and their betrayal of a 
nation.219 
President Kennedy directly entered negotiations for the first time on September 29. The 
president underscored that his main interest – in addition to seeing federal law obeyed – was to 
see that no one was hurt. Barnett pressed for a “cooling off” period before Meredith would try 
again, but the Kennedys rejected his suggestions for additional delays. Failing that, Barnett then 
turned to the law passed on September 19 banning applicants suspected of moral turpitude, and 
the conversation ended on uncertain terms. Barnett reached the height of his hubris later that 
evening at a University of Mississippi-University of Kentucky football game in Jackson. At half-
time he gave a speech in which he vowed to resist federal encroachment. Most of the crowd of 
42,000 rose to their feet and gave Barnett an ovation, inflating his sense of righteousness that 
was just two days away from being severely deflated.220 After the game, Barnett once again 
spoke to Robert Kennedy via phone. Barnett was incredulous when Robert Kennedy revealed 
that the National Guard would be mobilized. The attorney general also revealed that President 
Kennedy intended to make a statement on national television explaining his decision to mobilize 
the National Guard happened because secret negotiations with Barnett for a more peaceable 
solution had broken down. With his options having run out with the entry of the military into the 
situation and looming disclosure of his craven bargaining with the Kennedys, Barnett seemed to 
recognize that allowing Meredith to register was his last resort. In that conversation they agreed 
that Meredith would register on Monday, October 1.221 At the time of the phone call, there were 
twenty thousand soldiers from various battalions preparing to deploy to Mississippi upon the 
president’s order. They were not to be the tip of the spear in any action; any preparations 
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involving the military were being undertaken to act as a support structure for federal power 
exercised directly through the DoJ via the six hundred assembled U.S. marshals, deputy marshals 
and deputized personnel from other departments.222 It was the plan of the Kennedy 
administration for the marshals to be the first line of defense for Meredith and for the marshals to 
arrest Barnett if that proved necessary.223 Kennedy prepared a presidential proclamation (No. 
3497), declaring that Barnett had prevented the enforcement of court orders and calling for 
Barnett to cease and desist. The president also federalized the Mississippi National Guard 
minutes after midnight on September 30, 1962, with an executive order (No. 11053).224 
The president’s decision to federalize the state guard came as he and the DoJ received 
reports from the FBI of the worsening situation in Oxford. Edwin Walker’s inflammatory 
speeches inspired groups from across the country to send demonstrators to muster in Mississippi, 
most of them promising to come armed. Chairmen of Citizens’ Councils in Louisiana and 
Florida also offered their support. Two Alabama county sheriffs stepped forward with offers to 
cross state lines into Mississippi with “posses” of hundreds of men. The FBI also caught wind of 
Klansmen, militias, John Birchers and other assorted extreme right-wing groups around the 
country volunteering members to come to Oxford.225 The FBI even picked up one particularly 
bizarre report of a wealthy Barnett supporter having arranged for four WWII-era surplus 
Canadian Royal Air Force P-51 Mustang fighter planes to be laundered and sent to Mississippi 
for Barnett to command.226 
On the afternoon of Sunday, September 30, 1962, the U.S. Marshals based in Memphis 
were given word to prepare immediately to travel to the University of Mississippi. The 
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beginnings of the chaos that was to unfold showed itself then, too, when the Gen. Creighton 
Abrams, the officer in charge of the military forces mustering at the Naval Air Station in 
Memphis, was not informed that the marshals were heading to Oxford to face a mob.227 
Chancellor J.D. Williams of the university also remained in the dark about Meredith being 
brought to campus Sunday afternoon, so could make no concrete plans for maximizing security. 
Meredith himself also did not know that the DoJ had decided to put in motion its plan on Sunday 
afternoon as he waited at the naval facility in Memphis.228 The first contingent of 170 marshals 
arrived in Oxford via airplane at 2:30 that afternoon. Members of the Department of Justice 
overseeing the federal efforts, including Nicholas Katzenbach, a deputy attorney general, arrived 
soon thereafter and proceeded with the deputies to the university campus. The group, riding in 
army trucks and Border Patrol cars, was met by Colonel T.B. Birdsong, the head of the 
Mississippi Highway Patrol, and led onto campus. The original plan for Meredith’s registration 
had it taking place that Sunday evening at the Lyceum building on campus, but the plan was 
postponed again until the following morning, Monday, October 1. It was decided that Meredith 
would stay on campus that night rather than create more risk by moving him and his band of 
federal protectors. Meredith had been assigned a discreet sleeping place on campus in a 
dormitory room assigned for U.S. marshal use. Subject to the same concerns for their safety, the 
marshals also stayed on campus rather than adjourning to their tent city on the outskirts of town. 
This turn of events had the marshals, wearing metal helmets and armed with clubs, revolvers and 
tear gas, continuing to man their posts at the Lyceum throughout the night.229 Katzenbach had 
the marshals keep guard at the Lyceum rather than draw them back to Baxter Hall, the dorm 
Meredith had been assigned for the nights, so as not to draw attention of potential troublemakers 
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to where Meredith was located. The position around the Lyceum taken up by the federal agents, 
though, was hastily organized and tactically exposed due to the unsecured neighboring buildings 
and tree-filled park adjoining the Lyceum.230 
The flashpoint of the coming riot had not yet come by 5:00 p.m. on Sunday evening. 
Campus was still quiet, and the Circle, the wooded park adjoining the Lyceum, was occupied 
only by squirrels. As word spread of the marshals’ presence, hundreds of curious onlookers 
descended on the Circle. The Mississippi Highway Patrolmen who were tasked with keeping 
campus clear of outsiders could not stop the flow of campus insiders toward the Circle.231 At 
5:00 p.m., Katzenbach was at the office of a university official communicating with Robert 
Kennedy via phone. Katzenbach recommended that Meredith be flown in from Memphis at that 
time, and left with several others in a Border Patrol car to go to the Oxford airport to collect 
Meredith.232 The situation around the Lyceum and in the Circle was beginning to degrade 
simultaneously. Hundreds of students returning to campus heard of the marshals’ presence and 
began going to the vicinity. Confederate battle flags began to appear, and the atmosphere took on 
an air of standoffishness. Chancellor Williams was unprepared for the growing crowds, and 
entered the mass to encourage students to return to their dorms and stay away.233 By 6:00 p.m., 
the crowd numbered more than one thousand, compared to around 450 marshals. The marshals 
were remaining calm and impersonally courteous in the face of the more boisterous, insulting 
crowds. The highway patrol by this time had given up on anything other than directing traffic 
and watched with the same interest as the crowd of civilians. It is notable that no state or school 
officials tried to quash the growing throng of increasingly vocal onlookers. Williams, despite 
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appealing to individual students to clear out, never fully employed his authority to enjoin the 
students in the crowd to leave.234 It was around 7:00 p.m. that the assaults on marshals and 
members of the press began. Some members of the crowd began to rush toward the marshals 
outside the Lyceum and spit on them, though the marshals did not retaliate. One of the 359 
campus-registered journalists had his camera and car destroyed by the mob. Indifferent state 
police helped him and his wife who was accompanying him only when it seemed serious bodily 
harm was imminent.235 
 The leadership of the state of Mississippi committed serious errors in judgment once it 
was clear the mob outside the Lyceum was becoming more emboldened. In addition to a 
leadership vacuum in the Lyceum area, State Senator George Yarborough exacerbated the 
quickly degrading situation when he authorized state troopers to leave the area. His order left the 
marshals alone against an uncontrolled civilian mob without even the indifferent control 
exhibited by the state troopers.236 About the same time the state troopers were cut loose from 
making any overtures toward keeping order, Meredith arrived at the Oxford airport from 
Memphis. Katzenbach traveled with Meredith in a federal car escorted by a state highway patrol 
quickly and without much notice through a side entrance to campus. Meredith arrived at Baxter 
Hall, his dormitory, and quickly settled in with a small, discreet force of marshals guarding his 
room.237 
 At 7:30 p.m., Barnett gave a statewide radio and television broadcast stating that 
Meredith was on campus, enraging many in the crowd who had not yet heard the news. In his 
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address, Barnett condemned the federal government by saying it was “trampling on the 
sovereignty of this great state…You are destroying the Constitution of this great nation. May 
God have mercy on your souls.”238 Barnett’s ersatz submission statement came only after 
President Kennedy threatened to disclose the governor’s collusion with the federal government, 
which would certainly have had a detrimental effect on the rest of the remainder of his term.239 
By 8:00 p.m., the situation in the Circle had seriously deteriorated into the beginnings of a riot. 
The crowd had begun hurling various missiles at the marshals in front of the Lyceum. A black 
soldier who was the driver of one of the army trucks that had transported the marshals was 
sprayed in the face with a fire extinguisher by a rowdy youth as the driver sat in the cab of the 
truck.240 As DoJ personnel on the scene tried to communicate with Robert Kennedy in 
Washington to ask how to proceed, chief marshal McShane ordered the marshals to don their gas 
masks and fire a volley of tear gas to drive back the crowd. Robert Kennedy tried to alert the 
president of the ugly turn of events prior to the president’s televised national address, but could 
not get there in time. President Kennedy appealed for peace and stated that he intended to use the 
minimum amount of force necessary to ensure federal law was obeyed. His address was too late 
to appeal to the rioters on the University of Mississippi campus.241 
 The riot continued for hours, with the marshals following a strategy of launching tear gas 
grenades to push back the mass, then retreating to the Lyceum. The missiles in the form of rocks, 
bricks and caustic chemicals continued to be hurled by the rioters. More and more outsiders 
flowed into campus with little to stop them. The mob’s numbers grew to more than two thousand 
in the first hours of the riot. Bullets fired from unknown positions began to strike dozens of 
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marshals, who did not have enough emergency medical aid resources on hand.242 The marshals 
also had none of the materiel that was standard crowd-control gear: bullhorns, walkie-talkies, 
mobile light sources, police barriers and body armor.243 Discriminate attacks against the marshals 
also spread to journalists. Cameras and notebooks served as beacons for the mob to home in their 
attacks on. With the police presence on campus minimal, those journalists under attack found 
themselves with almost no protection. In many cases, the more disciplined university students 
who were trying to maintain order swooped in to pull to safety journalists who were being 
pummeled. Anglo-French journalist Paul Guihard was less lucky – he was shot at very close 
range in the back, the bullet piercing his heart and killing him. The inflammatory ex-general 
Edwin Walker also materialized on campus at this time. Many in the crowd implored him to 
organize the mob and lead them against the marshals at the Lyceum, though he did not manage 
to do so. Some local clergy tried to calm the mob by explaining that Meredith was not actually 
inside the Lyceum.244 By 9:30 p.m., one university student recalled that she recognized almost no 
one in the Circle among the riotous crowd; most were “rednecks” unfamiliar to her.245 
 At 10:00 p.m., deputy attorney general Katzenbach received authority from Washington 
to call in the local National Guard unit to the Lyceum to act as reinforcements for the besieged 
marshals.246 Katzenbach realized the situation called for escalation of the federal effort and 
resisted on the marshals’ request for permission to open fire on students with pistols.247 
Katzenbach then called Captain Murry Falkner of the Mississippi National Guard unit based in 
Oxford and instructed him to bring his local troop to the Lyceum. As the marshals waited for 
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assistance from the federalized National Guard, the situation worsened as more and more people 
bypassed roadblocks to pour into campus. At least two hundred of the five hundred marshals 
sustained injuries from the various missiles, chemicals and bullets being shot their way.248 
Another bystander in the Circle, a local jukebox repairman, became the second fatality of the 
night when struck by a bullet from an unknown pistol.249 Captain Falkner, when his convoy of 
four jeeps and two trucks reached campus, was injured when a brick was thrown through the 
windshield of his truck and broke his arm.250 
 President Kennedy and Barnett continued to maintain phone contact frequently 
throughout the night. Barnett thought he detected wavering in the president’s resolve to see that 
federal court orders were obeyed, while Kennedy seemed to not fully appreciate the magnitude 
of the riot that was raging on the University of Mississippi campus. Kennedy began to become 
frustrated by the lagging response of the army to send troops from staging areas in Memphis to 
Oxford. The first army M.P.s arrived at the Oxford airport at 1:00 a.m. and arrived on campus at 
2:15 a.m. Despite the presence of the army, the riot continued as more guardsmen arrived on 
campus and joined the marshals at the Lyceum and at Baxter Hall where Meredith was staying. It 
was not until 6:15 a.m. that General Charles Billingslea, the field commander, declared campus 
secure.251 The rioting on campus, though, was pushed into Oxford proper. The mayor, Richard 
Elliott, contacted the FBI for help, and the army was on the town square within twenty 
minutes.252 
 That morning, October 1, 1962, at 7:55 a.m., Meredith, Chief U.S. Marshal McShane and 
Assistant U.S. Attorney General John Doar rode in a Border Patrol under marshal guard to the 
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Lyceum.253 With marshals and army guardsmen still surrounding the Lyceum, Meredith 
registered in the office of registrar Robert Ellis at 8:15 am. He paid his tuition and fees of $230 
there, then left for his first class almost an hour later, thus ending segregation at the University of 
Mississippi.254 
The University of Alabama 
 The desegregation of the University of Alabama on June 11, 1963, by Vivian Malone and 
James Hood was not the first attempt on the part of black applicants to gain admission to the 
university, nor was it the first time a black applicant gained entry to the school. The 1963 
desegregation is the exemplar in this study of the desegregation of the University of Alabama for 
several reasons. First, it takes place during the same era as the desegregations of the University 
of Georgia and the University of Mississippi, and less than one year after the latter. It is being 
included to the exclusion of the 1956 admission of black graduate student Autherine Juanita 
Lucy because Lucy’s presence at the university lasted only several days before unrest caused the 
university Board of Trustees to suspend Lucy for reasons of public safety in the face of growing 
unrest. The Board of Trustees later expelled Lucy when a lawsuit she filed against the university 
implied the trustees were complicit in the riots that drove her from campus. The 1963 
desegregation was the one that stuck. Lucy’s admission is also being excluded because she was 
admitted as a graduate student in library science. It is the contention of the researcher that the 
desegregation of undergraduate education is of greater symbolic importance in the civil rights 
movement. Undergraduate life is what defines the culture of a university. The majorities of 
undergraduate populations at public universities tend to be composed of in-state residents, thus 
the desegregation of undergraduate education was more likely to have made a resistant 
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population feel an affront had been committed. Graduate-level education at universities also 
takes place in a different atmosphere than undergraduate-level education. Graduate students have 
fewer classes that convene less frequently and at different hours than undergraduate classes, thus 
graduate students are less visible and less numerous on campus in comparison to undergraduates. 
Comparison between the Lucy case in 1956 and Hamilton/Holmes in 1961 and Meredith in 1962 
would not be nearly as insightful as a comparison with the University of Alabama’s 1963 
desegregation. The Lucy desegregation, though, does help provide context for the comparably 
peaceful 1963 desegregation, so some details are included. 
Autherine Juanita Lucy 
 Autherine Lucy, a 1952 English B.A. graduate of the all-black Miles College in Fairfield, 
Alabama, was one of two women active in the Alabama NAACP who applied for admission to 
the University of Alabama in 1953. Lucy, along with her classmate from Miles College, Polly 
Anne Myers, sought out help from the NAACP for their applications as graduate students to the 
University of Alabama. Thurgood Marshall and Constance Baker Motley – both of whom would 
be involved as counsel in later university desegregation suits profiled in this study – were 
assigned as counsel to the women. Arthur Shores, a black Alabama attorney, joined the LDF 
team. The University of Alabama had maintained a policy of ignoring black applicants and 
wished for the state to continue the tradition of “Jim Crow scholarships” that paid for qualified 
black applicants, of which there were 103 in 1955, to attend out-of-state colleges.255 After two 
years and nine months, their case, Lucy et al v. Adams (William F. Adams, the Dean of 
Admissions at the University of Alabama), was ruled upon in favor of the plaintiffs by U.S. 
District Court for the Northern District of Alabama Judge H. Hobart Grooms. Upon appeal, the 
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decision was unanimously upheld in the U.S. Supreme Court in October 1955.256 An injunction 
was granted to the plaintiffs that enjoined the University of Alabama from denying Lucy and 
Myers admission.257 The Board of Trustees of the university, however, still managed to deny 
Myers admission based on her “conduct and marital record” (Myers had married since the initial 
suit) while admission was granted to Lucy. Myers had been the more outspoken and mature of 
the two applicants, and the board hoped that denying Myers would cause Lucy to reconsider 
attending the university alone.258 Lucy decided to proceed with her enrollment, and began classes 
on February 3, 1956.259 
 Lucy’s attendance at the University of Alabama as a graduate student would last only a 
few days before rioting caused university administrators to act to quell the unrest by suspending 
Lucy. A riot with up to one thousand people began on the night of February 2, 1956, in 
Tuscaloosa, followed by another on February 3. The violence broke out when workers from a 
rubber plant in Tuscaloosa began throwing rocks at the car of the Dean of Women’s car, which 
had been made available for use in transporting Lucy to classes on February 3. The car, which 
did not contain Lucy, was destroyed. While Lucy was inside a campus building attending her 
first class, a mob containing many Ku Klux Klan members surrounded the building. The mob 
eventually moved on to attack a post office, a bus and an American flag display, with three 
young men arrested.260 
 For Lucy’s protection, she was spirited off campus by the Tuscaloosa police and brought 
to the offices of the local black newspaper, The Alabama Citizen. After her location was 
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compromised by drive-bys and threatening phone calls, the owner of the newspaper drove her to 
Birmingham for her safety.261 The university Board of Trustees barred Lucy from returning to 
campus for reasons of public safety after a final demonstration had to be broken up by police on 
February 6.262 Lucy filed suit in federal court against the university to petition for reinstatement, 
and was again represented by her NAACP team. In the case presided over by Judge Grooms, 
Lucy’s lawyers accused the university Board of Trustees of being complicit in planning the riots 
that drove Lucy from the campus. On February 29, 1956, Grooms ruled in favor of the 
defendants by refusing to hold the university and board members in contempt of the U.S. 
Supreme Court ruling, saying the officials did underestimate the resistance they met, but were 
not negligent in doing so.263 
 Lucy’s expulsion stood at the time, though the University of Alabama ultimately 
overturned it in 1980. Though there were elements of social and religious life in Tuscaloosa that 
appealed for peace in the Lucy desegregation, resistance was widespread among townspeople 
and students. No special preparations for an orderly desegregation had been made – no police 
presence, no plan for visiting press and no emergency measures had been taken. There also was 
not much in the way of local press coverage, thus scant opportunity for the populace to 
conceptualize of what a peaceful desegregation would mean. Tuscaloosa News editor Buford 
Boone, who would later become a behind-the-scenes operator in the nonviolent 1963 University 
of Alabama desegregation, wrote a Pulitzer-winning editorial entitled “What a Price for Peace” 
in the aftermath of Lucy’s banishment. In that piece, he criticized university administrators for 
capitulating to pressure from a mob264. Just as relevant as the lessons learned from security gaps 
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and lackluster preparations in 1956, the moderating influence of Boone and other like-minded 
newspaper editors would play an important role in promoting a peaceful desegregation in 1963. 
In an interesting coda to the Lucy incident, Lucy did ultimately return to the University of 
Alabama and earned a Masters in elementary education in 1992. 
Vivian Malone and James Hood 
 The desegregation of the University of Alabama took place on June 11, 1963. Integration 
was accomplished by two black applicants, Vivian Malone and James A. Hood. They were 
chosen from among hundreds of potential applicants by the NAACP’s Legal Defense Fund to 
receive legal assistance with their applications. Malone and Hood were both academic standouts 
at their high schools, and in Hood’s case, at his Atlanta college. Malone came from a civil rights-
activist, working class family who stressed the importance of their children’s educations from an 
early age – Malone’s older brothers had already attended Tuskegee Institute. During her years in 
high school at Central High in Mobile, Alabama, Malone was a high achiever who had her sights 
set on college. When a paperwork foul-up caused her matriculation at the black Alabama A&M 
College to be delayed until fall 1961, a neighbor saw an opening for Malone to take a shot at 
ending segregation. Lewis Koen, who was active in the civil rights movement, heard of Malone’s 
delay in attending Alabama A&M, and convinced Malone to apply to the University of 
Alabama’s Mobile Center extension campus along with several other black applicants. Part of 
what fueled Malone’s decision to apply was that neither Alabama A&M nor Alabama State 
offered accounting, her desired major.265 Because of her academic achievements in high school 
as well as her willingness to remain in the application process despite intimidation from whites 
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who visited her home, Malone was deemed by the LDF to be one of the applicants who stood the 
best chance of weathering the daunting process, and she received their support.266 
 James A. Hood, from Gadsden, Alabama, also made the LDF’s short-list for potentially 
successful candidates. Hood was a top-notch athlete and student body president at Carver High 
in Gadsden. He was also known as a good student, though he had a nervous disposition for 
which he learned to compensate with a clever sense of humor. Hood’s middle-class family was 
also very active in the local civil rights movement in Gadsden, and Hood continued his activism 
when he went to Atlanta’s Clark College. Hood was already a sophomore at Clark College when 
he applied to the University of Alabama. His decision to apply stemmed from his realization that 
while in high school he had participated in a scurrilous study by a University of North Carolina 
professor that found blacks were “about 200,000 years behind whites in developing brain 
structures associated with higher mentality.”267 He confronted the professor via a letter, to which 
the professor replied that Hood was obviously lacking in the mental capacity to understand the 
study. A friend of Hood’s at the headquarters of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference 
(SCLC), a civil rights group, suggested that Hood seek retribution by applying to the University 
of Alabama. The second factor influencing Hood’s decision to apply was his interest in 
becoming a professional minister. He wished to study clinical psychology, which was not offered 
at Clark College, but which was available at the University of Alabama. Hood’s friend as the 
SCLC put him in touch with the LDF, and Hood made their list of qualified candidates.268 
 Malone and Hood were not alone in their decisions to apply. Attempts by blacks to 
integrate public universities in Alabama were increasing at the time. Eighty-six black students 
from Alabama A&M applied to the University of Alabama school of nursing in Birmingham on 
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January 15, 1962, but all were denied with excuses that quotas were filled or enrollment had 
closed. University of Alabama President Frank Rose told Governor George Wallace that the 
university had turned aside more than 230 black applicants at the time, but Rose said in later 
years that the university was actually seeking out qualified candidates for desegregation, and 
even sought out help from Martin Luther King, Jr. The university itself played no role in actually 
selecting which candidates applied, however, and sat on the sidelines at the time.269 
Governor George Wallace, the lawsuit and the stand in the schoolhouse door 
 Governor George Wallace would prove to be a pivotal and puzzling character in the 
desegregation of the University of Alabama. Outwardly, he created a façade of defiance of the 
federal government that was consistent with his image as a segregationist and a supporter of 
states’ rights. In private, though, his actions seemed to be motivated by a desire to avoid the sort 
of violence that marred the desegregation of the University of Mississippi in 1962. His true 
motivations vis-à-vis the desegregation and, more generally, the black populace of Alabama, 
have remained a subject of debate. Wallace was elected governor for four terms, the first in 
1962. He was elected on a staunch segregationist platform in 1962, but modified his stance each 
time to suit the cultural climate. Wallace famously recanted his segregationist views in 1979, 
before his last term as governor (1983 – 1987). 270 
 Wallace entered government in Alabama after returning from a tour as an aircraft 
mechanic in World War II. After working for Governor Chauncey Sparks, Wallace won a seat in 
the state legislature in 1946, and stayed until 1953. Wallace had an early record of supporting big 
businesses and white supremacists, such as the Black Belt-Big Mule alliance of industrialists that 
was in favor of establishing low-skill jobs that were rooted in natural resource extraction and 
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export. Wallace’s support for these initiatives curried favor among conservative, rural white 
voters who stood to be employed in these industries, versus the long-term gains from value-
added manufacturing and educational jobs that were lost in the short sale.271 
Wallace first ran for the governorship of Alabama in 1958 as a reaction to Governor Jim 
Folson’s mild response to the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education ruling. During the campaign, 
Wallace accidentally attracted the support of the NAACP through his condemnation of an 
opponent’s Klu Klux Klan ties. The unwanted endorsement contributed to Wallace’s sound loss, 
and led him to more actively court segregationist votes in future elections. He also developed an 
electoral strategy of staging conflicts with the federal government from his re-assumed position 
as a circuit court judge after his first gubernatorial campaign. His tactics, such as locking away 
county voting records from the U.S. Civil Rights Commission, appealed to many conservative 
Alabama voters. Wallace’s second run at the governor’s office in 1962 was based on 
segregationist rhetoric, and was when he made his infamous vow to “stand in the schoolhouse 
door” in order to defy federal court orders to desegregate schools and universities in Alabama. 
He won the governorship, and embarked on an incumbency where his populist, racist rhetoric 
laid a foundation for his strong support among conservative whites. Wallace’s popularity also 
emboldened him to heighten racial tensions and take extreme liberties with his office, such as 
creating a Sovereignty Commission that mirrored the eponymous organization in Mississippi, 
which also unconstitutionally spied on its citizens.272 
Wallace made his first specific move in the University of Alabama desegregation 
proceedings on March 18, 1963, when he called a meeting of the university Board of Trustees to 
discuss applicants to the Huntsville extension campus. At the time, it was still unclear exactly 
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which applicants and which campus would be the first to desegregate, and two black federal 
employees based in Huntsville aimed to continue their educations at that city’s campus.273 At the 
meeting of the board, Wallace made clear he wanted to force the LDF into a longer and more 
complex court battle based on larger constitutional questions, rather than to allow them to argue 
that the 1955 injunction ordered by Judge Grooms was still valid. Wallace also diverged from the 
haphazard scheming that characterized Mississippi governor Ross Barnett’s approach to 
desegregation less than a year earlier when the Alabama governor made clear he expected the 
Board of Trustees to abide by the eventual court ruling, whatever it would be. Wallace knew he 
had painted himself into a corner with his campaign promise to make a stand, but he also knew 
he had to make the stand alone, without the involvement of other state and university officers.274 
Wallace’s approach to the desegregation, defiant though it was, was equally concerned 
with maintaining public law and order as much as it was a political play to ensure the governor 
was able to save face during an increasingly likely desegregation. To that end, Wallace consulted 
with high-ranking members of the Citizens’ Councils in Jackson, Mississippi, to attempt to learn 
more about what had gone wrong in the desegregation of the University of Mississippi.275 
Wallace also sought to keep communications with the federal government open. On April 25, 
1963, the governor invited U.S. Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy to the governor’s mansion 
to discuss the coming federal court hearing, for which suit was filed by the LDF on behalf of 
Malone, Hood and another applicant, Sandy English, on April 19.276 The discussion between 
Kennedy and Wallace became heated at times, and it ended with both sticking to their original 
positions and with no concrete plans for going forward having been reached. In comparison to 
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Ross Barnett, Wallace showed that he understood the nuances of desegregation and how they 
might affect the population of the state. He pleaded with Kennedy to have the federal 
government proceed toward desegregation slowly, if it was so ordered by the court. The 
governor did not want a repeat of the violence in his state by the same elements who rioted in 
Mississippi.277 Wallace, for his understanding of the potential danger posed by currents of 
federal skepticism in Alabama, still played to their desires for maintenance of a separate-but-
equal Jim Crow society. He told Kennedy that he wanted to improve life for blacks, but not 
through university education. Instead, Wallace asked the attorney general for help in bringing to 
Alabama more vocational programs and industry which would employ the black underclass.278 
The leaders of Tuscaloosa civic and business life were not waiting for Wallace to decide 
on a course of action. As early as October 1962, there was a private meeting of prominent 
citizens at the home of one of Tuscaloosa’s leading industrialists to discuss strategies of how to 
avoid violence when the inevitable desegregation of the university came. The group, which 
included Tuscaloosa News editor Buford Boone, University of Alabama head football coach Paul 
“Bear” Bryant, as well as bank presidents and members of the local school board. Boone, the 
newspaper editor, eventually became the most deeply involved in the effort, as demonstrated 
from his editorial perch in the Tuscaloosa News. One of the other leaders, George LeMaistre, a 
bank president, said of their motives for the extra-governmental meetings: “The relatively recent 
experience in Little Rock and the subsequent damage to the business community in that city 
made a very persuasive argument for allowing the orders of the [Supreme] Court to be carried 
out without active resistance or violence.”279 
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The concerned civic and business leaders did more than just talk to one another about 
their concerns about a crisis of desegregation. They began to meet with leaders in other 
communities in order to establish a statewide basis of support for law and order in the event of 
university integration. Boone plied well-connected contacts around Alabama to in turn put 
pressure on the office of the governor to ensure peace and adherence to law. The group 
influenced others to also contact the university board of trustees to press for them to adhere to 
the court rulings, regardless of Wallace’s intentions. The Alabama State Chamber of Commerce 
lent its support to the cause of peaceful desegregation by taking out full-page ads in state 
newspapers that urged state officials to maintain law and order if desegregation came. The 
business and civic leaders traveled to Jackson, Mississippi, to further investigate what went 
wrong in the integration of the University of Mississippi. They also sought to understand the 
motives of black applicants to white universities, and met with four of the black applicants to the 
University of Alabama, as well as blacks who had recently integrated Clemson University in 
South Carolina.280 The group of civic and business leaders ultimately drew up a nine-step plan 
for maintaining law and order during desegregation of the university, beginning with a statement 
from the State Chamber of Commerce, and gradually boxing in Wallace so that he would have to 
allow the applicants to register.281 
The University of Alabama administration also moved ahead with its own plans to ensure 
an orderly transition to integration independent of Wallace. University president Frank Rose 
tended to talk out of both sides of his mouth – he cooperated with Wallace in performing 
background checks on the applicants to try to find defects of character or intellect, but also 
worked of his own accord to head off anti-intellectual and segregationist political interference by 
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building support within the Tuscaloosa business community. Several deans who had been at the 
university during the Lucy desegregation were described as being extremely angry at the ugly 
turn of events 1955, and were determined not to let the same thing happen the next time. 
University officials and forty student leaders held a retreat in October 1962 that focused on 
discussion of how peaceful desegregation could be achieved. On November 9, 1962, the 
university board of trustees passed a resolution that called for law and order, with the university 
faculty passing a similar resolution on November 14.282 
The LDF filed suit on behalf of applicants Vivian Malone, James Hood and Sandy 
English in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama on April 19, 1963. 
English, a transfer applicant from Stillman College in Tuscaloosa, ultimately did not make the 
cut with Malone and Hood. The suit was filed with the intent of Malone and English 
matriculating in the fall semester and Hood in the summer term.283 When the hearing began on 
May 16, Judge H. Hobart Grooms – the same federal judge who had ordered an injunction in the 
1955 Lucy case – bound University of Alabama Dean of Arts and Sciences Hubert Mate to the 
1955 injunction, thus striking down any opportunity for university counsel to steer the scope of 
the hearing toward larger, more complex constitutional questions. LDF lawyer Constance Baker 
Motley tried to get Mate to answer whether or not the three plaintiffs would be admitted, but 
university counsel Andrew Thomas instructed Mate not to answer. On May 17, one of the LDF 
counsel, Charles Morgan, filed a “show cause” petition to force the university to definitively 
state whether or not it would admit the black applicants.284 On May 19, Rose told Wallace the 
background checks performed by university-hired investigators had shown that all the applicants 
were qualified. The board then voted unanimously to admit Malone and another black applicant, 
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Dave McGlathery.285 McGlathery was a Navy veteran and an Alabama A&M graduate who was 
working at the NASA facility in Huntsville. McGlathery applied to the Huntsville branch in 
order to begin graduate studies.286 
The University of Alabama’s effort to stave off desegregation ended on May 21, 1963, 
when Judge Grooms dismissed the university’s petition to stay his 1955 injunction in the Lucy 
case. Grooms declined to delay ordering the university to grant admission to the applicants who 
made the final cut – Malone and Hood for the Tuscaloosa campus and McGlathery for the 
Huntsville campus – because the U.S. Supreme Court had, in Grooms’ words, “promptly slapped 
down” the 1955 appeal filed by the university in the Lucy case.287 Part of what shaped Grooms’ 
decision to uphold his eight-year-old injunction was that he felt attitudes on race were changing 
in Alabama. He noted that he had received fewer threats and dissenting letters during the course 
of the hearing than he had during the Lucy case. Grooms also felt that, the contemporary turmoil 
in Birmingham notwithstanding, “the masses of white citizens in Birmingham were not fighting 
us [over the inevitable outcome]” during the course of the hearing.288 The Supreme Court also 
declined to hear Wallace’s challenge to the injunction.289 
By May 21, 1963, the Alabama government had not yet taken any steps toward preparing 
law enforcement for the desegregation. On that day, Al Lingo, the head of the Alabama state 
troopers, announced his department would leave the particulars of planning to the local 
Tuscaloosa police, and that the state police would abide by any decisions the local police 
made.290 On June 11, 1963, the day of desegregation, 125 of the 825 state troopers under Lingo’s 
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command were present on the university campus.291 Prior to that, President Kennedy had 
federalized part of the Alabama National Guard on May 12, 1963, and ordered 3,000 troops into 
the state. It was done with the dual purposes of providing security in Birmingham during the 
riots, as well as having the troops mobilized and ready to move to Tuscaloosa on short notice if 
additional security was needed there.292 Between 500 and 600 of the guardsmen were sent to 
Tuscaloosa for the June 12 desegregation.293 The Birmingham News opined that the troop 
mobilization was done with the university in mind, and less for the Birmingham unrest.294 
Wallace’s intentions were still unclear to everyone but himself after the May 21st ruling 
by Grooms. The governor’s earlier conversation with Robert Kennedy left the presidential 
administration wondering, thus their decision to federalize Alabama guardsmen. The Department 
of Justice opted to keep up the pressure on the governor’s office given their desire to avoid Ross 
Barnett-style indecision and doublespeak leading to a leadership vacuum and bloodshed. On 
May 21, the DoJ began to individually contact 375 prominent business leaders on a list of 
prominent Alabama businessmen. They pointed out to the businessmen the negative 
consequences that awaited commerce in the state if the desegregation devolved into chaos and 
violence. Eighty percent of those contacted agreed to contact Wallace’s office to object to his 
stated plans for a stand at the university.295 
Business and civic leaders also continued to make efforts to affect a peaceful outcome. 
On May 22, 40 Tuscaloosa businessmen met to discuss strategies for peace because they were 
concerned both about short-term factory shutdowns due to violence, as well as long-term damage 
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that could result in further tarnishing Alabama’s image.296 On May 28, 400 civic leaders in 
Tuscaloosa gathered at the Stafford Hotel to discuss what else they could do to push Wallace not 
to obstruct the law. The group passed a resolution that requested the governor remain in the 
capital, Montgomery, and not interfere with the desegregation. One of the attendees, Circuit 
Judge Reuben Wright, said the only way to keep federal troops out of Tuscaloosa was to let a 
few black students into the University of Alabama. The petition was signed by 212 of the 
attendees.297 As the date of desegregation neared, the city’s religious leaders also chimed in to 
implore their congregations to remain peaceful. The Tuscaloosa News reported on June 10, the 
day before desegregation, that many clergy had delivered sermons reminding their congregations 
to obey the law.298 
The university began making preparations for the desegregation on May 30, when access 
to campus was restricted to students, faculty and staff. A 10 p.m. to 6 a.m. curfew was enacted, 
along with a prohibition on groups larger than three people. ROTC cadets were instructed not to 
wear their uniforms, so as not to spark fears of the presence of federal military personnel on 
campus. Soft drink machines were removed from campus because of the fear that the drinks’ 
heavy glass bottles could be used as missiles during a riot. The Dean of Men also encouraged 
students to report to his office rumors of plans for resistance by students.299 
Wallace appeared in U.S. District Court on June 3, 1963, in response to the May 24, 
1963, DoJ motion for an injunction to prevent a stand by the governor on the Tuscaloosa 
campus. On June 4, Judge Seybourne H. Lynne enjoined Wallace from blocking the 
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integration.300 The injunction prohibited Wallace, or any designees, from physically blocking or 
interfering with the enrollment of the black applicants. More generally, he was also enjoined 
from seeking to prevent the enrollment of anyone entitled to attend the university under the 1955 
Lucy injunction.301 Lynne cited biblical scripture in his decision and called for peace. The judge 
also facilitated a meeting between federal and university officials to improve planning for an 
orderly integration.302 
Wallace said on June 5 that he still planned defy court orders to go through with his stand 
to physically prevent the applicants from registering, and would go to jail in order to do so.303 
Privately, Wallace told university president Frank Rose that he was considering foregoing a 
stand. In an effort to ensure peace was kept, Wallace told the infamous Birmingham 
Commissioner of Public Safety, Eugene “Bull” Connor to stay away from Tuscaloosa.304 
Wallace continued to call for the populace of Alabama to stay away from Tuscaloosa. On June 2, 
Wallace had made his first appearance on national television when he went on NBC’s Meet the 
Press to address questions about the desegregation. He made it clear that he wanted everyone 
uninvolved with the desegregation to stay home.305 It was a directive he repeated emphatically 
over the next several days. The governor ordered 500 Alabama National Guardsmen into 
Tuscaloosa so that they could quickly be federalized and placed under the command of the 
president in the event of unrest. Another important step in ensuring law and order during the 
desegregation came when Wallace convinced the local Klu Klux Klan to avoid the campus on 
June 11. To placate their own displeasure at the integration, the KKK held a cross-burning and 
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rally in a field on the outskirts of town where the leader, Grand Wizard Robert Shelton, 
instructed Klansmen to stay away from Tuscaloosa. The KKK agreed to stay away because they, 
for the first time, faced on-sight arrest and loss of government favors from Wallace.306 
The atmosphere of Tuscaloosa began to become more tense as 500 news reporters began 
to flood into the town.307 Buford Boone met with President Rose to develop a plan for 
controlling information and quashing rumors, so that the press descending into town would not 
accidentally spread untruths. It was an important strategy for helping to maintain order that was 
absent in both the University of Mississippi and 1955 University of Alabama desegregations. An 
Associated Press reporter was retained as a public relations point man, and the university 
provided reporters with facilities with typewriters, phones and darkrooms for developing 
photographs.308 The press grew tense as Wallace’s intentions were kept private. They, like the 
populace, were left to wonder what Wallace would do on June 11. On the morning of June 10 at 
the hotel where many of the reporters were staying, a waiter dropped a tray of plates in the 
restaurant, causing a room full of reporters to jump or dive for cover at the sound of breaking 
glass.309 
On the night of Monday, September 10, 1962, Wallace still did not know what he was 
going to do the next day when Malone and Hood were to come to campus for registration. That 
night, Winton Blount, the president of the Alabama State Chamber of Commerce, managed to 
get through to Robert F. Kennedy in Washington, D.C. During that call, Kennedy agreed to a 
plan in which Deputy U.S. Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach, the highest-ranking DoJ 
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official in Tuscaloosa, would confront Wallace. Malone and Hood would wait in a car nearby.310 
The plan allowed for Wallace to make his stand, but also to not directly violate the injunction 
barring him from blocking the applicants.311 Wallace to this point had been meticulous in 
planning out his resistance. He had backed himself into a corner with his 1963 inaugural address 
promise of “segregation now, segregation forever.” Wallace risked losing most of his political 
cache in the state if he capitulated too easily; he risked contempt of court, jail time and his 
governorship if he resisted. The solution reached on the eleventh hour with Robert Kennedy was 
the only solution in which the governor could save face through a technicality.312 
At 10:00 a.m. on June 11, 1963, Wallace arrived at Foster Auditorium on the University 
of Alabama’s Tuscaloosa campus. Four federal officials arrived after Wallace and went into the 
building a few minutes after Wallace’s arrival. The scheduled time of Malone and Hood’s 
registration of 10:30 a.m. passed without the appearance of the students. At 10:48 a.m., three 
cars pulled up to the front of the auditorium, and several federal officials emerged, including 
Katzenbach, Macon L. Weaver, the U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Alabama, and 
Peyton Norville, Jr., the ranking U.S. marshal in the area. At their arrival, Wallace was waiting 
in front of the entrance to the building behind a lectern. The governor had a microphone hooked 
to a loudspeaker. When Katzenbach told Wallace he was there with a proclamation from 
President Kennedy ordering Wallace to end his stand, Wallace interrupted and read a statement 
citing the Tenth Amendment and states’ rights. The federal officials returned to their cars and 
took Malone and Hood to their respective dormitories. It was reported that student council 
members welcomed Hood to his dormitory.313 
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Shortly before 2:00 p.m. General Henry Graham, the commander of the now-federalized 
Alabama National Guard, arrived. At 3:15 p.m., three troop carriers filled with armed guardsmen 
arrived at a building near the auditorium. A second convoy arrived shortly thereafter and took up 
positions near the auditorium. Katzenbach and other federal officials then arrived and conferred 
with Graham. Graham, flanked by four sergeants, then strode toward the entrance to Foster 
Auditorium where Wallace waited. Graham said to Wallace, “It is my sad duty to ask you step 
aside under the orders of the President of the United States.” Wallace responded by pulling a 
piece of paper from his pocket, read a brief statement, and said to Graham, “I know that this is a 
bitter pill for you to swallow.” The governor reiterated his wishes that Alabamians refrain from 
violence and rioting. He vowed to continue the fight from Montgomery. Wallace left with his 
aides, and a few minutes later, federal officials escorted Malone and Hood into the auditorium 
where they registered for classes.314 
The night of June 11, President Kennedy went on national television to tell the nation of 
his decision to deliver to Congress a new civil rights bill “to enact legislation giving all 
Americans the right to be served in facilities which are open to the public – hotels, restaurants, 
theatres, retail stores and similar establishments. This seems to me to be an elementary right. Its 
denial is an arbitrary indignity that no American in 1963 should have to endure…” The bill went 
before Congress on June 20, 1963, was strong than a bill that had died in debate earlier in the 
year. It would outlaw segregation in all public accommodations, allow the U.S. attorney general 
to initiate school desegregation and would also give the attorney general the ability to cut off 
federal funding to institutions and programs in which discrimination occurred. The bill passed 
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the House in early 1964, then the Senate on June 19, 1964. President Lyndon B. Johnson signed 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 into law on July 2, 1964.315 
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CHAPTER THREE - METHODOLOGY 
Newspapers Examined 
 The researcher began to investigate the question of how the mass media might have 
influenced public reactions to public university desegregations in the South with a cursory 
examination of the history of the desegregation of the University of Mississippi by James 
Meredith in 1962. The researcher was familiar with that instance of desegregation because of his 
location in Oxford, Mississippi, where the University of Mississippi (also known as Ole Miss) is 
based. 
The researcher undertook a review of literature and websites pertaining to civil rights 
history to reacquaint himself with the order of events in the Civil Rights Era, beginning with the 
end of the American Civil War, followed by the Jim Crow era of strict racial segregation of 
public and private facilities in the southern United States, and ending with the passage of the 
1964 Civil Rights Act, which bookends the era according to popular consensus of historians. The 
researcher undertook that review with a focus on university desegregations in the South in order 
to provide some context for understanding the University of Mississippi’s particularly disorderly 
desegregation, and why there are few other university desegregations that are as popularly 
known, level of upheaval notwithstanding. Prior to further investigation, the researcher was 
aware of difficulties with desegregation at Ole Miss due to both personal familiarity and pop 
culture – besides a Bob Dylan song, there are many books available on the subject of James 
Meredith and the university’s unseemly handling of its desegregation. Aside from that instance, 
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the University of Alabama was also known to the researcher as having experienced a difficult 
desegregation because of the enduring legacy of Alabama’s Governor George Wallace and the 
portrayal of his stand for a few moments in the very popular film Forrest Gump. The researcher 
assumed other southern universities experienced similarly unsmooth desegregations, but they 
remained unknown to him prior to targeted searches on the subject. 
The University of Mississippi was selected for further examination from the outset for 
several reasons. First, its aforementioned status as a widely known example of racial discord and 
federal skepticism made it a clear choice. Second, because it is so widely known, it has been the 
subject of prior academic inquiry – or, at least, examples of academic inquiry about the 
University of Mississippi are more readily apparent than other instances of desegregation – and 
has resulted in a wealth of historical accounts. Most importantly to this examination of 
desegregations vis-à-vis mass media theories, the desegregation of the University of Mississippi 
and, to a greater degree, the portrayal of minorities in media in Mississippi, has been examined 
in greater detail through mass media content analyses than was readily apparent in other 
instances of university desegregation. That is, the researcher found more books and articles that 
addressed the question of Mississippi media’s coverage of James Meredith/the integration of the 
University of Mississippi than for any other analogous example at another university. Third, the 
University of Mississippi was chosen because it is the alma mater and flagship university of the 
home state of the researcher, thus was chosen for a contribution to the scholarly study of a 
particularly bleak and oftentimes unjust period in Mississippi history. 
Through further investigation, primarily on the Internet and academic databases such as 
Ebscohost and J-Stor, other examples of university desegregations emerged, with none of them, 
on the surface, appearing to be as volatile and deadly as the University of Mississippi’s. The 
99 
University of Alabama’s desegregation emerged as an early candidate for inclusion because it 
took place not quite nearly a year later than the University of Mississippi under the same 
presidential administration – especially the Justice Department under Attorney General Robert F. 
Kennedy – and with a similarly charismatic and widely popular governor as Mississippi’s Ross 
Barnett. Second, it became apparent that this desegregation has also been studied in some depth, 
though most often as a period in the biography of George Wallace. This meant the machinations 
and maneuvering that led to the University of Alabama’s (UA) desegregation has been well 
covered, though not as fully as an event unto itself as University of Mississippi’s has been. Nor 
have the personalities of the integrating students, Vivian Malone and James A. Hood, been 
examined with the same level of interest as James Meredith, perhaps because of the image of 
Meredith being one man facing off against an institution is more compelling than dividing it by 
two, and perhaps because in the years since the integration of Ole Miss, Meredith has behaved 
erratically and been a source of consternation for those who would prefer to canonize him for his 
role in the civil rights movement. 
Third, it also became apparent that the office of governor would hold great importance in 
desegregations because of the examples provided by Barnett and Wallace. In both these instances 
it came down to a governor hoping that he would be able to ignore ever-higher federal court 
rulings and to continue with practices that had been rendered unconstitutional by Brown v. Board 
of Education and other case law. The researcher surmised that a third example would likely 
involve a similar, futile deployment of “interposition” to defy the federal government, though 
perhaps not with as much verve on the part of the governors and unrest on the part of the public 
as in Mississippi and Alabama. 
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The third example that emerged was the University of Georgia, though its desegregation 
took place in 1961, prior to both the University of Mississippi’s (1962) and the University of 
Alabama’s (1963). This example was settled upon because of its temporal similarity, location in 
the Deep South and series of legal maneuvers that led up to desegregation. Though the 
desegregation of the University of Georgia (UGA) did not take place under the administration of 
John F. Kennedy – it took place in early January 1961, only a couple weeks prior to his 
inauguration – it took place in an era that, like the other two desegregations in the subsequent 
two years, saw him elected in a country with similar social and policy pressures. Besides the 
quickening civil rights movement, Americans were culturally preoccupied with the Space Race, 
Red Scare and uneven foreign policy toward Cuba (i.e. the Bay of Pigs fiasco and later Cuban 
Missile Crisis), as became evident in cursory examinations of period newspapers. These shared 
traits overshadowed the fact that the Kennedy administration had no role in the University of 
Georgia desegregation, though it is a moot point because federal intervention was not necessary 
in the University of Georgia case as will be explained later 
The University of Georgia was also chosen because, like the University of Mississippi 
and the University of Alabama, it was the flagship public university of its state. The University 
of Georgia was also chosen because of its proximity to Atlanta, the largest and most 
cosmopolitan city of the Deep South, both then and now. The researcher supposed that a large 
city such as Atlanta and its relative liberality might have a chilling effect on the potential for the 
sort of far-right racist views that emerged in the pages of provincial Mississippi newspapers. The 
initial goal of the study for the researcher’s literature review is to give context to the chaotic 
desegregation of the University of Mississippi, and juxtaposition of cosmopolitanism to the 
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provincial culture of Mississippi could provide interesting insights that might not be possible 
with more similar examples. 
The initial review of literature on civil rights movement and university desegregation 
yielded other examples, but these three were settled on because: 
1. They were all the flagship universities of their respective states. 
2. Their desegregations were contentious, though to varying degrees. 
3. They took place in the same era, in consecutive years. 
4. They all took place in college towns that were removed geographically from their state 
capitals. 
5. The desegregations all involved the first instances of undergraduate desegregation at 
their respective universities, which is more culturally important than instances of 
graduate-level desegregations. 
6. Charismatic, widely popular governors opposed the desegregations in all instances, 
thus proving a point against which newspaper coverage could potentially push or pull, 
especially within editorial pages. 
In order to justify his selection of the three universities in question and to relate their 
desegregations to mass communications theory, the researcher then undertook a review of media 
available in the states at that time. In order to narrow the focus of the study, the researcher chose 
to limit it to newspaper coverage of the desegregations and coverage of an arbitrarily chosen 
period of time – one month – prior to the day of desegregation. Newspaper coverage was chosen 
because newspapers were the most widely available sources of news coverage at that time, and 
were also more widely read. This medium was also selected because of its relatively ready and 
complete availability to a contemporary researcher, whereas many television or radio broadcasts 
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from the time would be lost to time or difficult to acquire. Newspapers were also chosen for their 
mixture of straight news and editorial coverage. This provided two areas in which to analyze 
coverage of desegregation: 
1. Straight news which, according to American journalistic ideals, should be unbiased, 
thus providing an opportunity to examine if the papers in question lived up to these 
ideals, and 
2. Editorial coverage, which gave columnists and the public an opportunity to air their 
views on desegregation. 
Analysis of hard news was limited to what appeared on the front-page, as this is the first 
and most widely read page, generally speaking. The front page presents the news that the editors 
believe is most consequential in the lives of their readers, and is thus a prime example of agenda 
setting of the press. Analysis was also limited to the front page to ensure manageability of data, 
as the sizes of news sections varied greatly from day to day and from paper to paper. It served to 
equalize this source of disparity so that it was more digestible from an analytical point of view. It 
is also a subjective supposition on the researcher that the front page of a newspaper is more 
thoroughly read than subsequent news pages; there was no data to be found on that subject. The 
editorial page was likewise settled upon for the readership draw that it provides. It was the most 
public and accessible forum for communities at that time, and the insight provided by analysis of 
this section will serve to show that it could likewise contribute to setting the agenda of the 
public. 
The survey period of one month was settled upon for two reasons. First, because cursory 
research showed that the last few days prior to desegregation of a university provided most of the 
material for analysis. Most papers analyzed indicated that there was a legal battle over 
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desegregation one month prior to the date of desegregation. Setting the survey period to even just 
a week prior to desegregation would have likely provided enough material for analysis in the 
cases of daily newspapers, but would have provided very limited samples of the relevant student 
and weekly newspapers, which the researcher determined were potentially important in setting 
the agenda of the communities surrounding the universities in question, and, particularly, the 
students at the universities themselves. The one month period allowed for statistically relevant 
samples from each paper to be analyzed, while also allowing for a greater understanding on the 
part of the researcher of the context surrounding each desegregation. Second, it was discovered 
during additional research on agenda-setting that a one-month period of media coverage prior to 
an event in is the most statistically significant period for influencing individuals’ opinions on a 
subject. 
With the parameters for survey periods set, the researcher then set out to acquire archived 
copies of the relevant newspapers. Once again, the researcher sought to analyze the front page 
and editorial page content of the largest state newspaper, the local city newspaper and campus 
newspaper for one-month period prior to the undergraduate desegregation of the flagship public 
universities of the states of Georgia (University of Georgia, 1961), Mississippi (University of 
Mississippi, 1962) and Alabama (University of Alabama, 1963) which will follow. In the case of 
the Atlanta Journal-Constitution, which is the largest newspaper in Georgia as of 2010, it was 
born of the merger of the Atlanta Journal evening paper and Atlanta Constitution morning paper. 
The researcher had difficulty ascertaining individual 1961 circulation figures at the outset of 
research, thus chose to analyze the Atlanta Constitution without realizing it was in fact the 
Atlanta Journal that had the larger circulation. The researcher believes the information gleaned 
from the Atlanta Constitution is valid, regardless of the somewhat lower circulation figures, 
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since it may be reasoned that at this time the state of Georgia had two flagship newspapers based 
in the state capital. The selection of the Atlanta Constitution also made available for analysis the 
columns of editor Ralph McGill, whose vociferous opposition to segregation yielded interesting 
research. The other newspapers surveyed are all still extant, though publication frequencies have 
in some cases changed over the years. The newspapers analyzed are as follows: 
University of Georgia 
• The Atlanta Constitution 
• The Athens Banner-Herald 
• The Red & White (University of Georgia) 
 
University of Mississippi 
• The Jackson Clarion-Ledger 
• The Oxford Eagle 
• The Mississippian (University of Mississippi) 
 
University of Alabama 
• The Birmingham News 
• The Tuscaloosa News 
• The Crimson White (University of Alabama) 
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CHAPTER FOUR - RESULTS 
Newspaper coverage of the desegregation of the University of Georgia 
 The reaction of the mainstream press to the imminent desegregation of the University of 
Georgia was one of neutrality and inevitability, at least within the three newspapers analyzed in 
this study. Thus the agenda they set forth through their non-radical coverage helped set the tone 
for a desegregation carried out, for the most part, without massive resistance on the part of the 
populace – the January 11 riot notwithstanding – and without the endless, desperate legal 
maneuvering on the part of the governor’s office that characterized the later desegregations of 
the University of Mississippi and the University of Alabama. 
To understand the tone the papers set, it is important to point out that Georgia was 
already primed for desegregation by the time of the 1961 integration of University of Georgia. 
First, black Americans were encouraged in the post-World War II era by their military service in 
that conflict and by the decolonization successes of nations in Africa, a message that perhaps 
also sunk in with white Americans who saw black enfranchisement becoming a reality, though 
one that was far away. 
In Georgia, business and community leaders gradually discouraged segregation in society 
and the economy. During the pre-Vandiver Herman Talmadge administration, W.R. Bowdoin, 
the vice president of the Trust Company of Georgia, wrote that national companies with 
branches in Georgia were growing concerned about the educational levels of their workers, on 
which segregation had detrimental effects. Manchester, Georgia, banker and chairman of the 
106 
state board of education James S. Peters wrote to Roy T. Harris that desegregation of primary 
schools was inevitable and that closing them in response to the Brown decision was a futile stand 
that would have detrimental economic consequences for the state. The threat to the Georgia 
economy in closure of schools to resist Brown was also communicated by Mills B. Lane, Jr., the 
president of the Citizens and Southern Bank, who said each day schools were closed might cost 
the state economy one industrial plant. By 1960, the president of the Georgia Bar Association 
officially stated his opposition to segregation laws and called for their repeal. Following the 1960 
fall meeting of the Georgia Baptist Convention, the members passed a resolution against closing 
primary schools. 
As the sit-in movement began to gather steam and an Atlanta black elementary school 
was bombed in retaliation, the Atlanta Chamber of Commerce began a drive to organize 
businesses against school closures.316 Atlanta Constitution editor Ralph McGill also ramped up 
his progressive rhetoric in his frequent editorial commentary on the irrationality of segregation. 
By being willing to openly state his progressive views in the state’s paper of record, McGill 
helped to give legitimacy to public debate of the issue, particularly to white Christians who were 
cowed into silence by ardent white supremacists in the community.317 
Researcher’s findings on Georgia newspaper content 
 The Atlanta Constitution was one of two newspapers of record in the state of Georgia in 
1961, published daily Monday through Saturday and combined with The Atlanta Journal in the 
joint Atlanta Journal-Constitution Sunday edition. In 1961, the circulation of The Constitution 
was listed as 199,282 with an “Independent-Democratic” political affiliation (see Appendix C, 
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p.145). Though its primary market was Atlanta’s population of 501,400 people318, the newspaper 
was read throughout the state and its population of 3,943,000. Also of note are the distributions 
of Georgia’s population along ethnic (71 percent white, 29 percent black) and municipal (46 
percent urban, 54 percent rural) lines319, lending some demographic support to Georgia’s 
relatively urbane state at the time (see Appendix B, p.143). 
The tone of coverage set by The Constitution in the month prior and up to the day after 
the desegregation of University of Georgia is suggestive of the increasing tolerance for the idea 
of desegregation in the state. Between the dates of December 11, 1960, and January 12, 1961 
(thirty-two days) there were a total of eight issues with news content on the front page (25 
percent of editions) related to the desegregation of University of Georgia. Within those eight 
editions with related content, there were a total of thirty-two news items (twenty-eight news 
stories, four photographs) on the front page. Of those twenty-eight news stories, all of them were 
neutral in tone and produced by Constitution staff or stringers, as opposed to being stories taken 
from the news wire (see Appendix D, p.148). 
The stories all occurred between December 14, 1960, and January 12, 1961. The first 
news story on December 14 was neutral and highlighted the fact that other white female 
applicants had been accepted to University of Georgia after Charlayne Hunter was rejected on 
the grounds of female dormitories being already filled to capacity. The next front-page story 
occurred on December 16, and quantified at around 300 the number of white students accepted 
after Hunter and Holmes had been rejected. Subsequent stories highlighted the double standards 
the black applicants had to endure and outlined the machinations of the appeals, motions and 
injunctions in federal courts. Of the twenty-eight news stories analyzed, 100 percent were neutral 
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in tone. A front-page story on January 7th included the entirety of Judge Bootle’s federal court 
order, demonstrating the newspaper’s dedication to accurately informing the public of the 
intricacies of the desegregation. News coverage during this time also painted a picture of 
Vandiver being reluctant to withdraw university funds. Of interest, though not directly relevant, 
were news stories naming Vandiver as being a candidate for inclusion in the newly elected 
President John F. Kennedy administration. Photographs were split evenly between neutral and 
pro-desegregation, though they are more difficult to classify given that they leave room for 
interpretation by the researcher. For instance, on January 11, 1961, one photograph interpreted as 
neutral shows Governor Vandiver being served with court papers, while another, interpreted as 
being pro-desegregation shows a group of “mothers against integration” as being portrayed in a 
negative light. The other neutral photographs show students waiting on campus and Charlayne 
Hunter after her first class. It is worth noting that The Constitution did not feature any pictures of 
blacks in its pages during this time – the norm for mainstream newspapers in the South at the 
time – except for instances of the applicants and their legal team appearing on campus. The 
frequency of photographs of the black participants in the drama were relatively few compared to 
pictures of, for instance, James Meredith in the pages of The Clarion Ledger during his 
desegregation of the University of Mississippi. This might be explained in two ways: First, there 
were relatively few photo-worthy moments of high drama at which Hunter and Holmes were 
present during the University of Georgia desegregation, as both were based at other universities 
up until a few days before they integrated the university. The second explanation might be that 
the editors of the Jackson paper intended to show the enemy represented by James Meredith in 
his desegregation, which can be accounted for by the caustic tone of their coverage of the Ole 
Miss desegregation compared to the neutral-to-positive tone of The Constitution’s coverage of 
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University of Georgia’s desegregation. Aside from content related to desegregation, the paper 
also featured coverage of President-elect Kennedy and conjecture about his selections for key 
government posts, with foreign relations coverage chiefly devoted to Fidel Castro/Cuba, Nikita 
Khrushchev and “Red” China (see Appendix D, p.151). 
While the news content of The Constitution was mostly neutral, analysis shows the 
editorial content – under the direction of integration proponent Ralph McGill – was firmly in 
favor of Hunter’s and Holmes’ successful desegregation. Of the thirty-two editions analyzed, 
eleven (34.4 percent) had occurrences of desegregation-related content, which included 
editorials, columns, letters and cartoons. During those eleven days with relevant content, twenty 
items were found – seven editorials, ten columns, two cartoons and one letter – of which 
eighteen (90 percent) were pro-desegregation and two (10 percent) were deemed of unclear 
intent. Every single occurrence of McGill’s front-page editorials was in favor of desegregation, 
though they varied between staking the claim on legal ground and moral ground. On January 7, 
1961, McGill wrote that litigation had run its course and that federal law superceded state law. 
On January 11, 1961, he wrote of “erasing the picture of the ‘Ugly Southerner.’” McGill also 
praised Vandiver on the same day, saying he “didn’t try to duck or dodge [federal law].” In his 
January 5th front-page editorial, McGill attempted to lend more legitimacy to desegregation for 
conservative readers by citing the tacit support for desegregation voiced by a Georgia Klu Klux 
Klan Grand Dragon who said it was inevitable. McGill also attempted to appeal to Christian 
values of acceptance in his January 12th front-page editorial, saying that the younger generation 
more accurately exemplifies Christian values than their elders. In the same column he also names 
two state senators as being on the right side (pro-desegregation) in the desegregation issue. 
Though it is not usually mentioned in the same breath as the desegregation of University of 
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Georgia, the editorial staff of The Constitution were cognizant of the possibility of federal 
intercession into the desegregation if the state government persisted in too much legal 
maneuvering. Though not directly related to the University of Georgia desegregation, the paper 
ran an editorial predicting federal intervention of Atlanta primary schools were not integrated. 
The editorial writers all agreed on desegregation and preferred that it be handled internally rather 
than involve the federal government because desegregation was inevitable. It is also worth noting 
that the tone of editorials in favor of desegregation did not view the governor as an adversary. In 
fact, McGill’s January 11 editorial called Vandiver “brave.” In the one occurrence of a related 
letter to the editor on December 15, 1960, a visitor to Georgia wrote in support of desegregation 
saying, “…there is a sadness in the Negro’s eyes as he looks my way – and leaves this visitor 
ashamed.” Both occurrences of editorial cartoons were unclear to the researcher, due to lack of 
context and a microfilm transfer that was illegible. Because there is no editorial content that is 
not in favor of desegregation, there are also no accusations of communist influence in the actions 
of the NAACP and the applicants, charges that would frequently be leveled in the two other 
university desegregations profiled in this study (see Appendix D, p.151). 
 The Athens Banner-Herald was the mainstream, Democratic-affiliated daily newspaper 
of Athens, serving its population of 33,500 with a circulation of 6,625 in six-times-weekly 
(except Saturday) editions (see Appendix C, p.145).320 Like the Atlanta-Constitution, The 
Banner-Herald’s zeitgeist included conjecture that Governor Vandiver was a likely candidate for 
selection as Secretary of the Army for President-elect Kennedy’s administration and foreign 
policy coverage chiefly concerned with communist rivals like Cuba, the USSR and China. 
Directly relating to the desegregation of University of Georgia, the period of analysis included 
the thirty-two-day period between December 11, 1960, and January 12, 1961, during which 
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twenty-eight editions of The Banner-Herald were published. Of those twenty-eight editions, nine 
(32.14 percent) were found with front-page news content relating to the desegregation. Within 
those nine editions, twenty-three news stories were found, accounting for 100 percent of all news 
content. There were no photographs of Hunter and Holmes, nor any of demonstrators during the 
desegregation. All of the news stories were neutral in tone, with a mixture of locally produced 
stories by Banner-Herald staff and ones by Associated Press writers (see Appendix D, p.149). 
 The Banner-Herald’s in-house coverage was characterized by balance in the stories they 
wrote, attempting to allow for both sides of the debate’s viewpoints to be communicated. It is 
perhaps notable that the paper referred to applicant Hunter as “Miss Hunter,” demonstrating a 
level of respect for a black Georgian that was relatively recent in light of the Jim Crow-era’s 
journalistic practices in reporting on black people. Front-page news on the desegregation was 
most consistent and was given the most space in the three days after Judge Bootle’s decision and 
the ultimate success of the applicants to register for classes. The news relating to the intricacies 
of the court decisions was left to AP wire stories reproduced in the paper (see Appendix D, 
p.152). 
 The editorial stance of The Banner-Herald is more conservative than that of The 
Constitution and the strong influence of the latter’s editor Ralph McGill. Only four instances 
(14.29 percent of editions) of editorial content concerning University of Georgia’s desegregation 
were found in the twenty-eight editions analyzed, with one arguably pro-desegregation editorial, 
one editorial that was neutral and two that were unclear. The neutral December 18, 1960, 
editorial highlighted some of the difficulties faced by primary school desegregations in northern 
parts of the United States and asked for understanding of the difficulties being faced currently in 
the South, presumably meaning the University of Georgia. The one pro-desegregation editorial 
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on January 10, 1961, stated its stance on economic and procedural grounds. It stated that state’s 
failed appeal to the Supreme Court was “the end of the line” and that admission of blacks to 
University of Georgia is “tolerable” because the damage that would be done to the state’s 
economy by closing the university would be “intolerable.” It also stated that, “Though we may 
dislike the course set for us, it is ours to follow.” This demonstrates a problem faced throughout 
the study in that the tone is somewhat bitter, but, in the end, the item in question comes down on 
the side of desegregation on grounds that, though not morally rooted, are favorable toward 
desegregation in other ways. It is for this reason that this editorial and others later on were 
categorized in this manner. It is also worth pointing out that because Athens was a much smaller 
city than Atlanta, The Banner-Herald would have likely been more beholden to conservative 
local business owners who might have boycotted advertising in the paper if they felt the paper 
was too liberal in its editorial stances, therefore eliciting a measured response from the paper. 
Two other editorials on January 12, 1961, condemned rioters and charged instigation and 
irresponsible reporting by other news outlets, but their opinions on the desegregation were not 
clearly stated, thus were categorized as being unclear (see Appendix D, p.152). 
 The Red & Black was the campus newspaper of the University of Georgia, and was, at 
the time, not an independent publication as it is today. Exact figures for the enrollment at 
university in 1961 cannot be found, but have been roundly cited at around 7,000 in sources 
consulted in the course of this study. Likewise, efforts to discover the circulation of The Red & 
Black in 1961 have not yielded any figures, though it has been suggested by the former head of 
the University of Mississippi Student Media Center that a general rule is to publish a copy for 
each student plus an additional 10 percent for distribution in the community, putting the 
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circulation at around 7,700.321 The Red & Black was published once weekly at the time, but the 
publication during the desegregation proceedings seems to have increased with special editions 
devoted to coverage. 
A total of five relevant editions were analyzed during the period between December 11, 
1960, and January 19, 1961. The latter date was included because it was the first edition 
published after the desegregation of the university. All issues (five) published during the one-
month period preceding the desegregation included relevant content. A total of eleven news 
items were found, including eight stories and three photographs. All of the items in found were 
categorized as being neutral in tone. Red & Black staff produced all content. The first story on 
January 5, 1961, laid out Judge Bootle’s ruling and pointed out that Vandiver’s stance was 
dictated by state law. News on January 9th included a story about university administrators 
appealing for nonviolence and a story in which Hamilton Holmes’ father was interviewed stating 
why Holmes wanted to attend the university. News on January 10th included a timeline of events 
and judgments to date, and a story on January 19th reported that 13 university students were 
suspended due to their roles in the riot at Hunter’s dormitory. Photographs during the period 
showed students petitioning to keep the university funded and open and Hunter and Holmes 
appearing on campus (see Appendix D, p.150). 
 Editorial content occurred in all five editions published during the period of analysis. 
They included six editorials, two columns, two cartoons and seven letters to the editor for a total 
of seventeen editorial items. Of those seventeen items, five (29.41 percent) were pro-
desegregation, none were anti-desegregation, ten (58.82 percent) were neutral and two (11.76 
percent) were unclear. Like the other newspapers profiled in the University of Georgia 
desegregation, The Red & Black also seemed to support desegregation primarily on the grounds 
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of recognition of federal primacy. Only letters following the desegregation made any moral 
judgments about granting admission to black students. It might also stand to reason that the 
newspaper staff and faculty overseers were concerned about community backlash for expressions 
of moral support. The Red & Black was also notable for imploring students to conduct 
themselves peacefully during the desegregation, perhaps sensing the possibility of unrest more 
accurately than the two non-student papers. In an editorial on January 9, 1961, they wrote, “Let 
those in the position of leadership be the ones to handle this situation. Let’s not try to take it into 
our own hands with violent actions.” An editorial on the front page on January 11, 1961, 
condemned students who participated in the riot at Hunter’s dorm, saying, “We hope you rabble-
rousers who planned, organized and carried through this little exhibition last night are not truly 
representative of this campus.” Two cartoons on January 10th were neutral and commented on 
state officials “dropping the ball” and on journalists inciting students to misbehave. A column on 
January 19th said, “We can pick up our broken pieces and carry on.” Of the seven letters printed 
on that day, one was neutral, two were sarcastic to the point of being of unclear intent and four 
were in favor of desegregation. The neutral letter asked where student leaders were on the 
evening of the riot at Hunter’s dorm, while the pro-desegregation letters addressed the hypocrisy 
of black citizens having such difficulties, one of which said, “Our nation preaches liberty, 
freedom and dignity of men all over the world (see Appendix D, p.153).” 
Newspaper coverage of the desegregation of the University of Mississippi 
 At the time of the desegregation of the University of Mississippi in 1962, there were 
nineteen daily newspapers published in the state of Mississippi322, with around one hundred 
weekly newspapers.323 The largest newspaper was the Jackson Clarion-Ledger, a morning 
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newspaper with a circulation of 52,396 for its weekday edition, and 88,530 for its Sunday edition 
(see Appendix C, p.145).324 The Clarion-Ledger was owned by the Hederman family, and its 
operations were overseen by manager Robert Hederman, Jr. and editor-in-chief Tom Hederman, 
Jr. The Hederman family also owned the Jackson Daily News, an afternoon paper, and 
monopolized the advertising market in Jackson, as evidenced by the unusually high profit rate of 
18 percent for papers. Both newspapers set their advertising rates jointly and cowed into silence 
any businesses that dissented from the opinions of the ultraconservative, segregationist 
Hederman family. The Hedermans had a penchant for using the influence of their newspapers to 
proliferate not just news, but their own biases as well as to carry out grudges and lend favors. 
The Hedermans once attacked in the pages of the Clarion-Ledger a former Jackson mayor who 
had refused to help cut their taxes by lowering the assessment on a piece of family property. On 
another occasion, they buried the news of family friend’s conviction of two murders deep within 
the paper instead of on the front page.325 Beyond simply granting favors to friends within the 
pages of their papers, the Hedermans also allowed third parties to manipulate their editorial 
policies. The Clarion-Ledger also regularly killed stories and published segregationist 
propaganda at the request of the Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission. In turn, the 
Sovereignty Commission supplied Clarion-Ledger editor Tom Hederman with secret agency 
files.326 
 The links of the Hedermans and their newspapers to the state power structure did not stop 
at business matters or the occasional quid-pro-quo deal with the Sovereignty Commission. The 
Hedermans, as devout Baptists, held deaconships at the influential First Baptist Church in 
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Jackson, and were members on all manner of charitable and civic boards. They appeared to be 
more comfortable wielding their influence from behind the scenes, though. Tom Hederman 
claimed to have declined an offer to be appointed a U.S. Senator by Governor Paul Johnson, Sr., 
instead recommending James O. Eastland.327 During the tenure of Governor Ross Barnett, 
Robert Hederman said, “We Hedermans served as colonels on the staff of Governor Ross 
Barnett.”328 
 The content of the Clarion-Ledger during the time of James Meredith’s desegregation of 
the University of Mississippi was aimed at maintaining white dominance of what James Silver 
termed the “closed society.”329 That was accomplished by segregating the newspaper in the same 
way Southern society was segregated. Occasions for celebration that were regularly given 
coverage for white people rarely received any space in the Clarion-Ledger, or any Mississippi 
paper for that matter. Black marriages and births went unannounced. Coverage of black news in 
white newspapers was usually given over only to stories that involved crimes. Criminality was 
the usual context for a photograph of a black person appearing in a newspaper; other instances 
were rare.330 Like many Southern newspapers, the Clarion-Ledger had segregated news sections. 
Special “colored editions” were printed and distributed in black parts of Jackson.331 The Clarion-
Ledger also always identified blacks with the descriptor “negro.” Ira Harkey, the editor and 
publisher of the Pascagoula Chronicle-Star during the 1950s and ‘60s, raised hackles in the state 
when he unilaterally opted to, in order: drop the “colored” tag that appeared after the name of a 
black subject in an article332; capitalize the “n” in “Negro;” dropped the descriptor altogether 
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unless it was relevant to the story333; and refer to black women as “Mrs.” and their real names 
instead of the generic pseudonyms “Hattie Lewis” or “Minnie Jones” that were usually 
assigned.334 Unlike Harkey’s progressive attitude toward blacks, most Mississippi newspaper 
editors, following the lead of the Hedermans, worked to play down any black accomplishments 
and avoided printing content that would run counter to white notions of superiority.335 
 Southern dailies have condemned for their role in helping to preserve Jim Crow, and the 
Clarion-Ledger, in particular, has been blamed for inflaming the tense situation in Mississippi 
when Meredith integrated the university. Ira Harkey opined: 
Daily newspapers were the most powerful force fostering retention of Jim Crow laws, 
which excluded the Negro from almost every good in public life. Using the newspapers, 
and being used by them, were the politicians, school leaders, lawyers and, incredibly, 
many churches. So closely did those four emulate the malevolent lead of the daily 
newspapers that it seems impossible to consider the five apart. Constant degradation of 
the Negro by these pervasive groups kept alive the public scorn for blacks, leading to 
unreasoned hatred.336 
Newsweek’s point man in Oxford for the desegregation of the University of Mississippi, 
Karl Fleming, also felt the Clarion-Ledger was contributing to unrest with inflammatory 
editorials: “By [the Clarion-Ledger’s] insinuation, the paper as much as told Mississippi students 
to raise all the hell they wanted against Meredith, without fear of punishment.”337 It has also been 
pointed out that the Clarion-Ledger, at the very least, committed serious faux pas regarding 
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coverage of the civil rights movement and Meredith’s quest. For instance, the paper took to 
placing pro-Barnett editorials at the top of the front page.338 More likely, the Clarion-Ledger was 
guilty of serious breaches of journalistic integrity. It ascribed undue credit and free advertising to 
the White Citizens’ Council.339 The Hedermans also allowed reporters and columnists to get 
personally involved in the mission to maintain segregation.340 When the Clarion-Ledger’s city 
news editor, Gene Wirth, died of a heart attack in the middle of the Meredith affair, his obituary 
stated he had “spent many long and late hours conferring with the chief executive and other state 
officials,” thus demonstrating collusion with officials who should have been objects of 
skepticism.341 The unprofessional relationship of Wirth and the Barnett administration was 
further demonstrated when Barnett served as a pallbearer at Wirth’s funeral.342 
The Clarion-Ledger’s editorial content was universally in favor of maintaining 
segregation at the university, but locally generated news was also biased against Meredith and 
the federal effort to see federal court orders upheld (see Appendix D, p.158-159). That is not to 
say, though, the Hedermans devoted many resources to covering the high-profile story. More 
often than not, the editors of the Clarion-Ledger demonstrated a callous laziness vis-à-vis the 
Meredith desegregation. The Clarion-Ledger relied upon wire services for its stories about the 
desegregation of the university, often crafting the headlines to suit the Hederman agenda. It had 
no staffers devoted to reporting on the unfolding legal decisions, no fact-checkers,343 nobody to 
clarify what the case meant for social change, instead of simply placing the case in the context of 
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being a crisis right from the start.344 The Clarion-Ledger also never once interviewed Meredith 
in the twenty months between his initial suit and ultimate matriculation at the university.345 
During the several days leading up to the desegregation of the University of Mississippi, neither 
one of the Hedermans’ Jackson newspapers had any in-house coverage. The Jackson News got 
there only by the time the riot was out of control and would not go on campus, but the Clarion-
Ledger sent no personnel at all.346 It was for these reasons the Columbia Journalism Review 
called the Clarion-Ledger and the Jackson Daily News  “quite possibly the worst metropolitan 
newspapers in the United States.”347 
Most of Mississippi’s other daily newspapers fell into line behind the two Hederman-
owned Jackson newspapers. The editors of the newspapers in McComb, Columbus, Meridian, 
Greenwood and Clarksdale all voiced editorial support for Governor Barnett’s attempt at 
interposition, whether or not they knew it was futile. Joseph Ellis, Jr., the editor of the 
Clarksdale Press Register, though, acknowledged the paradox of his support: “We know that a 
major disaster is impending,” he wrote on September 26, 1962.348 The Delta Times-Democrat 
(Greenville) and the Pascagoula Chronicle-Star were the only two dailies in the state to advocate 
for integration, both with well-known, progressive editors, Hodding Carter II and Ira Harkey, 
respectively, at the helms.349 
In contrast to Karl Fleming’s statement that the Clarion-Ledger shoulders most of the 
blame for setting low expectations for integrity among the rest of the Mississippi press, other 
veteran journalists have reflected that the locus may lie elsewhere. Eugene Methvin, a former 
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editor at Reader’s Digest, said that the beat reporters saw themselves as “protectors of their 
community’s state of mind.” Others, though, point the finger at the editors of Southern 
newspapers. Ben Bagdikian, journalist and media critic, said that he and other reporters were 
scolded for being duped by “radicals” such as Martin Luther King, Jr. who, segregationist editors 
said, did not represent the contented black majority. New York Post reporter Ted Poston said 
young journalists who yearned to print the truth were spurned by editors who were beholden to 
conservative advertisers and rural white subscribers who wanted to maintain segregation.350 
According to the 1960 census, Mississippi was listed as having a population that was 93 percent 
rural and a black population that comprised 43 percent of the total (see Appendix B, p.143).351 
Researcher’s findings 
The coverage of Meredith v. Fair varied greatly among the three newspapers – The 
Clarion-Ledger, The Oxford Eagle and The Mississippian – whose front-page and editorial 
content for one month prior to the University of Mississippi’s desegregation was examined. The 
content of the Clarion-Ledger was, at best, neutral in front-page news articles. The great 
majority of the Clarion-Ledger’s news content was generated by AP or UPI wire reporters, 
however. The headlines accompanying those stories were also sometimes contorted to make 
implications not present in the body of the story. Editorial content generated by the Clarion-
Ledger’s editorial staff was universally opposed to the university’s desegregation. Editorial 
content in the form of letters to the editor from readers was nearly negative across the board, as 
well. Only two letters – out of a total of sixty-one pieces of editorial page content relating to 
Meredith over the course of thirty-one days – raised questions of Governor Barnett denying 
Meredith’s constitutionally guaranteed rights. The rest of the letters, like the editorials, either 
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praised Barnett, condemned the Kennedy administration for overstepping constitutional 
boundaries, called Meredith a troublemaker and/or cited inherent inferiorities of black character 
or intellect that precluded Meredith’s legal and/or moral matriculation to the University of 
Mississippi. The editorials by Clarion-Ledger staff also made frequent use of “Kennedyism” as 
shorthand for federal action. However, the editorial staff were more vehemently anti-
Communists than anti-federalists, and supported President Kennedy’s maneuvers vis-à-vis the 
Cuban Missile Crisis, which was beginning to unfold around this time. 
The Clarion-Ledger featured front-page coverage of the Meredith case on the first day of 
the survey period, September 1, 1962, a full month prior to the desegregation of the university. 
At the time of the first coverage, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black was still considering 
the request of Meredith’s legal team to have the Fifth Circuit’s injunction against the University 
of Mississippi upheld. The Clarion-Ledger was setting the agenda early and often compared to 
the Atlanta Constitution, which began consistent news coverage only about a week before the 
University of Georgia was desegregated. Between September 1, 1962, and October 2, 1962, the 
Clarion-Ledger had a total of ninety-nine pieces of news content on its front page. Eighty-seven 
of those were news stories, while fourteen were photographs. Twenty-three of the thirty-one days 
of the survey period found front-page news coverage, with the frequency increasing to near-daily 
on September 12, 1962, until the end of the survey period (see Appendix D, p.154-155). 
The agenda-setting effort of the Clarion-Ledger can also be observed from its traditional 
Southern journalistic practice of using only white sources for quotes in its stories. The paper did 
not seek to portray any other perspectives besides that of the white power holders. The attempt of 
the Clarion-Ledger to conflate news and opinion was demonstrated by the frequent inclusion of 
City News Editor Gene Wirth’s editorials on the front page of the paper. Contrasted with the 
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front-page editorials of Ralph McGill in the Atlanta Constitution that explained in legal and 
cultural contexts the changes that were going on, Wirth’s editorials were inflammatory and did 
not seek to inform the readership of the finer points of the court battle. Wirth’s editorials were 
also not as clearly demarcated as McGill’s were, thus using to its advantage the indiscretion with 
which many readers differentiate “news” and “opinion.” It is likely the Clarion-Ledger would 
have continued with the questionable practice had Wirth not died of a heart attack before the 
desegregation of the university was settled. The newspaper also violated some journalistic best-
practices by sourcing the entire basis of stories from just one person. On October 1, 1962, one 
front-page article written by Charles Hill used unattributed, anti-desegregationist quotes from 
Lieutenant Governor Paul B. Johnson to promote the view that Governor Barnett had been 
stripped of his constitutional powers by federal activity. The next day, measuring the aftermath 
of the riot, a report with the headline “Marshals Set Off Ole Miss Rioting” presented an 
unbalanced account of the unrest sourced only from Sen. James O. Eastland. Eastland repeated 
the common refrain that 15,000 federal troops were in Oxford, while only 6,000 were in West 
Berlin (see Appendix D, p.154-155). 
Photographic coverage of Meredith’s case and the presence of federal personnel on the 
campus of the University of Mississippi was mostly negative in nature. There is a necessary leap 
that must be made in the researcher’s coding of photographic content, for the photograph 
documents only a moment in time. It does not clearly evoke the sentiments of the photographer, 
nor of the editors who make the choice about if and where to publish a photograph. But it is the 
contention of the researcher that inferences can made about the desires of a segregationist-era 
editor in his publication of a photograph pertaining to a court battle, campus occupation or other 
desegregation-related imagery. The editors of the Clarion-Ledger were clearly quite willing to 
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engage in non-standard practices of colluding with members of the state government to influence 
the executions of federal court orders in Meredith v. Fair. The agenda of the editors was also 
clearly demonstrated by the overwhelmingly negative editorial content devoted to the case, as 
well as the lack of in-house resources devoted to adequately reporting the case. It is, therefore, 
not a stretch to conclude that the editors of the Clarion-Ledger would seek to use photographs to 
portray those on the side of desegregation of the University of Mississippi in a negative light. 
The Clarion-Ledger published fourteen photographs relating to the desegregation of the 
university during the 31-edition survey period. Thirty-five percent of the photographs were 
coded as portraying desegregation in a negative light. These photographs showed Governor 
Barnett in a positive light, showed black reporters being denied press credentials and showed 
protestors against Meredith/the federal government. Most photographs were classified as neutral, 
generally showing crowds on campus or Meredith and his counsel leaving a courthouse. It is 
worth noting again that the Clarion-Ledger did not devote many resources to covering the case 
(see Appendix D, p.154-155). On the night of the riot on the university campus, the paper had no 
photographers or reporters present, leaving coverage to wire services. Therefore, neutral 
coverage via photographs might have been increased because the wire photographers did not 
have the same agenda as the editors of the Clarion-Ledger. 
The Oxford Eagle, the weekly newspaper of Oxford, Miss., the location of the University 
of Mississippi, apparently stooped low to get under the bar set by the Clarion-Ledger in its 
coverage, as Karl Flemming of Time alluded to. Coverage of the desegregation of the university 
was scant during the five editions published during the month prior to desegregation. Of the six 
front-page news items that appeared, five were neutral. One was a message from the mayor of 
Oxford on September 27, 1962, that praised the restraint that people had shown thus far. A front-
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page bulletin on the same day, however, was judged to express anti-desegregationist sentiment. 
Other stories and photographs that were published on October 4, 1962 – the first post-integration 
edition – were also neutral in tone (see Appendix D, p.156). They soberly documented the fact 
that Meredith had integrated the university. Most other news at this time was dedicated to the 
return of students for the fall semester and to a new Southern Bell station in town. The results in 
the editorial section of the Oxford Eagle were split evenly between anti-desegregationist and 
unclear intentions. On September 6, 1962, there was an editorial cartoon that depicted a looming 
desegregation fight, though it was unclear to the researcher what particular commentary it sought 
to make. An unclear letter on September 20 made mention that a large federal government was 
necessary for a growing country, but other points in the letter obscured the intent. The Oxford 
Eagle also featured columns written by one “Great Yick” during this time. Yick came down 
firmly on the side of segregation in his columns, expressing that he felt culls of the “mongrels” 
would be necessary if integration happened in a September 27 column. A letter on the same day 
was unclear. It referred to the campus newspaper of the University of Mississippi, The 
Mississippian, as being a “beacon of liberalism.” It is unclear if “liberalism” is a pejorative in 
this context. Editor and publisher Nina Goolsby also expressed her opposition to integration of 
the university. In an October 4 editorial, she wrote, “…like thieves in the night, [the federal 
government] violated the Constitution (see Appendix D, p.160). 
The Mississippian, the daily on-campus newspaper of the University of Mississippi, 
featured very consistent, in-house news coverage of the Meredith case beginning on September 
18, 1962. Prior to that, there were several wire stories over a three-month period that reported on 
the case. Coverage became consistent after Governor Barnett’s September 13 “genocide” speech. 
Contrasted with the front-page news coverage of the Clarion-Ledger, The Mississippian was 
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remarkably neutral. In fact, all twenty-three of the news stories and photographs during the 
survey period were judged to be neutral (see Appendix D, p.157). In the context of a Jim Crow-
era Mississippi whose media was dominated by and whose agenda was set by the regrettably 
negligent Clarion-Ledger, the students who produced The Mississippian seemed to be able to 
resist the temptation to submit to prejudicial notions. That could be chalked up to youthful 
rebelliousness, as well – it is not possible to know the motivations from content analysis alone. 
Editorial content was mixed. There were only six instances of editorial page content that was 
related to the desegregation. Prior to the survey period, it is worth noting that there were several 
letters to the editor that expressed progressive sentiment. It was unusual for anyone to take the 
relative risk to submit a letter to a public forum that affirmed the humanity of blacks, but it 
occurred as early as mid-March 1962. Editorials during the actual survey period occurred twice 
on the front page. Both times were the editor-in-chief, Sidna Brower, making remarks aimed at 
addressing the escalating situation, beginning on September 21, and then again the next day. In 
the first, Brower congratulated the student body on the restraint they had so far shown. On the 
next day, she criticized other newspapers for spreading misinformation. Both were classified as 
being neutral in tone. Two letters were published during the survey period. One urged 
Mississippians to stand up to the federal government, but another unclear letter on September 26 
anticipated violence, though it did not appear to condone violence. The final editorial in The 
Mississippian came on October 1. In it, the paper staff came down firmly on the side of 
desegregation, stating: “The federal government is once again showing its strength and power to 
uphold the laws of our country (see Appendix D, p.161). 
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Newspaper coverage of the desegregation of the University of Alabama 
 The Birmingham News, the largest and most influential newspaper in the state of 
Alabama, was founded in 1888 by Rufus Rhodes and purchased in 1910 to Victor Hanson, a 
veteran newspaperman, and Frank Glass, a former Hanson colleague from another newspaper. 
Early in Hanson’s tenure as publisher, the Birmingham News gained a reputation for integrity in 
the face of special financial interests who wanted stories killed. Hanson once risked bankruptcy 
to print a story that a bank that had financed the paper wanted killed. The Hanson family and the 
Birmingham News profited in the same market where several other newspapers failed. 352 In 
1955, the Hansons sold the newspaper to the S.I. Newhouse publishing empire, but Clarence B. 
Hanson, the nephew of Victor Hanson, remained as publisher and the paper continued to have an 
independent voice.353 
 The Birmingham News set a forward-looking tone in the state of Alabama in 1954 when 
it editorially supported the spirit of the Brown v. Board of Education U.S. Supreme Court ruling 
by calling for the voluntary gradual desegregation of schools supervised by the state rather than 
rely on the federal government to drive them.354 Clarence Hanson, in a 1967 address to a civic 
group, remarked that the Birmingham News had a conservative outlook, but which did not 
conflict with their mission to inform their readership of the inevitability of a changing country 
and racial landscape. “Because of our constitutionally guaranteed right to publish, we are sternly 
obligated to supply essential information to our people.”355 
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 During the time surrounding the desegregation of the University of Alabama in 1963, the 
city of Birmingham was experiencing great social upheaval due to demonstrations by blacks in 
defiance of Jim Crow segregation that were met with forceful responses by public authorities. To 
date, most discussions of the role of the Birmingham News during 1963 have focused on the 
unrest in Birmingham versus the contributions to law and order the paper likely made in the 
events an hour away in Tuscaloosa. In 1988, the Birmingham News published an admission in its 
pages of having made mistakes during its coverage of race relations in the 1960s. Former 
employees admit that the paper did not live up to its mission to provide the truth to its readers 
because conflicting interests it had with wanting to continue to stay in the good graces of city 
leaders, as well as the editors’ hesitance to inflame the situation with coverage of injustices being 
done to blacks.356 
 The Tuscaloosa News also set a tone of acceptance and progress during the 1963 
desegregation. Editor Buford Boone was a prominent member of the Tuscaloosa community, and 
interjected himself into narrative, albeit behind the scenes. Boone and other civic leaders met on 
several occasions – in ever increasing numbers each time – to question what desegregation meant 
to Tuscaloosa and to the state. Each time, they realized the inevitability of integration, and 
reached the conclusion that they must wield their influence to maintain peace and order. At the 
very least, they chose to side with integration for reasons of commerce – riots would cost money 
rather than generate it. Damage to buildings and cars would be costly, but damage done to 
Alabama’s image would be even costlier. Boone, on the other hand, seemed to believe the 
desegregation was righteous from all points of view, including as a civil right. Boone’s 
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participation was in line with the social responsibility theory of the press, and likely contributed 
in some way to keeping order. 
 Other newspapers around the state contributed to the general consensus that violence was 
impermissible. It was not just a public posture, as seemed to be the case in Mississippi in 1962. 
While many Mississippi newspapers officially stated that they hoped people would stay away 
from Oxford, their support for Governor Barnett’s interposition showed they were spoiling for a 
fight, or at least for a spectacle. What nobody seemed to expect was the level of violence that 
was achieved without consistent leadership from Barnett. In Alabama, the editors had the benefit 
of seeing what happened when a governor – whose ego was inflated by popular support – tried to 
defy the federal government. 
The appeals of Alabama editors in 1963, then, seemed more authentic than the cursory 
calls for order in Mississippi in 1963. The Florence Times of Florence, Alabama, began to 
criticize Governor George Wallace’s stance in early 1963. It said it was Wallace’s duty as a 
Christian to avoid violence. It called on influential people in the state to put pressure on Wallace 
to change his mind. The paper also said blacks deserved equal treatment. The Tuscaloosa News 
reprinted the editorial along with Alabama attorney general and Wallace arch-rival John 
Patterson’s criticism of other public officials who supported Wallace’s unconstitutional stance. 
President Kennedy met with a number of Alabama newspaper editors and executives on May 14, 
1963, to let them know he did indeed intend to repeat his actions in Mississippi and send in 
federal troops if it proved necessary. As Wallace continued to voice his intent to make a stand on 
June 11, the newspapers turned against him. The Tuscaloosa News praised the university board 
of trustees for voting to admit the applicants and obeying court orders. The paper also implored 
Wallace to act with dignity. The Tuscaloosa News and other newspapers around the state began 
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to instruct people to stay away from Tuscaloosa and the University of Alabama campus as the 
day of desegregation drew nearer.357 
Researcher’s findings 
Relating to the desegregation, 98 percent of the Birmingham News’ front-page coverage 
during the month-long survey period was neutral. Stories were well balanced and had no 
apparent agenda other than establishing facts. Front-page news content appeared in 19 editions of 
31 editions survey (61.3 percent). The majority of that content came in the form of news stories 
produced by Birmingham News staff. The news content is remarkable only in its neutrality and 
balance in comparison to the coverage of Jackson’s Clarion-Ledger. The Birmingham News’ 
circulation as of 1961 was 187,000, more than three times as large as the Clarion-Ledger’s.358 
More readers in Birmingham and around the state would have seen the newspaper, thus been 
better informed by its balanced coverage than the inflammatory coverage of the Clarion-Ledger 
in Jackson in the year prior. The front-page coverage of the Birmingham News began on May 21, 
1963, and outlined in neutral language the progression of event leading up to desegregation on 
June 11, 1963. Only one edition, on May 25, was judged to have shown overtly pro-
desegregation sentiment when it portrayed Governor Wallace as being a militant, ex-Golden 
Gloves boxer who was not prepared to rationally handle the situation (see Appendix D, p.162-
163). 
Editorial coverage of the Birmingham News was more mixed. Of fifty-two pieces of 
editorial content, 32.7 percent was judged to be pro-desegregation, while 34.6 percent was anti-
desegregation in tone. Most of the columns and editorials produced by Birmingham News staff 
were pro-desegregation. The newspaper did run a variety of editorials from other newspapers 
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around the state, some of which were not in favor of desegregation. Most of the letters published 
were anti-desegregation. The writers typically accused the federal government of overstepping 
its constitutional boundaries. One writer on June 11, 1963, referred to the black populace as “our 
colored people,” implying ownership. Another writer on the same day referred to blacks who 
supported President Kennedy as “Massa Jack’s darkies.” The Birmingham News gave equal 
voice to its readership to dissent from its generally progressive views of the inevitability of the 
desegregation of the University of Alabama (see Appendix D, p.167-168). 
Like the Birmingham News, the Tuscaloosa News was also nearly entirely neutral in its 
front-page reporting on the unfolding desegregation. Unlike the other newspaper, the Tuscaloosa 
paper made frequent use of Associated Press content. As a paper with a circulation of around 
20,000, the Tuscaloosa News would have had fewer resources for sending staff to Montgomery 
or Birmingham to cover Wallace and his administration. Of eighty-two pieces of front-page news 
content surveyed, 97.5 percent were judged to be neutral. Both instances of pro-desegregation 
news content were found in AP stories. One AP story on May 24, 1963, referred to “diminutive 
Governor Wallace…last of the Southern state chieftains to defy the federal government.” The 
other pro-desegregation AP story on June 5 said Judge Lynne’s injunction on Wallace to prevent 
him from blocking the applicants’ registration “spelled out federal supremacy and swept away 
any vestige of validity in the state sovereignty power claimed by Wallace.” Beginning on June 8, 
the Tuscaloosa News’ front-page reporting was done by in-house staff, and objectively reported 
on the unfolding details of the preparations for desegregation, including Wallace’s admonitions 
for people to stay away from Tuscaloosa (see Appendix D, p.164-165). 
Editorial coverage in the Tuscaloosa News was evenly split between pro-desegregation 
and anti-desegregation content at 40.9 percent each. The number of letters and editorials were 
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nearly the same – nine and ten, respectively – with all the letters being anti-desegregation, and 
most editorials being pro-desegregation in tone. The Tuscaloosa News’ editorials and columns 
asked the readership to recognize the inevitability of the university’s desegregation and asked 
people to stay away from campus. The only anti-desegregation column that was published was a 
June 5, 1963, reprint from the Northwest Alabamian newspaper, which mentioned “invaders” 
from the “federal juggernaut.” The letters, like in other newspapers profiled in this study, usually 
accused the federal government of overstepping its authority. One letter on May 29 opined that 
the Communist party was behind the desegregation. Another letter on May 31 likewise said, 
“Khrushchev and Castro are at the helm of this movement (see Appendix D, p.169-170). 
The Crimson White, the student newspaper of the University of Alabama featured scant 
coverage of the desegregation. The researcher was unable to ascertain the frequency with which 
the newspaper was printed at the time in 1963. The desegregation took place during a summer 
term, thus the Crimson White may have been following a printing schedule that differed from the 
regular school year. The library of the University of Alabama had three editions on file that fell 
during the one-month survey period and made photocopies available to the researcher. All three 
editions, running between May 16, 1963, and June 13, 1963 (the first edition post-desegregation) 
featured news and editorial content related to the desegregation. Of fifteen pieces of front-page 
news content in the Crimson White, fourteen (93 percent) were classified as being neutral in 
tone. The other was judged to be pro-desegregation. The student newspaper reported mostly on 
university preparations being made for desegregation. The eight pieces of editorial content were 
evenly split between pro-desegregation and neutrality (see Appendix D, p.166). Editorials 
implored students to accept the reality of desegregation. In an editorial on June 9, 1963, the staff 
of the Crimson White came out and said, “We are in favor of desegregation on moral grounds.” 
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As with other student newspapers, the staff of the Crimson White likely felt greater immunity in 
stating support for reasons of morality versus commerce or constitutionality. Letters were mixed. 
An anti-desegregation letter on June 13 accused the newspaper staff of “favor[ing] integration 
with a race of savages.” Another letter called the black students “misguided Negroes.” The writer 
of a letter on May 16, however, mirrored the sentiment the Crimson White would disclose 
several days later. The writer asked, “Is there really any difference [between blacks and whites]? 
You tell me if it hurts to hate just as much as it hurts to be hated (see Appendix D, p.171).” 
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CHAPTER FIVE - CONCLUSIONS 
 The researcher has shown the agenda-setting theory of the media to be an appropriate 
lens through which to examine the desegregation of southern universities. Agenda-setting theory 
has provided a framework for the researcher to investigate whether or not newspapers made a 
contribution to the manner in which desegregations were carried out. The newspapers profiled, in 
the month prior to the dates of desegregation, had a powerful potential for influencing the 
opinions of readers. They could inform their readers of lawsuits, court rulings and preparations 
being made for the integration of black students into all-white universities. The newspapers 
could gradually and objectively inform their readers of how their long-established Jim Crow 
society would be changed. The editorial pages could act as public forums for both newspaper 
staff and the public to debate the merits or faults of desegregation and of the constitutionality of 
the federal government’s actions. On the other hand, newspapers could also act as echo chambers 
of misinformation, or even disinformation. A newspaper might align itself too closely with a 
governor and find its objectivity compromised. It could also purposefully choose to set an 
agenda of resistance to desegregation and tacitly permit the readers to believe they could engage 
in civil disobedience or violence with impunity. 
The three newspapers examined in Georgia and the three newspapers examined in 
Alabama were of the former type. These six newspapers – The Atlanta Constitution, The Athens 
Banner-Herald, The Red & Black, The Birmingham News, The Tuscaloosa News and The 
Crimson White – presented news related to their respective desegregations with balance and 
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objectivity. They sought out multiple opinions in news stories and refrained from presenting the 
black applicants to the universities as being pawns of the NAACP or communist sympathizers. 
On some occasions, the newspapers crept away from objectivity and came down on the side of 
desegregation in the name of constitutionality and justice. Historical analysis of the conditions of 
the desegregations of the University of Georgia and the University of Alabama has shown these 
papers did not report misinformation. 
The editorial pages of the six newspapers also made available a reasonable forum to the 
readers of the papers. Editorial staff generally wrote in favor of desegregation, usually out of a 
sense of inevitability and that resistance would be futile. They implored their readers to adhere to 
law and order. But sometimes they braved backlash from conservative white readerships and 
expressed moral support for the black applicants and the righteousness of desegregation. 
Importantly, the editorial pages also left room for dissenting opinions. Letters to the editor in 
these six newspapers generally opposed desegregation. The staff allowed readers to sound off 
with pseudo-science and conspiracy theories about communist infiltration in the federal 
government. The editorial pages also featured occasional letters from readers who were 
sympathetic to the cause of desegregation. Accordingly, the desegregations of the University of 
Georgia and the University of Alabama could be boiled down to oversimplified summaries of 
their respective magnitudes: it only became a bit chaotic at the University of Georgia, and it was 
spontaneous, isolated and quickly dispersed. At the University of Alabama, there was no 
violence to speak of, though the atmosphere was tense. 
The newspapers of Mississippi were a different story, however. The Mississippian, the 
student newspaper of the University of Mississippi would be more accurately categorized with 
the last group, for its news was balanced and editorials concerned with maintaining peace. The 
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Mississippian, however, was but a small student newspaper in the middle of a maelstrom of 
misinformation and disinformation disseminated by the Clarion-Ledger, the largest newspaper in 
the state. The Clarion-Ledger’s owners closely aligned themselves with Governor Ross Barnett. 
The Jackson paper was unyielding in its opposition to desegregation on all fronts. It was 
negligent in its coverage of such an important in-state event. Reporting was left to wire services 
such as AP and UPI. The editors in Jackson often matched neutral wire stories with 
inflammatory headlines. On the occasions when the Clarion-Ledger devoted resources to in-
house reporting, the results were very often unbalanced. They extensively quoted anti-
integrationist government sources without counterbalancing views from parties in favor of 
desegregation. The researcher coded only 63 percent of Clarion-Ledger front-page news stories 
during the survey period as being neutral. Most journalists would likely agree that proportion is 
far too low. Twenty-seven percent were anti-desegregation in tone. Again, nowhere near being 
objective. 
The editorial pages of the Clarion-Ledger acted as little more than sounding boards for 
readers and staff alike to express white supremacist, anti-government views. Conspiracy theories 
about Kennedy administration collusion with communist entities were frequent. A full 95 percent 
of the editorial content was anti-desegregationist. It is not a stretch to imagine how the constant 
barrage of anti-segregationist sentiment spouting forth from the most influential newspaper in the 
Mississippi owned by one of the state’s most influential families might set an agenda for 
resistance. Whatever the effect, it set a low bar for the rest of the newspapers in the state to 
aspire to. All but a few did. The Mississippian was one of only a few that exceeded the bad 
example set by the Clarion-Ledger. The Oxford Eagle was not. The provincial Oxford 
newspaper expressed proportionally as much vitriol in its few weekly pages as did the Clarion-
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Ledger. Again, to oversimplify the magnitude of unrest during the desegregation of the 
University of Mississippi: the coverage in both the Clarion-Ledger and the Oxford Eagle was 
inflammatory and did not give high priority to communicating the facts, which correlated to a 
chaotic and lethal desegregation. 
It cannot be said that the nine newspaper profiled – three in each state – set the agendas in 
their respective states alone. The biggest three – The Atlanta Constitution, The Clarion-Ledger 
and The Birmingham News – certainly held considerable sway in the media landscapes of their 
states. But other newspapers as well as other forms of media also contributed to the agendas in 
each state. In Mississippi, there were eighteen daily newspapers around the state in addition to 
the Clarion-Ledger. Weekly newspapers were even more numerous. The possible agenda-setting 
effects of radio and television news are beyond the scope of this study, but undoubtedly they 
contributed to the outcomes of desegregations in each state. 
The key result of this study has been to demonstrate at the very least a simple correlative 
relationship between the coverage of the newspapers that were surveyed and the relative 
orderliness with which each university was desegregated. Agenda-setting effects were likely 
present in the newspapers’ coverage of each desegregation, but cannot be conclusively proven. 
Agenda-setting effects are most clearly demonstrated by polling, which was not part of this 
study. The events all took place nearly fifty years prior to the study. Polling of an event so far in 
the past would be nearly impossible to accomplish, and there is no guarantee results would be 
valid. The desegregations, at least in Mississippi and Alabama, had such high profiles that it is 
likely anyone polled who was alive at the time would rank them of being of high salience, even 
if that were not the case at the time of desegregation. Conversely, because they took place almost 
fifty years ago, their salience may have faded in the minds of people who would have been 
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polled. Regardless of polling, a causal relationship would be hard to prove, even if opinions of a 
statistically significant sample of individuals had been recorded back in the 1960s. Polling data 
relating to the desegregations was unable to be found, except for one instance in which 30 
percent of a sample of 676 University of Alabama students agreed that desegregation was “a step 
in the right direction to improve the quality of citizenship in the state.”359 This minority opinion 
still did not correlate to any unrest on that campus. If 30 percent is significant enough to predict a 
peaceful desegregation, then the proportion that represents a tipping point into unrest is still 
unknown. Absent a demonstration of a causal relationship, a correlative relationship is still valid. 
The historical backgrounds of each desegregation are also useful for constructing a 
picture of the state of race relations and the commitment of the state and university executives to 
achieving orderly integrations. They provide what quantitative analysis alone cannot – the 
impressions of experts who have studied the period, as well as the input of journalists who 
witnessed the events. When Karl Fleming, a Time reporter, called the Clarion-Ledger of the Jim 
Crow era the worst newspaper in America, that is a valid qualitative analysis that the researcher 
cannot make. It provides contextual support for the researcher’s findings of comprehensively 
racist, anti-federal content in the Clarion-Ledger. 
The researcher believes the findings of this research project have current and future 
applications for both journalists and historians. Content analysis of newspapers can yield valid 
insights into the zeitgeist of an era. More sophisticated analyses that take into account word 
frequency or amount of newsprint inches devoted to a subject could likewise yield correlative 
evidence. Precise calculations of those types could perhaps be used to reach a mathematic 
correlation on a scale of 0 to 1, rather than the simple qualitative correlation of this study. A 
near-future application the methodology employed in this study, paired with comprehensive 
                                                
359 Blasi, p.75. 
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contemporary polling, might be able to positively correlate media coverage of the current 
Congressional budget debate with presidential election results, or with how members of 
Congress themselves are motivated to vote on bills. A more analogous application might be a 
study of some violent event relating to race or politics. The media presents the contemporary 
American political landscape as being highly polarized. In some future event with a long lead 
time – perhaps with federal judicial involvement – running up to a pivotal moment that has the 
potential for explosive resistance, the outcome could be analyzed with the same methodology as 
the desegregation of these southern universities. 
It has been clearly demonstrated in other studies – and given further support in this study 
– that the media has an agenda-setting effect on public opinion. It can sometimes also contribute 
to setting the agenda for public action or passivity. With ever more forms of media creeping into 
the consciousness of the public via ever more conduits – television, Internet, mobile phones – 
demonstrating the agenda-setting effects of myriad media sources will be valuable for future 
researchers for understanding the motivations and actions of the public. For those casting an eye 
on the past, especially the American Civil Rights Movement, analyzing the content of media can 
help to understand why Jim Crow gradually gave way to a culture that places greater emphasis 
on diversity and social justice. 
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Appendix A 
 
How articles were coded 
 All content was analyzed and coded by a single coder, with five percent (twenty-eight) of 
the 543 newspaper articles being coded by an independent coder in order to establish intercoder 
reliability. An intercoder reliability rate of at least 90 percent was desired. The content presented 
for the independent coder consisted of at least one randomly selected sample article of front-page 
and editorial page content from each of the nine newspapers included in the study. In addition to 
these eighteen articles, ten more were randomly selected from all newspapers and both categories 
of content in order to reach the five percent threshold. The researcher considered it impractical to 
have an independent coder devote many hours to reading hundreds of newspaper articles to reach 
a conclusion that would likely be the same in most cases, thus five percent was chosen as a 
statistically significant portion of the survey sample in order to establish a rate of intercoder 
reliability. Such a seemingly small percentage was settled upon because the researcher did not 
seek to demonstrate statistical significance with his newspaper surveys, but to illustrate the way a 
given newspaper presented news and editorials during a particular moment in history. The 
independent coder was informed of the researcher’s methodology and categorization of content. 
After demonstrating an understanding of the task, the independent coder proceeded to code 
content for the twenty-eight articles chosen for her. The results were a 100 percent rate of 
intercoder reliability. 
Front-page news and editorial page content related to desegregation were divided into 
several categories. News content was organized into categories of “news” and “photographs.” 
Editorial page content was organized into categories of “editorials,” “columns,” “cartoons,” and 
“letters.” 
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 Each instance of desegregation-related content was classified as exhibiting an overall 
“tone” that was either “pro-desegregation,” “anti-desegregation,” “neutral” or “unclear.” Pro-
desegregation articles contained language that was, on the whole, in favor of desegregating the 
university in question. It does not imply that the writer or columnist was in favor of 
desegregation exclusively on moral grounds, but that some reason – usually economic or 
constitutional – was given for the desegregation being the right course of action. 
Conversely, a classification as being anti-desegregation in tone meant the writer or 
columnist gave some rationale for being in favor of segregation of the university in question. The 
usual reason for classifying a piece of content as being anti-segregationist was that the writer 
objected on grounds of the federal government or federal judiciary’s actions being 
unconstitutional. Also common were letters and columns that implied a communist conspiracy 
behind the application of blacks to white public universities. Content that referred to black 
people in disparaging terms was also classified as being anti-desegregationist in tone. 
“Neutral” content generally presented more than one point of view. In the case of news 
content, it meant the article was written in a balanced, objective way. Multiple sources were 
usually cited and no specific agenda was obvious. The same goes for editorial content that was 
deemed neutral – it pondered the situation at hand, but did not come down on one side or the 
other. 
Content that was coded as being “unclear” was the least common. It usually contained 
allusions to some person or event that was unfamiliar to the researcher, though it was obviously 
making some sort of commentary on the desegregation of a university. It most commonly 
occurred in editorial pages in letters to the editor. 
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Appendix B 
1960 Census figures for Georgia, Mississippi and Alabama 
 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau 
 
• Population of Georgia in 1960 
Total: 3,943,000 
Urban: 1,814,000 = 46% (P.21, Geographic Distribution, 1960 Census) 
Rural: 2,129,000 = 54% 
White: 2,817,223 = 71% (P.31) 
Black: 1,122,596 = 29% (Up from 1940 and 1950 censuses) 
Other: 3,297 = <1% 
Atlanta was 24th largest city (P.24) 
 
• Population of Mississippi in 1960 
Total: 2,178,000 
Urban: 187,000 = 8.5% (P.21, Geographic Distribution, 1960 Census) 
Rural: 1,991,000 = 91.5% 
White: 1,257,540 = 58% (P.31) 
Black: 915,743 = 42% (down from 1,074,578 in 1940) 
Other: 4,852 = <1% 
Jackson was 84th largest city (P.24) 
 
• Population of Alabama in 1960 
Total: 3,267,000 
Urban: 1,488,000 = 45.5% (P.21, Geographic Distribution, 1960 Census) 
Rural: 1,779,000 = 54.5% 
White: 2,283,609 = 70% (P.31) 
Black: 980,271 = 30% (down from 983,000 in 1940) 
Other: 2,860 = <1% 
Birmingham was 36th largest city (P.24) 
 
(Total U.S. population at this time was 179,977,000) 
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Appendix C 
Circulation and population figures from Editor & Publisher International Yearbook 
 
• US totals for circulation of dailies (Sun – Mon, morning and evening) in 1961 (only year 1961-
1963 for which compiled figures were found) was 60,283,114, both subscription and newsstand 
sales, as reported by the Audit Bureau of Circulations in Editor & Publisher. 
 
Georgia 1961 
• Atlanta population 1961 estimate: 501,400 
 Constitution (m): 199,282 
 Journal-Constitution (S): N/A 
 Affiliation: Independent-Democrat 
Other: No particular restrictions on advertising that is not accepted. The Atlanta Journal 
is the evening paper and has higher circulation. 
 
• Athens population 1961 estimate: 33,500 
 Banner-Herald (eS no Sat.): 6,625 (e); 7,779 (Sunday) 
 Affiliation: Democrat 
 Other: Advertising not accepted – Liquor. 
 
• University of Georgia enrollment 1961: N/A 
 Red & White: N/A 
 
Mississippi 1962 
• Jackson population 1962 estimate: 148,033 
 Clarion-Ledger (m): 52,396 
     (S): 88,530 
 Affiliation: Democrat 
 Other: No alcohol ads 
 
• Oxford 1962 estimate: N/A 
 Oxford Eagle (Th): 2,450 
 Affiliation: Democrat 
 
• University of Mississippi enrollment 1962: N/A 
 Mississippian circulation: N/A 
 
Alabama 1963 
• Birmingham population 1963 estimate: 347,705 
 Birmingham News (eS): 187,020 (e); 220,313 (S) 
 Affiliation: Independent-Democrat 
 
• Tuscaloosa 1963 estimate: 67,806 
 Tuscaloosa News (eS): 19,637 (e); 18,914 (S) 
 Affiliation: Independent-Democrat 
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• University of Alabama enrollment in 1963: N/A 
 Crimson White circulation: N/A 
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Appendix D 
Content Analysis Results in Table Form (begins on following page) 
Atlanta Constitution Front-Page News Content 
 
 
1
4
8
 
Date/Page# 
Content 
Type 
Pro 
Desegregation 
Anti 
Desegregation Neutral Unclear Content (; denotes new item) 
12-14-1960 P.1 News: 1 0 0 1 0 
Balanced Atlanta Constitution story: shows that white females had been accepted when 
Hunter was rejected 
12-16-1960 P.1 News: 1 0 0 1 0 
Balanced Atlanta Constitution story: 300 white students were accepted after Hunter and 
Holmes were denied 
12-17-1960 P.1 News: 1 0 0 1 0 Balanced AC story: "double standards for whites" 
01-07-1961 P.1 News: 4 0 0 4 0 Four AC stories, all balanced 
01-09-1961 P.1 
News: 3; 
Photo: 1 
0 0 4 0 Three balanced stories; one neutral photo 
01-10-1961 P.1 
News: 6; 
Photo: 1 
0 0 7 0 
Neutral AC stories about desegregation, university closing, though one by Marion Gaines is 
dramatically worded; Neutral photo of students waiting around on campus 
01-11-1961 P.1 
News: 9; 
Photo: 1 
2 0 8 0 
Pro-desegregation photo: one shows anti-desegregation Mothers as foolish, other shows pro 
students; Rest are local neutral stories detailing machinations of court decisions; neutral photo 
of Vandiver being served 
01-12-1961 P.1 
News: 3; 
Photo: 1 
0 0 4 0 Three Atlanta Constitution stories; Neutral photo of Charlayne Hunter after class 
  2 0 30 0 Total front-page news items = 32 
      6.25% = Pro-desegregation 
8 editions (of 30 surveyed) with front-page news content = 26.6%  0.00% = Anti-desegregation 
      93.75% = Neutral 
Content Type Total Percentage    0.00% = Unclear 
News 28 87.50%     
Photographs 4 12.50%     
 
 
Figure 1 
Athens Banner-Herald Front-Page News Content 
 
 
1
4
9
 
Date/Page# 
Content 
Type 
Pro 
Desegregation 
Anti 
Desegregation Neutral Unclear Content (; denotes new item) 
12-13-1960 P.1 News: 1 0 0 1 0 
ABH article: "the Negro" (doesn't seem to be a pejorative), "Miss Hunter" 
12-16-1960 P.1 News: 1 0 0 1 0 ABH article: balanced, both sides covered 
12-18-1960 P.1 News: 1 0 0 1 0 ABH article: balanced, both sides covered 
12-30-1960 P.1 News: 1 0 0 1 0 Neutral AP story 
01-08-1961 P.1 News: 1 0 0 1 0 ABH article: neutral 
01-09-1961 P.1 News: 5 0 0 5 0 Four neutral AP stories; one neutral ABH story 
01-10-1961 P.1 News: 5 0 0 4 1 
Three neutral AP stories; one neutral ABH story; one unclear ABH story: "good-natured cheers 
(from rowdy student crowd directed toward Hunter and Holmes)" 
01-11-1961 P.1 News: 4 0 0 4 0 Four ABH stories, all neutral in tone 
01-12-1961 P.1 News: 5 0 0 5 0 One neutral AP story; Four neutral ABH stories 
  0 0 23 1 Total front-page news items = 24 
      0.0% = Pro-desegregation 
9 editions (of 28 surveyed) with front-page news content = 32.14%  0.0% = Anti-desegregation 
      95.8% = Neutral 
Content Type Total Percentage    4.2% = Unclear 
News 24 100.00%     
Photographs 0 0.00%     
 
Figure 2 
Red & Black Front-Page News Content 
 
  
1
5
0
 
Date/Page# 
Content 
Type 
Pro 
Desegregation 
Anti 
Desegregation Neutral Unclear Content (; denotes new item) 
01-05-1961 P.1 News: 1 0 0 1 0 Neutral Red & Black article: "Bootle ruled that University officials had discriminated" 
01-09-1961 P.1 
News: 3; 
Photo: 3 
0 0 6 0 
Three neutral Red & Black stories: Bootle grants stay on conditions; Non-violence urged by 
Dean; Holmes' father interviewed. 
01-10-1961 P.1 News: 3 0 0 3 0 
Three neutral RB stories: 1,500 people spotted Holmes and Hunter on campus and Vandiver 
cuts state funds; Timeline of events; Holmes' effigy burned but campus officials quickly stopped 
it. 
01-11-1961 P.1 
The microfilm for this date was a duplicate of the 01-09-1961 edition. It is unknown if this edition was circulated twice on the original 
dates. (Not counted) 
01-19-1961 P.1 News: 1 0 0 1 0 
Neutral RB story: Thirteen students suspended in connection with demonstrations at the 
university 
  0 0 11 0 Total front-page news items = 11 
      0% = Pro-desegregation 
5 editions (of 10 surveyed) with front-page news content = 50%  0% = Anti-desegregation 
      100% = Neutral 
Content Type Total Percentage    0% = Unclear 
News 8 72.73%     
Photographs 3 27.27%     
 
 
Figure 3 
Atlanta Constitution Editorial Page Content 
 
  
1
5
1
 
Date/Page# 
Content 
Type 
Pro 
Desegregation 
Anti 
Desegregation Neutral Unclear Content (; denotes new item) 
12-15-1960 P.4 Letter: 1 1 0 0 0 
"There is a sadness in the Negro's eyes as he looks my way - and leaves this visitor 
ashamed." 
12-31-1960 P.4 Editorial: 1 1 0 0 0 
Quotes GA constitution: "No doubt about the precedence of federal over state authority," 
"avoid a useless conflict between fed and state authority" 
01-05-1961 P.1 Column: 1 1 0 0 0 "[Prominent Klansman] accepts the reality of the Supreme Court decision" 
01-07-1961 P.1 
Editorial: 1; 
Column: 1 
2 0 0 0 
McGill: "Reality [of need to desegregate];" Editorial title - "Georgia's Course Is To Obey the 
Law," "no law requiring segregation in university system," "Litigation has run its course," 
"federal law supercedes state law" 
01-07-1961 P.4 Editorial: 1 1 0 0 0 
"When in conflict, the federal law supersedes state law," "Georgia has no law requiring 
segregation in its university system." 
01-10-1961 P.1 Column: 1 1 0 0 0 
McGill: "It is dismaying…to have a student leader reveal the depths of his immaturity," 
"discounts the future," "[a governor like Mr. Fabus is an] expensive luxury" 
01-10-1961 P.4 
Editorial: 1; 
Column: 2 
3 0 0 0 
McGill: "Forced segregation is not legal;" Editorial: "We cannot abandon public education;" 
Syndicated Lippman colum: "Idiocy has defeated sense before" 
01-11-1961 P.1 Column: 1 1 0 0 0 McGill: "erase the picture of the 'Ugly Southerner'" 
01-11-1961 P.4 
Editorial: 1; 
Column: 3; 
Cartoon: 1 
4 0 0 1 
McGill: "Vandiver didn't try to duck or dodge;" Editorial: "Judge's response legal;" Boswell 
column: "outcome inevitable;" Martin column: letter to son at UGA; Cartoon: unclear 
01-12-1961 P.1 Editorial: 1 1 0 0 0 
McGill: "frantically prejudiced persons," "There now is left no ground on which falsehood can 
stand." 
01-12-1961 P.4 
Editorial: 1; 
Column: 1; 
Cartoon: 1 
2 0 0 1 
Editorial: "The sky has not fallen;" Column: "knuckleheads who threw rocks;" Cartoon: 
Unclear 
  18 0 0 2 Total editorial items = 20 
      90% = Pro-desegregation 
8 editions (of 30 surveyed) with editorial content = 26.6%   0% = Anti-desegregation 
      0% = Neutral 
Content Type Total Percentage    10% = Unclear 
Editorials 7 35.00%     
Columns 10 50.00%     
Cartoons 2 2.00%     
Letters 1 5.00%     
 
Figure 4 
Athens Banner-Herald Editorial Page Content 
 
 
1
5
2
 
Date/Page# 
Content 
Type 
Pro 
Desegregation 
Anti 
Desegregation Neutral Unclear Content (; denotes new item) 
12-18-1960 P.4 Editorial: 1 0 0 1 0 Neutral column 
01-10-1961 P.4 Editorial: 1 1 0 0 0 "Admittance of even two Negroes…is tolerable; end of the line" 
01-12-1961 P.1 Editorial: 1 0 0 0 1 Condemning bad acts of rioters, but opinion unclear 
01-12-1961 P.4 Editorial: 1 0 0 0 1 Charges of instigation by other news outlets of irresponsible reporting 
  1 0 1 2 Total editorial items = 4 
      25% = Pro-desegregation 
4 editions (of 28 surveyed) with editorial content = 14.2%   0% = Anti-desegregation 
      25% = Neutral 
Content Type Total Percentage    50% = Unclear 
Editorials 4 100%     
Columns 0 0%     
Cartoons 0 0%     
Letters 0 0%     
 
 
Figure 5 
Red & Black Editorial Page Content 
 
 
1
5
3
 
Date/Page# Content Type 
Pro 
Desegregation 
Anti 
Desegregation Neutral Unclear Content (; denotes new item) 
01-05-1961 P.4 Column: 1 1 0 0 0 
"We should face facts," "Let's think and then face the situation square in the face and 
show the rest of the United States that we in Georgia are the true leaders of the new 
South." 
01-09-1961 P.1 Editorial: 1 0 0 1 0 
"Let those in the position of leadership be the ones to handle this situation. Let’s not 
try to take it into our own hands with violent actions." 
01-10-1961 P.1 
Editorial: 1; 
Cartoon: 2 
0 0 3 0 
"Some few Yankee publications have imposed themselves upon our student body", 
"…preserving our reputation…"; Two neutral cartoons about the ball being dropped and 
journalists inciting student behavior. 
01-11-1961 P.1 Editorial: 1 0 0 1 0 
"We hope you rabble rousers who planned, organized and carried through this little 
exhibition last night are not truly representative of this campus." 
01-19-1961 P.1 Editorial: 1 0 0 1 0 
"[University officials are in better position] to determine who should be suspended or 
not than the state legislature." 
01-19-1961 P.4 
Editorial: 2; 
Column: 1; 
Letter: 7 
4 0 4 2 
Neutral editorials: "create total confusion"; "restraint and discretion were used"; Neut 
column: "we can pick up our broken pieces and carry on"; Pro-desegregation letters: 
"Our nation preaces liberty, freedom and dignity of men all over the world."; "quest for 
domestic unity and peace"; "challenge of Democracy"; "She was being led to safety 
away from you"; Neutral letter: "Where were the student leaders?"; Two unclear 
letters with what seems to be sarcasm. 
  5 0 10 2 Total editorial items = 17 
      29.4% = Pro-desegregation 
6 editions (of 10 surveyed) with editorial content = 60%   0.00% = Anti-desegregation 
      58.8% = Neutral 
Content Type Total Percentage    11.7% = Unclear 
Editorials 6 35.00%     
Columns 2 12.00%     
Cartoons 2 12.00%     
Letters 7 41.00%     
 
 
Figure 6 
Clarion-Ledger Front-Page News Content 
 
   
1
5
4
 
Date/Page# 
Content 
Type 
Pro 
Desegregation 
Anti 
Desegregation Neutral Unclear Content (; denotes new item) 
09-01-1962 P.1 News: 2 0 0 2 0 Two neutral AP stories 
09-07-1962 P.1 News: 1 0 1 0 0 
AP story used with negative headline against JFK: "…[We] are dedicated to a constitutional 
gov't…opposed to an all-powerful central gov't in [DC]." 
09-12-1962 P.1 News: 1 0 0 1 0 Neutral AP story 
09-13-1962 P.1 News: 1 0 0 0 1 Unclear Clarion-Ledger story 
09-14-1962 P.1 News: 1 0 1 0 0 Unbalanced Clarion-Ledger story- only segregationists shown 
09-15-1962 P.1 News: 4 0 0 4 0 Multiple sides represented 
09-16-1962 P.1 News: 1 0 0 0 1 Unclear 
09-17-1962 P.1 News: 3 0 1 3 0 One story is almost solely an extended anti-desegregation quote of Lt. Gov. Johnson 
09-18-1962 P.1 
News: 2; 
Photo: 1 
0 0 3 0 Neutral news; neutral photo 
09-19-1962 P.1 News: 5 0 3 2 0 
Three heavily biased reports by CL that extensively quote anti-desegregationists without 
balance; Two neutral AP stories 
09-20-1962 P.1 News: 3 0 0 2 1 Unclear article written in first person - unclear intent; Two neutral AP stories 
09-21-1962 P.1 News: 3 0 0 2 1 Neutral AP story; neutral CL story 
09-22-1962 P.1 News: 4 0 0 4 0 Neutral wire stories 
09-23-1962 P.1 News: 2 0 0 2 0 Two neutral wire stories 
09-24-1962 P.1 News: 3 0 0 3 0 Two neutral UPI stories; one neutral CL story 
09-25-1962 P.1 News: 4 0 1 3 0 
Anti-desegregation CL article: "invading federal marshals…interference in admin of state 
laws." Two neutral AP stories; one neutral CL story 
09-26-1962 P.1 
News: 4; 
Photo: 1 
0 3 2 0 
Anti-desegregation CL article: "wrath of the federal judiciary"; "Meredith, grinning as he 
walked by" Photo: supportive of Barnett 
09-27-1962 P.1 
News: 7; 
Photo: 2 
0 3 5 1 
Anti-desegregation CL article: "'honor roll' of defenders of states' rights;" Two anti-
desegregation photos show forces against Meredith; neutral AP and UPI stories 
09-28-1962 P.1 
News: 5; 
Photo: 1 
0 3 2 1 
Anti-desegregation CL article: "Meredith was batting 0 for 4;" unlcear: "NAACP dictating to 
senators;" positive photo of Barnett; Neutral AP and UPI stories 
09-29-1962 P.1 
News: 6; 
Photo: 2 
0 1 4 3 
Anti-desegregation CL article: "upholding the soverign rights of the state," "attack and 
violence on the part of federal troops;" Three neutral wire stroies; One neutral CL story from 
DC bureau; One unclear account of Ole Miss by CL 
09-30-1962 P.1 
News: 8; 
Photo: 1 
0 4 5 0 
Anti-desegregation CL article: "federal invasion"; Two wire articles manipulated to be anti-
desegregation via headlines; Five neutral AP stories; Anti-desegregation photo shows black 
newsman being denied credentials 
Clarion-Ledger Front-Page News Content 
 
   
1
5
5
 
10-01-1962 P.1 
News: 9; 
Photo: 2 
0 4 7 0 
Anti-desegregation CL article: one presents anti-desegregation facts without attribution; one 
has only biased extensive anti-desegregation quotes from MS congressmen; one is verbatim 
statement from Barnett; other highlights distaste of Nat'l Guardsmen for duty. Four Neutral 
wire stories; Two neutral photos. 
10-02-1962 P.1 
News: 7; 
Photo: 4 
0 3 8 0 
Anti-desegregation CL article: unbalanced accounts of possible federal troop/marshal 
misconduct; Four neutral stories; Four neutral photos 
  0 28 64 9 Total front-page news items = 101 
      0.0% = Pro-desegregation 
23 editions (of 31 surveyed) with front-page news content = 74.2%  27.7% = Anti-desegregation 
      63.37% = Neutral 
Content Type Total Percentage    8.9% = Unclear 
News 87 86.14%     
Photographs 14 13.86%     
 
 
Figure 7 
Oxford Eagle Front-Page News Content 
 
 
1
5
6
 
Date/Page# 
Content 
Type 
Pro 
Desegregation 
Anti 
Desegregation Neutral Unclear Content (; denotes new item) 
09-27-1962 P.1 News: 2 0 1 1 0 
Bulletin: seems anti-desegregation, unbalanced; Message from Oxford mayor praising 
restraint shown by residents 
10-04-1962 P.1 
News: 2; 
Photo: 2 
0 0 4 0 Neutral Oxford Eagle story and bulletin; Photos seem neutral 
  0 1 5 0 Total front-page news items = 6 
      0.0% = Pro-desegregation 
2 editions (of 30 surveyed) with front-page news content = 26.6%  16.67% = Anti-desegregation 
      83.33% = Neutral 
Content Type Total Percentage    0.00% = Unclear 
News 4 66.70%     
Photographs 2 33.30%     
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Date/Page# 
Content 
Type 
Pro 
Desegregation 
Anti 
Desegregation Neutral Unclear Content (; denotes new item) 
09-18-1962 P.1 News: 1 0 0 1 0 Wire story 
09-21-1962 P.1 
News: 1; 
Photo: 2 
0 0 3 0 Mississippian story: balanced; Photos: no overt bias 
09-25-1962 P.1 News: 1 0 0 1 0 Balanced 
09-26-1962 P.1 News: 6 0 0 6 0 
Two Mississippian stories; Three wire stories; One story verbatim text of Judge Mize's 
decision 
09-27-1962 P.1 
News: 1; 
Photo: 1 
0 0 2 0 Balanced Mississippian story; Photo: no apparent bias 
09-28-1962 P.1 
News: 1; 
Photo: 2 
0 0 3 0 Balanced Mississippian story; Two photos of sheriffs 
10-01-1962 P.1 
News: 2; 
Photo: 1 
0 0 3 0 Balanced Mississippian story; Verbatim order from chancellor; Photo of marshals lined up 
10-02-1962 P.1 
News: 2; 
Photo: 2 
0 0 4 0 Balanced stories; Photos without apparent bias 
  0 0 23 0 Total front-page news items = 23 
      0.0% = Pro-desegregation 
8 editions (of 22 surveyed) with front-page news content = 34.8%  0.0% = Anti-desegregation 
      100% = Neutral 
Content Type Total Percentage    0.0% = Unclear 
News 15 65.22%     
Photographs 8 34.78%     
 
Figure 9 
Clarion-Ledger Editorial Page Content 
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Date/Page# 
Content 
Type 
Pro 
Desegregation 
Anti 
Desegregation Neutral Unclear Content (; denotes new item) 
09-03-1962 P.6 Column: 1 0 1 0 0 "national suicide and tyrrany" 
09-12-1962 P.8 Column: 1 0 1 0 0 "campus liberals" 
09-14-1962 P.1 Editorial: 2 0 2 0 0 "federal attacks," "[Barnett] spoke courageously;" "a Negro" [Meredith] 
09-15-1962 P.1 Editorial: 2 0 2 0 0 "[Barnett] rightly contends;" "[Barnett] fearless" 
09-15-1962 P.8 
Column: 1; 
Letter: 1 
0 2 0 0 "federal encroachment;" "Mississippianians are proud of [Barnett]" 
09-16-1962 P.1 Editorial: 1 0 1 0 0 "federal interference;" "racial integrity" 
09-16-1962 P.2 
Editorial: 2; 
Cartoon: 1 
0 3 0 0 
Editorials: "left-wing appeasement," "grab power under the name of brotherhood and 
tolerance," "racist murder anecdote;" "subvert the constitution;" Cartoon showing Barnett 
cutting off federal judge 
09-16-1962 P.3 Editorial: 1 0 1 0 0 
"ursurpation," "rape of the Constitution," "[Barnett] had the courage," "[Barnett] will not 
retreat," "blood-seeking Kennedys," "federal encroachment" 
09-17-1962 P.1 Editorial: 1 0 1 0 0 "federal encroachment," "outside interference" 
09-17-1962 P.6 Column: 1 0 1 0 0 "Yankee philosophy" 
09-19-1962 P.5 Column: 1 0 1 0 0 "[Barnett's] courageous stand," "will of the people" 
09-19-1962 P.6 
Column: 1; 
Letter: 3 
0 4 0 0 Column: "radical oddballs;" "Kennedyism;" "African semi-savages" 
09-20-1962 P.6 Column: 1 0 1 0 0 
"Shanty Irish (Kennedys)," "Pretty soon the federal payroll will be altogether Kennedy and 
Colored" 
09-21-1962 P.6 Column: 1 0 1 0 0 "big showdown," "[Meredith's] NAACP-federal friends" 
09-22-1962 P.4 
Column: 1; 
Letter: 1 
0 2 0 0 "civil rights" (in quotations); "[JFK administration are] Fabian socialists" 
09-23-1962 P.2 Cartoon: 1 0 1 0 0 Gavel shown driving "Integration" spike into Mississippi 
09-24-1962 P.6 
Column: 1; 
Letter: 4 
1 4 0 0 
Anti-desegregation column: "Yankees lack finesse, culture;" "decomposing the white race;" 
"power-hungry Kennedys;" Pro-desegregation letter: "deny liberty" 
09-24-1962 P.8 Column: 1 0 1 0 0 
The CL quotes other papers: "ursuped;" "regulate its own affairs;" "preserve their heritage;" 
"favorite whipping boy (MS);" "[Barnett is] a man who believes in his principles" "power-
hungry leaders in DC;" "so much has been done for the Negro at the expense of the whole 
populace" 
09-25-1962 P.8 
Column: 1; 
Letter: 3 
1 3 0 0 
Pro-desegregation letter: Fourteenth Amendment cited; Two Anti-desegregation letters: 
"[Barnett's] courageous attitude," "destroying the laws of the U.S. Constitution;" Anti-
desegregation column: "Kennedyism," "political interference," "power-drunk federals" 
09-26-1962 P.8 
Column: 1; 
Letter: 1 
0 2 0 0 Letters: "ruthless, Negro-worshipping Kennedys;""big government" 
Clarion-Ledger Editorial Page Content 
 
  
1
5
9
 
09-27-1962 
P.10 
Column: 1; 
Letter 2 
0 3 0 0 
Column: "[Barnett's] courageous stand;" Letters: "Ethiopians (referring to African 
Americans);" "[Barnett is] No.1 defender of state rights" 
09-28-1962 P.6 
Editorial: 1; 
Column: 1 
0 2 0 0 
Editorial: "State is unified behind [Barnett]," "our Ross," "cheap efforts of the Kennedy 
crowd," "Communist threat;" Column: "brow-beaten by the Federal Gov't" 
09-28-1962 P.8 Column: 1 0 1 0 0 "belligerent federal marshals," "Nobody was going past [Lt. Gov. Johnson]" 
09-29-1962 P.6 
Column: 2; 
Letter: 3 
0 5 0 0 
Columns:"Administration tactics against MS," "Kennedyism," "Ike's monumental stupidity;" 
"governmental pressure," "Keep MS Sovereign;" Letters: "dictatorial tyranny;" political 
intimidation;" "so-called professors come from the states in the North" 
09-30-1962 P.6 
Editorial: 1; 
Column: 1; 
Cartoon: 1 
0 3 0 0 
Editorial: "NAACP's pawn [Meredith]; Letter: "NAACP drivel;" Cartoon: shows Tenth 
Amendment in garbage 
09-30-1962 P.7 Column: 1 0 1 0 0 
"unfriendly federal gov't" "Mississippi cannot allow the unleashed furies of the Congo as are 
seen on the doorsteps of the U.S. Capitol," "Yankees," "skalawags are with us" 
10-01-1962 P.8 
Column: 2; 
Letter: 1 
0 2 1 0 
Neutral syndicated column; Anti-desegregation column: "Kennedy is a rebel-rouser;" Anti-
desegregation letter: "wire Congress and demand constitutional government" 
10-02-1962 P.6 
Column: 1; 
Letter: 5 
0 6 0 0 
Column: "dictatorial President," "NAACP troublemakers;" Letters: "Socialists;" "direct 
violation of Constitution;" "[Barnett's] courageous stand" 
  2 58 1 0 Total editorial items = 61 
      3.3% = Pro-desegregation 
28 editions (of 31 surveyed) with editorial content = 90.32%  95.1% = Anti-desegregation 
      1.6% = Neutral 
Content Type Total Percentage    0% = Unclear 
Editorials 11 18.03%     
Columns 23 37.70%     
Cartoons 3 4.90%     
Letters 24 39.34%     
 
 
Figure 10 
Oxford Eagle Editorial Page Content 
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Date/Page# 
Content 
Type 
Pro 
Desegregation 
Anti 
Desegregation Neutral Unclear Content (; denotes new item) 
09-06-1962 P.4 Cartoon: 1 0 0 0 1 Cartoon of looming school desegregation fight - opinion unclear 
09-20-1962 P.4 
Column: 1; 
Letter: 1 
0 1 0 1 
Anti-desegregation: "scrap our constitution;" Unclear: links idea of big gov't as a necessity 
for a growing country 
09-27-1962 P.4 
Column: 2; 
Editorial: 1 
0 1 0 2 
Unclear column: "The Mississippian is often a beacon of liberalism;" Anti-desegregation 
column: "force integration," "mongrelized culls," "integration will be bad for our country" 
10-04-1962 P.4 Column: 2 0 2 0 0 
Anti-desegregation column: "rights…bulldozed away," "ignore the rights and wishes of all the 
people of a state," "weaken our country;" Anti-degregation column by Goolsby (editor and 
publisher): "like thieves in the night [the federal gov't], violated the Constitution" 
  0 4 0 4 Total editorial items = 8 
      0% = Pro-desegregation 
4 editions (of 5 surveyed) with editorial content = 80%  50% = Anti-desegregation 
      0% = Neutral 
Content Type Total Percentage    50% = Unclear 
Editorials 1 12.50%     
Columns 5 62.50%     
Cartoons 1 12.50%     
Letters 1 12.50%     
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Date/Page# 
Content 
Type 
Pro 
Desegregation 
Anti 
Desegregation Neutral Unclear Content (; denotes new item) 
09-21-1962 P.1 Editorial: 1 0 0 1 0 Editorial by editor Brower only congratualtes students on restraint shown 
09-22-1962 P.1 Editorial: 1 0 0 1 0 Editorial by Brower is neutral, but criticizes other hypocritical papers 
09-26-1962 P.1 Cartoon: 1 0 0 0 1 Poor-quality copy of cartoon on microfilm - intent unclear 
09-26-1962 P.2 
Letter: 2 0 1 0 1 
Anti-desegregation letter: "If we can stand up to the Federal Gov't;" Neutral letter: 
seems to anticipate, but not condone, violence 
10-01-1962 P.2 
Editorial: 1 1 0 0 0 
"The federal gov't is once again showing its strength and power to uphold the laws of 
our country." 
  1 1 2 2 Total editorial items = 6 
      16.7% = Pro-desegregation 
5 editions (of 22 surveyed) with editorial content = 9.1%  16.7% = Anti-desegregation 
      33.3% = Neutral 
Content Type Total Percentage    33.3% = Unclear 
Editorials 3 50.00%     
Columns 0 0.00%     
Cartoons 1 16.66%     
Letters 2 33.33%     
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Date/Page# 
Content 
Type 
Pro 
Desegregation 
Anti 
Desegregation Neutral Unclear Content (; denotes new item) 
05-21-1963 P. 1 News: 2 0 0 2 0 Two neutral stories, one of which is a Birmingham News story 
05-22-1963 P.1 News: 2 0 0 2 0 
Two neutral Birmingham News stories - one outlines steps to date in desegregation; other 
about why President Kennedy is sending troops 
05-24-1963 P.1 News: 1 0 0 1 0 
Neutral BN story about Robert Kennedy asking for injunction against Wallace's planned 
stand. 
05-25-1963 P.1 News: 3 0 0 3 0 "Forthcoming crisis;" "showdown" 
05-26-1963 P.1 News: 1 1 0 0 0 
"ex-Golden Glover (Wallace)," "militant man (Wallace)," "arch enemy Robert Kennedy," 
"would cause violence" 
05-27-1963 P.1 News: 2 0 0 2 0 
Two neutral wire stories about Wallace dodging being served court papers and his Supreme 
Court appeal being dropped. 
05-29-1963 P.1 News: 2 0 0 2 0 Two neutral Birmingham News stories - balanced, unbiased; "stir up mob violence" 
05-30-1963 P.1 News: 1 0 0 1 0 Neutral BN story: "hide-and-seek game with federal government [about injunction]" 
06-02-1963 P.1 News: 1 0 0 1 0 Neutral BN story: Lt. Gov. Allen: Alabama "must not travel the Oxford route." 
06-03-1963 P.1 News: 4 0 0 4 0 
Four neutral BN stories: "Wallace vows to stand;" "Department of Justice petitions to stop 
Wallace;" Wallace's TV appearance praised; University of Alabama accepts James Hood for 
admission at Tuscaloosa 
06-04-1963 P.1 News: 1 0 0 1 0 Neutral BN story: Court ruling awaited on Wallace's planned stand. 
06-05-1963 P.1 
News: 3; 
Photo: 1 
0 0 4 0 
Three neutral BN stories: explain possibility of Wallace's arrest; Judge's rare "I" used in his 
written opinion; Wallace to be on TV; neutral photograph of Wallace and Judge Lynne 
06-06-1963 P.1 
News: 2; 
Photo: 1 
0 0 3 0 
Two neutral BN stories: "unreleting Governor;"  "Federal government will bring in troops;" 
Photo of Wallace in TV studio 
06-07-1963 P.1 News: 1 0 0 1 0 Wallace says, "[Malone] is a pawn in the hands of the NAACP." 
06-08-1963 P.1 News: 3 0 0 3 0 
Three Neut BNs: US will avoid jailing Wallace; State troops line UA campus; Bull Connor 
urges people to stay away. 
06-09-1963 P.1 
News: 6; 
Photo: 1 
0 0 7 0 
Six neutral BN stories: Wallace asks for peace; story on U.S. marshal who will accompany 
Malone and Hood; Army readies; 825 police assembled by Wallace 
06-10-1963 P.1 
News: 5; 
Photo: 1 
0 0 6 0 
Five neutral BN stories: U.S. asks Wallace to stand aside; Wallace, police ask people to stay 
away; Alabama National Guard on standby; UA pres Rose wants Wallace there to ensure 
order. 
06-11-1963 P.1 
News: 4; 
Photo: 1 
0 0 5 0 
Four neutral BN stories: JFK proclamation for Wallace to cease and desist; text of Wallace's 
statement; Wallace turned away federal gov't; Federal gov't would shortly register blacks 
anyway. 
06-12-1963 P.1 
News: 1; 
Photo: 1 
0 0 2 0 BN: Wallace pulls troops, blacks in class; photo of Alabama National Guard general. 
  1 0 50 0 Total front-page news items = 51 
      2% = Pro-desegregation 
19 editions (of 31 surveyed) with front-page news content = 61.3%  0.0 = Anti-desegregation 
      98% = Neutral 
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Content Type Total Percentage    0% = Unclear 
News 45 88.24%     
Photographs 6 11.76%     
 
 
Figure 13 
Tuscaloosa News Front-Page News Content 
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Date/Page# 
Content 
Type 
Pro 
Desegregation 
Anti 
Desegregation Neutral Unclear Content (; denotes new item) 
05-20-1963 P.1 News: 1 0 0 1 0 Neutral AP story - summarization of legal issues 
05-21-1963 P.1 News: 1 0 0 2 0 
Two neutral AP stories - trustees agree to admit two blacks; Autherine Lucy was expelled 
unproven accusations against school officials. Both stories balanced 
05-21-1963 P.1B News: 3 0 0 3 0 
Two neutral AP stories - details Judge Grooms' denial of trustees' motion of delay; neutral 
Tuscaloosa News story asking students about their reactions 
05-22-1963 P.1 
News: 2; 
Photo: 2 
0 0 4 0 
Two neutral AP stories - profile of Grooms and how there are fewer protests to him, implying 
a growing acceptance of desegregation; Attorney General Flowers says the fight is over; two 
neutral photographs 
05-23-1963 P.1 
News: 4; 
Photo: 1 
0 0 5 0 
Four neutral AP stories - President Kennedy considering new civil rights legislation; Wallace 
"testing" system; profile of Vivian Malone 
05-24-1963 P.1 
News: 1; 
Photo: 2 
0 0 3 0 Neutral AP story - Federal gov't invoked its sovereignty; two neutral photos 
05-25-1963 P.1 News: 1 0 0 1 0 Neutral AP story - Wallace has no comment on Justice Deptment proceedings against him 
05-26-1963 P.1 News: 1 1 0 0 0 
Biased AP story - "Diminuitive Governor Wallace," "last of the Southern state chieftans to 
defy the federal government" 
05-27-1963 P.1 News: 2 0 0 2 0 
Two neutral AP stories: Wallace avoiding being served; Wallace suit to prevent federal troops 
in Birmingham rejected by Supreme Court 
05-29-1963 P.1 News: 4 0 0 4 0 
Three neutral Tuscaloosa News stories - business and community leaders urge restraint to 
Wallace; AP story - Alabama senators back Wallace 
05-30-1963 P.1 News: 1 0 0 1 0 Neutral AP story - vote of confidence in Wallace by Senate 
05-31-1963 P.1 News: 1 0 0 2 0 
Two neutral Tuscaloosa News stories: one alerts public of campus safety, ID measures; 
second about KKK pledging to stay away, Grand Jury asking for people to avoid Tuscaloosa 
06-01-1963 P.1 News: 1 0 0 1 0 Neutral AP story - Wallace: "I don't want you to stand with me. I am going to stand for you." 
06-02-1963 P.1 News: 2 0 0 2 0 
Two neutral AP stories : Lt. Gov. Allen: "Let's not travel the Oxford route."; 
"Businessmen…urged…Wallace to abandon his doorway defiance." 
06-03-1963 P.1 News: 1 0 0 1 0 Neutral AP story - Judge Lynne delayed immediate ruling on Wallace edict. 
06-04-1963 P.1 News: 4 0 0 4 0 
Four neutral AP stories: Hood accepted; Paper Workers union backs Wallace; Hood parents 
proud; Wallace and University of Alabama presidsent Rose meet 
06-05-1963 P.1 News: 3 1 0 2 0 
One Pro-desegregation AP story: "…spelled out federal supremacy and swept away any 
vestige of validity in the state sovereignty power claimed by Wallace…[Lynne's] decision was 
a complete victory for the Justice Department."; Neutral Tuscaloosa story about roadblocks 
and IDs; Neutral AP story about Wallace going on statewide TV 
06-06-1963 P.1 
News: 2; 
Photo: 1 
0 0 3 0 
Neutral AP story: Wallace will risk arrest to make stand; Story detailing roadblocks at UA, 
accompanying map of roadblocks. 
06-07-1963 P.1 News: 2 0 0 2 0 
4,000 Alabama National Guardsmen; Highway Patrol task force has moved onto the UA 
campus 
06-08-1963 P.1 
News: 4; 
Photo: 1 
0 0 5 0 
Bull Connor says stay away, boycott; Roadblock details; Cabinet members give Wallace 
confidence vote; State Reprepresentative calls for law and order; Neutral photograph of 
roadblocks. 
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06-09-1963 P.1 
News: 6; 
Photo: 3 
0 0 9 0 
All are Tuscaloosa News stories except AP story about U.S. Chamber of Commerce president 
supporting integration. Wallace urges avoidance of Tuscaloosa; 500 Alabama Guardsmen in 
Tuscaloosa; Tuscaloosa radio stations cooperate in coverage; KKK predicts boycotts; Six men 
arrested with weapons; 3 neutral photographss all related to security. 
06-10-1963 P.1 
News: 4; 
Photo: 2 
0 0 6 0 
Two Tuscaloosa News stories: 500 Guardsmen and arrests of 15 armed men; Air of calmness 
on campus; AP: Voice of America radio to report and broadcast behind Iron Curtain; Wallace 
says stay away again. Two photos of seized arsenal and troops. 
06-11-1963 P.1 
News: 5; 
Photo: 2 
0 0 7 0 
Wallace statement; JFK statement; students surprised Wallace followed through; Gen. 
Graham informs Wallace of his "sad duty"; quick registration of two students. Photos of 
troops and Deputy U.S. Attorney General Katzenbach. 
06-11-1963 P.1 
News: 4; 
Photo: 2 
0 0 6 0 
Wallace statement; JFK statement; JFK federalizes 17,000 Alabama National Guard 
personnel; 46 lawyers sign statement saying Wallace wrong to test. Two photogarphs of 
stand at doorway. 
06-12-1963 P.1 
News: 3; 
Photo: 1 
0 0 4 0 
Three neutral Tuscaloosa News stories: "Both students…walked to their classes;""…to begin 
their work as students at the University of Alabama;" "under civil, not military, control." 
Photograph of Malone being walked to class by two white female students 
  2 0 80 0 Total front-page news items = 82 
      2.5% = Pro-desegregation 
25 editions (of 31 surveyed) with front-page news content = 80.65%  0.0% = Anti-desegregation 
      97.5% = Neutral 
Content Type Total Percentage    0.0% = Unclear 
News 65 79.27%     
Photographs 17 20.73%     
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Date/Page# 
Content 
Type 
Pro 
Desegregation 
Anti 
Desegregation Neutral Unclear Content (; denotes new item) 
05-16-1963 P.1 News: 1 0 0 1 0 
Story of unknown provenance: balanced, without bias, about two black federal employees 
applying for Huntsville graduate school: "mathematician", "analyst" 
06-09-1963 P.1 
News: 3; 
Photo: 1; 
Letter: 1 
1 0 4 0 
Three Neutral Crimson White stories - all focus on security, curfews. Photograph of secured 
road into campus; Pro-desegregation letter from William Faulkner 
06-13-1963 P.1 
News: 3; 
Photos: 6 
0 0 9 0 
Two stories about curfews; Other explains happenings of the day, with Hood praising the 
preparations made for his and Malone's arrival. Six photos of Wallace, National Guard general, 
crowd at door, helicopter over University of Alabama campus providing security. 
  1 0 14 0 Total front-page news items = 15 
      6.67% = Pro-desegregation 
3 editions (of 3 surveyed) with front-page news content = 100%  0.0% = Anti-desegregation 
      93.33% = Neutral 
Content Type Total Percentage    0.0% = Unclear 
News 7 46.67%     
Photographs 7 46.67%     
Other 1 6.67%     
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Date/Page# Content Type 
Pro 
Desegregation 
Anti 
Desegregation Neutral Unclear Content (; denotes new item) 
05-22-1963 P.10 Editorial: 2 1 0 0 1 
Pro-desegregation Birmingham News editorial: "It will reaffirm federal supremacy;" 
Other column unclear: Says Supreme Court is supreme, though expresses disdain 
for Kennedys. 
05-25-1963 P.4 
Editorial: 4; 
Cartoon: 1 
1 2 0 1 
Anti-desegregation editorials: "Federal juggernaut," "not many Negroes are brave or 
stupid enough to remain;" "we agree with the governor regarding race issues;" Pro-
desegregation editorial: "change is inevitable;" Unclear editorial is about maintaining 
rule of law; Anti-desegregation cartoon showing a "Federal Gov't" train barreling 
down the tracks 
05-26-1963 P.16 Column: 1 1 0 0 0 
Lengthy transcript of SACS accreditation problems at Ole Miss with clear implications 
for the University of Alabama 
05-27-1963 P.6 
Editorial: 1; 
Column: 1 
0 1 1 0 
Neutral Birmingham News editorial: praises preparations of university leaders; Anti-
desegregation wire column: A.G. Kennedy's Supreme Court brief "paves way for 
dictator" 
05-28-1963 P.16 Column: 1 1 0 0 0 
Pro-desegregation wire column: "current American predicament," "wisdom [of 
listening to the Supreme Court]" 
05-30-1963 P.12 
Editorial: 1; 
Column: 1; 
Letter: 1 
2 1 0 0 
Two pro-desegregation editorials: "[Wallace] presumably believes he has a 
mandate;""[Wallace] imperiled peace;" Anti-desegregation letter: "[Federal court] 
shows disdain for the Constitution," "trouble-makers like [The Birmingham News]" 
06-03-1963 P.16 
Editorial: 1; 
Letter: 5 
0 4 1 1 
Neutral BN editorial: Explains accreditation; Four anti-desegregation letters: "a vote 
in favor of communism;" "far greater crime and rioting in [DC];" "a serious problem 
[President Kennedy has created];" "violate our social order;" Unclear letter: refers to 
something unknown by the ressearcher 
06-04-1963 P.6 Editorial: 1 1 0 0 0 
Pro-desegregation BN editorial: "It is not necessary for [Wallace] to appear 
personally on campus to [make his stand]." 
06-05-1963 P.12 Editorial: 1 0 0 0 1 
Unclear BN editorial: comments on Vice President Johnson's speech, but unclear 
what they felt. 
06-06-1963 P.14 Editorial: 1 1 0 0 0 
"[Lynnne's] masterful legal summation," "supremacy of the federal judiciary," "[the 
stand] is against the U.S. and its judiciary," "dutiful Alabamians" 
06-07-1963 P.8 
Column: 1; 
Letter: 1 
0 1 0 1 
Unclear column: "Wallace exercising Constitutional right;" Anti-desegregation letter: 
"Our enemy is…the Communists who have used the Negro to further the Commie 
plan." 
06-08-1963 P.6 
Editorial: 11; 
Column: 1; 
Letter: 4 
2 5 1 8 
Mixture of editorials from around Alabama: Pro-desegregation: 2; Anti-
desegregation: 2; Unclear: 7; Neutral column: explains what happens if Wallace is 
arrested; Three anti-desegregation letters: accuses BN of being anti-Wallace; "liberal 
educators;" "King John," "moral decay;" One unclear letter. 
06-09-1963 P.16 
Editorial: 1; 
Cartoon: 1 
2 0 0 0 
Pro-desegregation editorial: "[University of Alabama Trustees] applied fine intellect, 
respect for law;" Pro-desegregation cartoon depicts ruin of mob violence. 
06-10-1963 P.14 Editorial: 1 1 0 0 0 
Pro-desegregation Wall Street Jounal editorial: "[Wallace] spoke feelingly of states' 
rights, not of states' responsibilities." 
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06-11-1963 P.16 
Editorial: 1; 
Letter: 4 
2 3 0 0 
Pro-desegregation editorial: "Are we indefinitely forever to have large numbers of 
Southerners believing that federal rulings are 'unconstitutional'?," "rulings 
are…thoughtful and sincere;" Anti-desegregation letters: "our colored people;" 
"usurpation of its rights," "Massa Jack's darkies;" "military dictatorship;" Pro-
desegregation letter: "risking peace and order at the university's door" 
06-12-1963 P.1 Editorial: 1 1 0 0 0 "[Wallace's] disrespect for federal court" 
06-12-1963 P.12 Editorial: 2 1 0 0 1 
Pro-desegregation column: "The confrontation has brought nothing not clearly 
established beforehand," "Conflict in this case of Tenth and Fourteenth 
Amendments;" Unclear editorial: "Trustees did not surrender power to Wallace as 
they did to Barnett at Ole Miss." 
  17 18 3 14 Total editorial items = 52 
      32.7% = Pro-desegregation 
17 editions (of 31 surveyed) with editorial content = 54.84%  34.6% = Anti-desegregation 
      5.8% = Neutral 
Content Type Total Percentage    26.9% = Unclear 
Editorials 29 55.76%     
Columns 6 11.54%     
Cartoons 2 3.85%     
Letters 15 28.85%     
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Date/Page# 
Content 
Type 
Pro 
Desegregation 
Anti 
Desegregation Neutral Unclear Content (; denotes new item) 
05-15-1963 P.1 Editorial: 1 1 0 0 0 
"Preserving order and preventing, in the likely event of some integration, any chaotic 
interruption" 
05-16-1963 P.1 Column: 1 1 0 0 0 "One of the Negroes is a mathematician and the other is an electrical engineer" 
05-19-1963 P.4 Letter: 1 0 1 0 0 
"We…are taking orders from Casto and Martin Luther King through the Kennedys," "to 
integrate is a step toward tearing down our churches, schools and homes" 
05-22-1963 P.4 Cartoon: 1 1 0 0 0 Cartoon lampooning Northern U.S. race relations and suburbia 
05-23-1963 P.1 Editorial: 1 1 0 0 0 Statement from Tuscaloosa leaders saying desegregation is the only way forward 
05-23-1963 P.4 Letter: 1 0 1 0 0 
"main spearhead drive of the liberals to destroy States Rights", "the cause of one-world 
integration" 
05-26-1963 P.4 Letter: 2 0 2 0 0 
"Who will save America here at home?;" "The greatest mistake of your fine career will 
be unleashing federal troops or marshals upon us." 
05-29-1963 P.4 Letter: 1 0 1 0 0 
"[The federal gov't] uses Gestapo-like tactics to force its will at bayonet point," "The 
Communists are masters in using uninformed people to help them accomplish their goal 
of world slavery." 
05-30-1963 P.4 
Column: 1; 
Letter: 1 
1 0 0 1 
Pro-desegregation syndicated Lippmann column: "They will not accept quietly an 
imposed inferiority in education," "this is a rather violent country;" Unclear letter: "Have 
you hired any Negroes on your staff…in the past nine years?" 
05-31-1963 P.4 Letter: 1 0 1 0 0 
"The federal gov't is pushing for a complete sweep of power…dictatorial power over the 
American people…Khrushchev and Castro are at the helm of this movement." 
06-02-1963 P.4 
Editorial: 1; 
Letter: 1 
1 1 0 0 
Editorial: "Abide by court rulings, no matter how repugnant…Our choice is between 
integrating peacefully and integration enforced by fed troops." Letter: "Forefathers," 
"Our nation is rapidly falling under a dictatorship every day that passes." 
06-04-1963 P.4 Editorial: 1 1 0 0 0 
"[Wallace carried himself] with proper dignity and restraint" on Meet The Press." "We 
disagree with [his] thinking, as a practical matter" 
06-05-1963 P.4 Editorial: 1 0 1 0 0 
Anti-segregation column from the Northwest Alabamian newspaper: "Federal 
juggernaut", "invaders" 
06-07-1963 P.4 Editorial: 1 1 0 0 0 
"Negro students will be registered," "valid court order," "[Stand is] foolish and 
unnecessary" 
06-08-1963 P.1 Editorial: 1 0 0 1 0 
Netural front-page editorial about not believing rumors. "It's good sense not to believe 
wild rumors." 
06-08-1963 P.4 Letter: 1 0 1 0 0 
"I think you are trying to create sensationalism in these matters rather than a simple 
statement of news." 
06-09-1963 P.4 Editorial: 1 0 0 1 0 
"There is hope in many hearts for peace - for acceptance of major change without one 
hand raised in anger." 
06-10-1963 P.4 Editorial: 1 0 0 1 0 "We, too, shall be trying to inform accurately, fully and properly." 
06-12-1963 P.4 Editorial: 1 1 0 0 0 
"Orders of a federal court must be carried out," "[Wallace] could have handled his 
responsibilities better." 
  9 9 3 1 Total editorial items = 22 
      40.9% = Pro-desegregation 
19 editions (of 31 surveyed) with editorial content = 61.3%  40.9% = Anti-desegregation 
      13.6% = Neutral 
Tuscaloosa News Editorial Page Content 
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Content Type Total Percentage    4.5% = Unclear 
Editorials 10 45.45%     
Columns 2 9.10%     
Cartoons 1 4.50%     
Letters 9 40.90%     
 
 
Figure 17 
Crimson White Editorial Page Content 
 
 
1
7
1
 
Date/Page# 
Content 
Type 
Pro 
Desegregation 
Anti 
Desegregation Neutral Unclear Content (; denotes new item) 
05-16-1963 P.4 Letter: 1 1 0 0 0 
"Is there really any difference? You tell me if it hurts to hate just as much as it hurts to be 
hated." 
06-09-1963 P.3 Editorial: 3 1 0 2 0 
Neutral editorial: "comply with the regulations;" Pro-desegregation editorial: "We are in 
favor of desegregation on moral grounds," "[Resistors are] breaking their own backs;" 
Neutral editorial about behind-the-scenes work to desegregate safely 
06-13-1963 P.4 
Editorial: 2; 
Letter: 2 
1 2 1 0 
Pro-desegregation editorial: "[Black students] are here to stay." Neutral editorial about 
effective state troopers. Anti-desegregation letter: "you favor integration with a race of 
savages;" "misguided Negroes" 
  3 2 3 0 Total editorial items = 8 
      37.5% = Pro-desegregation 
3 editions (of 3 surveyed) with editorial content = 100%  25% = Anti-desegregation 
      37.5% = Neutral 
Content Type Total Percentage    0% = Unclear 
Editorials 5 62.50%     
Columns 0 0.00%     
Cartoons 0 0.00%     
Letters 3 37.50%     
 
 
Figure 18 
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